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ABSTRACT
The dissertation presents an attempt to extend the capitalization debate
to the case of the decentralized--and often regulated--commercial land and
real estate market. It asks whether and to what extent variations across
centers in commercial land rents, space rents, and wages reflect locational
value, and thoroughly examines the role that local development restrictions
play in affecting the magnitude of these variations.
Previous work on capitalization has been inadequate in addressing these
issues. Assuming mobile households but immobile firms, early analyses
concluded that differences in amenity levels are perfectly capitalized by land
values, creating thus the misconception that only land prices are affected by
amenities. Subsequent analyses on the intercity or intracity level have
cleared up this fallacy by compellingly showing that, with both mobile
households and firms, not only land prices, but also wages have to some extent
capitalize locational value. Yet, these analyses are not explicitly spatial;
they do not fully account for the commercial land and real estate market; and
they do not explore capitalization effects in markets which are not
necessarily competitive.
Capitalization is theoretically examined here in the context of four
spatial models of a two-center, two-sector metropolis, fully incorporating
land and space consumption by firms. The first examines capitalization under
the assumption of perfectly competitive markets. The other three study
capitalization under conditions of a constrained supply of land and/or a
regulated commercial density. The analysis of these models clearly shows that
in a competitive land market, intercenter differences in production amenities
are mostly capitalized by labor wages (and land rents) rather than commercial
space rents. Once, however, development restrictions, either in the form of
zoning limits or density regulations, are introduced at the most advantageous
location, amenity differences are shifted toward higher space rent and lower
wage differences between centers.
This analysis has set the stage for appropriately studying
capitalization from the empirical perspective. Utilizing an extensive
database on. space rents, census data on housing prices and locational
advantages, as well as data on development controls in the greater Los Angeles
area, a number of empirical models have been developed. Their estimation
results confirm the presence of binding development controls in the greater
Los Angeles area and validate their hypothesized role in the amenity
capitalization process. In short, in the presence of land constraints,
density regulations or both, space rents are shown to capitalize more
locational value. In.addition, land and density constraints are found to
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significantly increase the positive effect of production amenities on floor
space rents.
Despite the simplifying assumptions of the theoretical models and the
deficiencies of the data employed in the empirical study, these analyses shed
considerable light to the process through which compensating price
differentials across centers are established in contemporary multinodal
metropolises. Most importantly, perhaps, they elucidate the role that
institutional rigidities, often characterizing the commercial land market,
play in this pricing and capitalization process.
Dissertation Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Associate Professor of Economics and Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
The dissertation extends the capitalization debate to the case of the
decentralized and often regulated commercial land and real estate market. It
asks whether and to what extent variations across commercial nodes in
commercial land rents, space rents, and wages capitalize locational value, and
thoroughly explores the role that local development restrictions play in
affecting the magnitude of these variations.
These issues are accentuated by the relative gap in the existing
capitalization literature and the need to better understand the mechanism
through which the seemingly large and systematic differences in commercial
land rents, space rents, and wages are established in today's decentralized
markets. The issue is important, as relative factor and market prices play a
significant role in the intrametropolitan distribution of jobs and,
consequently, the relative economic vitality of downtown and suburban
markets.
1. Capitalization and Pricing Issues
Since the early sixties American cities began to decentralize
increasingly. Fiscal and racial externalities have spurred the
suburbanization of higher income households [Bradford and Kelejian, 1973],
while the scarcity of centrally located land and the slow process of central
city redevelopment have encouraged the horizontal spread of older, more
densely developed metropolises [Wheaton, 1982].
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The rapid decentralization of households has greatly encouraged the
decentralization of jobs, which began to move rapidly out of central cities to
take advantage of large suburban concentrations of white collar labor or
cheaper land [Archer, 1981; Black, 1980; Erickson and Wasylenko, 1980; Mills,
1964; Moses, 1961; Steinnes, 1978; White, 1976; Wheaton, 1984; Struyk and
James, 1975]. As a result, metropolitan markets have increasingly begun to
exhibit a multinodal structure. Agglomeration advantages or external scale
economies, co-location benefits emanating out of the close interdependency of
firms, and other production amenities associated with better accessibility or
lower tax rates might have encouraged the concentration rather than the
dispersion of commercial development in suburban locations [Ogawa and Fujita,
1980].
Notably, the spatial "segmentation" of the commercial sector has been
accompanied by a price "segmentation" as well. Casual observations and
existing empirical studies alike have uncovered large and systematic
differences across commercial nodes in land prices, space rents [Clapp 1983;
Wheaton 1984], and labor wages [Eberts, 1981]. Such price variations across
locations raise the important question of the mechanism through which these
are generated and, most importantly, sustained in the market.
It has traditionally been assumed that the capitalization of local
amenities is in the heart of such price variations across space. Focusing on
markets where only demand forces are assumed to operate, the literature has
convincingly described intercenter variations in (residential) land prices and
wages as the result of the "dual" capitalization of differences in transport
costs or other amenities into both the residential and labor markets of urban
areas. Differences in transport costs within cities, for example, must
perfectly be capitalized by residential land prices [Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969;
Mills, 1972; Wheaton, 1974]; between cities of varying sizes, however, wages
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must also vary to compensate marginal workers for higher commuting [Moses,
1961; White, 1976; Roback, 1982; Blomquist et. al., 1988]. Emanating out of
the close interaction between the labor and residential land market, this
process is consistent with Rosen's [1974] "equalizing differences" hypothesis,
postulating that such variations are necessary to ensure that workers enjoy
equivalent welfare, irrespective of location. By compellingly establishing
this dual capitalization process, the literature cleared up the misconception
of partial equilibrium analyses (i.e., monocentric models) that only land
prices capitalize locational value, and gave credence to the argument that
urban locations must best be viewed as diverse-bundles of rents, wages, and
urban amenities.
While, however, the literature has altogether acknowledged the presence
of mobile households and the mechanism through which residential values are
determined, it has not fully considered the active presence of mobile firms in
the land market, the way they use land and consume space, and, most
importantly, the role they play in the capitalization process. As a result,
many closely related questions remain largely unaddressed. Just, how does the
capitalization of production amenities work in the commercial land market of
multinodal metropolises? How are variations across nodes in commercial land
and floor space rents determined? To what extent do such components of the
firm production costs as floor space rents or wages capitalize locational
value? What role do such institutional rigidities, as zoning limits or
density regulations, which invariably operate in the commercial land market,
play in the. capitalization process?
The lack of compelling answers to these questions may largely be
attributed to the lack of a sufficiently complete analytical framework within
which to examine how commercial land and real estate prices are determined and
how pricing in the commercial land market relates to pricing in the
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residential and labor markets to which this is so closely linked. Such a
framework is necessary to tie together the role that spatial differentiations
from both the demand (production amenities) and the supply side of commercial
land (development restrictions) play in the pricing process.
2. Objectives and Methodology
Against this background, the dissertation has two distinct, yet closely
interrelated, objectives. First, to provide a theory of how the
capitalization of production amenities works within the contemporary
multinodal metropolis, and illustrate how this eventually generates
compensating variations across centers in commercial rents and wages.
Second, to empirically analyze the pattern of commercial pricing within a
multinodal metropolitan area, in order to substantiate or contradict some of
the theory's implications.
1.1 The Theoretical and Modeling Approach
The general conceptual and methodological framework adopted in this
study originates in the traditional land market theory and the general
equilibrium principles underlying the new generation of multicentric city
models [i.e., Clapp, 1983]. Building on such past modeling efforts in the
field, four simplified models of the land market within a two-center
metropolis were developed to examine capitalization. The first models long
run equilibria in a competitive land market. The other three examine spatial
price equilibria under a constrained supply of land and/or a regulated
commercial density. Together, they help explicitly address the following
questions:
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[1] How do differences across centers in some exogenous
advantages to the firm affect pricing in the commercial land
market, the commercial property market, and the labor market of a
multinodal area? To what extent do variations in commercial land
rents, space rents, and wages capitalize differences in locational
value?
[2] How do local development restrictions, either in the form
of zoning limits or density regulations, affect commercial
pricing, and what role do they play in the capitalization process?
Summarized in a number of theoretical propositions and demonstrated
through a series of simulated examples, the answers to these questions shed
considerable light to the mechanism through which variations across centers in
commercial land and real estate prices are determined within multicentered
metropolises. Most importantly, perhaps, they elucidate the role that
institutional rigidities, often characterizing the commercial land market,
play in the capitalization process.
1.2 Empirical Modeling
The empirical analysis provides for direct tests of some of the
theoretical propositions and, hence, an indirect test of the empirical
validity of their underlying theory. Following a long run equilibrium
framework, the empirical study employs standard econometric techniques to
estimate and model differences in "effective" space rents across a number of
office-commercial nodes in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim SCSA (Standard
Consolidated Statistical Area). The models were explicitly designed to test
for the presence of development constraints in the greater Los Angeles area
and to analyze the role they play in the capitalization process.
As such, the models utilize an extensive database on space rents from
Coldwell banker and a.set of data on housing prices, locational advantages,
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and land and density restrictions across 33 nodes within the study area.
These data are not without limitations. Asking rents instead of contract
rents are available; building quality variables are insufficient; housing
price data are urban aggregates rather than more localized data; data on land
availability could be translated into dummy rather than numeric variables.
Yet, despite these data deficiencies, the empirical results seem to provide
considerable support to the relevant theoretical propositions.
3. Organization and Outline
The dissertation is organized into two major parts. Part 1 includes
chapters I through V, which cover the theoretical and modeling approach
employed to address the central questions of this dissertation.
Part 2, includes chapters VI through IX, which discuss the empirical work that
stemmed out of the theoretical analysis. A brief outline of the contents of
each is provided below.
3.1 PART 1. Rent and Wage Capitalization: A Theoretical Analysis
Chapter I, an introductory to the theoretical part, discusses the
implications of a number of intracity and intercity models with respect to
capitalization. It suggests that existing models do not fully account for the
commercial land and property markets and do not examine capitalization effects
in markets which are not necessarily competitive. Thus, it concludes, to
appropriately study capitalization in the decentralized commercial land and
real estate market, an explicitly spatial, nonmonocentric model must be
developed. This model, it suggests, must incorporate land and space
consumption by firms and provide for differences across centers in land supply
and development densities.
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Chapter II, then, builds on this conclusion to outline the general model
of a two-center, two-sector metropolis. It discusses in detail household and
firm equilibrium and analyzes the basic interactions between the city's
residential market, labor market, and the market for service output. The
analysis of the model establishes the positive response of residential land
rents and wages to changes in employment and reaffirms the "dual"
capitalization of intercenter differences in transport costs by both labor
wages and residential land rents. At this stage, however, this general model
is incomplete, in that it does not exactly specify how the commercial land and
real estate markets operate.
Chapter III, then, provides an analysis of four alternative models of
the commercial land market, especially designed to examine how the
capitalization process works in each: Model I, portraying a perfectly
competitive land market at both of the city's subcenters; Model II,
portraying a land market segmented by a binding zoning limit at one of the
city's subcenters; Model III, featuring a land market with regulated
commercial density; and Model IV introducing both a zoning limit and a
density regulation, combining thereby features from both Model II and
Model III. The examination of long run equilibria in these models shows that
in a competitive land market, wage differences are likely to capitalize the
bulk of any advantage difference to the firm. As, however, increasingly
binding zoning limits and/or density regulations are applied to the more
advantageous center, differences in floor space rents start capitalizing more
(and wage differences less) locational value.
Chapter IV presents a series of numerical simulated examples of each of
the four models discussed in the previous chapter. In addition to providing
considerable support to the theoretical propositions, the simulations shed
some light to the magnitude of space rent and wage capitalization. In
- 15 -
particular, they show that, under quite general conditions, restrictions must
be very restraining for space rents to capitalize the bulk of the locational
advantage to the firm, if only one of the two constraints is applied to the
commercial land market.
Finally, the concluding section of Part 1 summarizes the theoretical and
modeling approach and highlights the most important conclusions advanced in
the first four chapters of the dissertation. This sets the basis for the
discussion in Chapter V, which follows.
3.2 PART 2. Space Rent Capitalization: The Case of Greater Los Angeles
Chapter V is an introductory to the empirical part. It discusses the
most important empirical implications of the theory developed and critically
evaluates past empirical studies on intrametropolitan commercial pricing.
Concluding that existing empirical studies may be flawed for they do not fully
account for the supply side of the commercial land market, it proceeds with
outlining the present empirical study, which attempts to rectify the problems
characterizing prior empirical work.
Chapter VI describes the study area, identifies its broader commercial
submarkets, and discusses the selection of a number of commercial nodes within
their boundaries. Finally, it presents the selected subcenters' "average"
building attributes and asking rents to conclude that the former considerably
vary across centers; thus, it suggests, average rents cannot be used as the
basis for intercenter price comparisons.
Chapter VII builds on this conclusion to present alternative hedonic
models designed to estimate "effective" subcenter rents for a building of
constant "quality" and other attributes such as age, size, and height.
Projecting a somewhat.different picture of-rent differentials than what the
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"average" rents reflect, "effective" rents appear to significantly vary across
centers, setting thus the stage for the analysis that follows.
Chapter VIII, then, draws from the conclusions of the theoretical part
to statistically analyze this pattern of "effective" rents in order to address
the relevant theoretical propositions. To test for the presence of binding
development restrictions and investigate the role they play in the
capitalization process, a number of linear and nonlinear statistical model
specifications are presented, and the data employed to estimate them are
discussed. The econometric estimation of these models confirms the presence
of development constraints and validates their -hypothesized role in the
capitalization process.
Part 2's concluding section briefly summarizes the methodology and
highlights the main conclusions of the empirical work presented in the last
four chapters of the dissertation.
Finally, the concluding chapter of the dissertation provides a brief
overview of the theoretical and empirical analysis and discusses extensions
and refinements of the theoretical and empirical models that these analyses
have utilized.
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PART I
RENT AND WAGE CAPITALIZATION:
THEORY AND MODELING
Chapter I.
RENT AND WAGE CAPITALIZATION
IN THE LITERATURE
With its direct implications for urban pricing, amenity capitalization
has been a central focus for academic research in the field of urban economics
and other related strands of economic analysis. Price differences across
space in this literature are often viewed as equalizing differences for the
different attributes or amenities/disamenities (advantages/disadvantages) that
different urban locations embody. This hedonic "hypothesis" underlies both
the simple intracity location and spatial pricing models, a number of more
elaborate intercity models, and, to a certain extent, the newly developed
multicentric city models. This chapter reviews in detail the theoretical
advances to date with respect to the amenity capitalization issue.
1. Land and Space Rent Capitalization: Intracity Models
1.1 Standard Monocentric Models
Capitalization effects within single, monocentric and well defined urban
areas were first examined in the context of the traditional land market models
of Alonso [1960], Muth [1969], Mills [1972] and Wheaton [1974]. Notably,
these theoretical models are based on the a priori assumption that households
are mobile, but that employment i-s exogenous and firms are immobile.
Concentrated in the city's spaceless central business district, the latter are
not supposed to consume land or face any intracity location choices. Thus,
- 19 -
such and similar analyses of the land market have ignored the firm equilibrium
and have solely been confined to the examination of household equilibrium and
the way residential land prices vary with locational amenities across space.
The amenity originally considered was access, as represented by the
distance of residential locations from the area's single employment center and
the transport costs involved. As all models clearly demonstrate, residential
land values do perfectly capitalize variations across space in transport
costs. Obviously, differences in land prices represent the compensating
variation which makes less or more attractive sites provide urban land
consumers with the same level of utility.
Subsequently, these standard monocentric models, focusing on one-
dimensional distance gradients, were extended to include other amenities also
defined by their distance from the city center. The case of air quality is,
perhaps, the most representative in this class of models [i.e., Stull, 1974;
Henderson, 1985]. Henderson [1985], for example, assumes air quality to
worsen with smaller distance from the city center, the site of pollution.
Assuming that the rate at which this disamenity declines with distance from
the city center may well exceed the effects of change in accessibility, he
suggests that a positive land rent gradient may be established in the city.
In somewhat more complex adaptations of the monocentric model, urban
space is characterized by a vector of amenities or neighborhood attributes
[Polinsky and Shavell, 1976]. In these location models, household equilibrium
still requires that the price of land be computed as the compensatory
variation necessary to ensure that household utilities remain spatially
invariable.
Polinsky and Shavell [1976] caution to a potential application problem
arising when household utilities are assumed to be endogenously rather than
exogenously determined. The former assumption is adopted by "closed" city
- 20 -
models, portraying cities where in-migration from, or out-migration toward, a
larger urban area is limited. The latter assumption is adopted by "open" city
models, in which the city is assumed to be a part of a larger urban area
throughout which households are perfectly mobile.
As Polinsky and Shavell note, the validity of cross-section results to
predict property value adjustments in response to changes in amenity schedules
depends on this assumed degree of mobility. In the small open model, the
results of cross-section analyses may unquestionably be used to predict
changes in residential rent schedules. In closed city models, however, the
use of these results to predict property value changes is debatable, for
property values at any location depend on the distribution of amenities
throughout the city. The clear implication is that a general equilibrium
model is needed to derive the overall pattern of intracity property values
and suggest appropriate statistical models for empirical verification.
These simple models, mostly stressing the effect of accessibility, have
stimulated a number of empirical studies which have substantiated to some
extent the assertion that access (among other factors) is a locational amenity
or, equivalently, an attribute that is valued positively by urban land
consumers [Kain, 1964]. Studies of property values, however, tend to conclude
that, in general, the effect of accessibility is weak compared to the effect
of structural, qualitative and other locational characteristics of housing
[Quigley, 1979].
1.2 Hedonic Models of Urban Markets
The recognition of the differentiated character or heterogeneity of
built capital, its locational fixity, and its.durability (at least in the
short run) led to the development of the alternative but equivalent discrete
- 21 -
choice [Sweeney, 1974; Quigley, 1976] and bid-rent approaches [Wheaton, 1977].
Models based on such approaches have quite often been employed to establish or
evaluate "amenity" effects in property markets. Although these were first
developed to facilitate empirical applications in the residential property
market, they can readily be applied to the analysis of any other hedonic
market, such as the market for office space [Clapp, 1981; Wheaton, 1984].
According to the conventional hedonic approach, households or firms are
assumed to have a utility function, which depends on the location and
qualitative features of housing or office space. Suppliers provide different
buildings in different locations to suit tenants in a profit maximizing
fashion. Housing consumers or office tenants compare rents with attributes
and seek the best location. According to the bid-rent version of the model,
rather than taking prices as given, consumers of housing or office space
establish bids for units, characterized by an array of attributes- related to
locational or structural unit characteristics. Ultimately, units are occupied
by those households or office tenants offering the highest bid.
The two conceptual approaches are equivalent; in equilibrium, rents
should always be positively related to desirable attributes, in a way that
yields equal utility to housing consumers or office tenants and equal profits
to the suppliers of housing or office space [Wheaton, 1977].
Once again, analyses based on such approaches [Quigley, 1976; Wheaton,
1977] suggested that intraurban differences in such amenities as access,
crime, school quality, or quality of environment do influence residential
location and residential land and property values. Most importantly,
applications in the case of office markets, such as Clapp's [1983] or
Wheaton's [1984], have uncovered the importance of a number of locational
attributes, such as access to labor and other accessibility advantages related
to highway systems, in influencing nonresidential location and pricing. At
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the same time, however, Wheaton's [1984] empirical study rejected the
hypothesis that variations across Boston's communities in effective tax rates
significantly influence variations across space in commercial space rents.'
1.3 Interjurisdictional Models in the Local Public Finance Literature
The realization that amenity packages, including tax rates and public
services, widely vary across jurisdictions extended the amenity capitalization
debate into the realm of public finance [Oates, 1969; Edel and Sclar, 1974;
Hamilton, 1975; Yinger, 1982]. Yinger's [1982] is perhaps the most refined of
these analyses. Arguing that past analyses are incomplete because they do not
fully account for the markets for housing and local services, Yinger draws
from the Tiebout literature to examine the household location decision and
resident voting in an urban area with diverse local governments. He shows
that capitalization is a feature of a long run equilibrium; perfect
capitalization of amenity differences between jurisdictions by land prices, he
suggests, should occur and be sustained in the long run [Yinger, 1982]. He
disqualifies previous arguments [i.e., Edel and Sclar, 1974; Hamilton, 1975]
that capitalization can be eliminated through supply responses because, he
argues, nonfiscal variables do impact housing prices. Thus, if consumers have
preferences over the goods produced by local governments and if mobility is
sufficiently high, property values should be expected to be higher in
communities with more attractive packages of public goods. 2'
' These studies are in some more detail reviewed in Part 2 (Chapter V)
of this dissertation.
2/ Pogodzinski [1988] argues that Yinger's proposition is misdirected,
because complete capitalization occurs regardless of the presence or the absence
of amenities.
- 23 -
2. "Dual" Capitalization: Intercity Models
The models above implicitly assume that location decisions take place
within a single city or metropolitan area. The recognition that households
and urban firms are free to choose among alternative locations not only within
but also between cities or metropolitan areas has complicated the
capitalization question and the way analysts should go about addressing it.
Equilibrium within a system of cities now involves at least two basic
factor markets--the market for urban land and the labor market. The
capitalization question now is which factor market capitalizes variations in
amenity values and, if both do, what the relative capitalization magnitudes
are. Rosen [1979], Henderson [1982], Roback [1982] and Blomquist et. al.
[1988] have all developed simple models to address these newly emerged
questions. Mostly, their analyses focused on the issue of how amenity
differences between cities or metropolitan areas are capitalized by interarea
differences in labor wages and/or residential land prices. Although these
analyses considerably improved the way analysts have been thinking about
capitalization, their modeling approaches often appear to be somewhat
problematic.
In examining equilibrium in the labor market without, however, fully
accounting for the demand for labor, Henderson [1982] has shown that
interurban variations in labor wages must capitalize to some extent
differences in amenity levels or cost of living. Rosen [1979], Roback [1982]
and Blomquist at. al. [1988], on the other hand, have examined in detail
equilibrium not only in the labor, but also in the (residential) land market.
They concluded that intercity differences in amenity levels must be
capitalized into both the land and the labor market of urban areas. The clear
implication here is that land prices and wages alike have to vary between
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cities or metropolitan areas so that workers/households enjoy equivalent
welfare and firms produce at equal costs across space. Analyses of such
equilibria justified Rosen's [1974] contention that urban locations must best
be viewed as tied bundles of rents, wages, and spatial amenities. Most
importantly, perhaps, these analyses have largely proven that the conventional
wisdom that only land prices are affected by local amenities may be quite
misleading [Roback, 1982].
Roback's model has gone beyond this general conclusion to look at the
decomposition of amenity values into land rents and wages. Her conclusions
can best be illustrated by Figure 1-1. The upward slopping lines represent
wage and land rent combinations equalizing household utilities at given
amenity levels. The downward slopping lines are those wage and land rent
combinations that equalize unit production costs, again at given values of the
amenity. In Figure I-1, it is assumed that Region 1 is more amenable both to
households and firms. In this case, Region 1 will have higher land rents but
not necessarily higher wages than Region 2. It can easily be inferred that if
Region 1 is more amenable to households but less amenable to firms than
Region 2, then Region 1 will have lower wages but not necessarily lower land
rents than Region 2.
Roback's model [1982] refined Henderson's [19821 analysis by fully
accounting for the demand for labor. Yet firms in her model still consume
land and not space and, unlike Henderson's model, amenities, commuting costs
and, consequently, land prices are not allowed to vary within urban areas.
The Blomquist et. al. [1988] model presents an improvement over the Roback
model in that it allows amenities to vary both within and across urban areas.
Similarly to what happens between. urban areas, Blomquist et. al. suggested,
for a complete equilibrium in the residential and labor markets, amenity
differences across locations (counties) within metropolitan areas must be
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FIGURE I-1:
The Roback Hodel
capitalized by both residential land rents and labor wages.
These and similar analyses have given rise to a number of applied
econometric studies uncovering significant variations in real wages and
residential rents between urban counties or metropolitan areas [Hoch, 1974;
Israeli, 1977; Rosen, 1979; Henderson, 1982; Blomquist et. al., 1988]. Such
differences are mostly accounted for by differences in such amenities or
disamenities as air quality, climate, crime, and, to a smaller extent, quality
of schools and education. Most recently, Gyourko and Tracy [forthcoming] have
empirically demonstrated the role that variations across cities in local
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fiscal conditions play in creating compensating wage differences across urban
areas.
3. Spatial Multicentric Models
The models just reviewed share a number of common deficiencies that
render them inappropriate to be used as analytical tools for thoroughly
addressing the questions posed in this dissertation. They do not fully
account for mobile firms which consume land and use space, they do not explore
capitalization effects in markets which are not necessarily competitive, and,
most importantly, they do not reflect the multinodal structure of the modern
metropolis.
The new generation of multicentric models, on the other hand, reflect
irrefutably the spatial structure of the contemporary city [White, 1976;
Sullivan, 1986; Wieand, 1987; Papageorgiou and Casetti, 1971; Hartwick and
Hartwick, 1974; Romanos, 1977; Clapp, 1983; Capoza, 1971; Ogawa and Fujita,
1979]. Yet, although explicitly designed to address multicentricity
phenomena, this new generation of urban models have not appropriately been
expanded to deal explicitly with capitalization and commercial pricing issues
within decentralized metropolises [Stahl, 1987].
On the demand side, these models have examined the decentralization
phenomenon and the resultant urban spatial structure. Their focus and
modeling structures may often differ, but the "dual" capitalization of
transport cost differentials into both the residential land and the urban
labor market is a common feature of their derived equilibria."
S In one of the first of such modeling efforts, White [1976] developed
a simple model to analyze the long run equilibrium adjustments associated with
the transition from a monocentric to a two-center city. Her analysis focuses
principally on manufacturing firms dependent heavily on export terminals and
(continued...)
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Multicentric Models:
FIGURE 1-2:
"Dual" Capitalization of Transport Costs
Land
Rents
To Ti T2 T3 T,,
Center 1 Center 2 Dsac
This "dual" capitalization can best be illustrated using Figure I-2.
Center 1 is the central business district, while Center 2 represents a small
employment center developed around a suburban transport node. The residential
land rents paid by Center 1 workers should still capitalize differences in
.( . .... cont.inued)
often facing labor scarcity problems. More recently, Sullivan [ 1986] and Wieand
[ 1987 ] have developed similar, but more elaborate models of a circular two-center
city. Sullivan [1986] has introduced a three-sector economy with households,
office activity, and industrial production in an open city. Weiand [1987]
developed a more elaborate closed model to analyze not only the long run but also
the short run equilibrium adjustments that firm decentralization brings about in
urban areas.- To this end, he used a two-period planning horizon and fully
accounted for the intertemporal behavior of the suppliers of office and
industrial space.
Papageorgiou and Casetti [1971], Hartwick and Hartwick [1974], Romanos
[1977], and Clapp [1983], on the other hand, have constructed more general
multicentric models with more than two centers present in urban areas, but with
the location of these centers being exogenously determined. Capozza [1971],
Ogawa and Fujita [1979], as well as others, have further generalized such
nonmonocentric models, by abandoning the assumption of a prespecif ied number and
location of urban subcenters. In their models the number and location of centers
are endogenously derived. In particular, Ogawa and Fujita [1979] have examined
how different types of nonmonocentric cities may be formed on the basis of
different locational and linkage requirements by the office firms. Interestingly
enough, they concluded that if the bid rent gradient of firms is as steep as the
bid rent gradient of -households, it is quite possible that urban firms be as
dispersed in the city as households are.
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commuting costs, as the simple monocentric model would require. For the
marginal workers at T,, however, who commute different distances but have
identical land expenses, wages between centers must also vary to provide them
with equivalent welfare. This wage variation, on the other hand, must be
accompanied by a land rent variation between centers as well. Center 1 is
bigger and, as such, it must in equilibrium have higher residential land rents
at its borders than Center 2.
On the supply side, and similarly to the intercity models just reviewed,
these models have assumed a perfectly elastic supply of commercial land. As
such, they can be used to explain commercial or firm pricing patterns only if
perfectly competitive market conditions are assumed. More specifically, they
can explain intrametropolitan nonresidential rent differentials only to the
extent that it can safely be assumed that nonresidential land rents equal
their neighboring residential land rents and space rents are positively
related to housing prices; and they can explain nonresidential space rent
differentials, only to the extent that these move in a parallel fashion with
land rent differentials. This may hardly be the case if restrictions on
nonresidential development are present in urban areas. 4 '
Assuming an open city model, Sullivan [1986] made the first attempt to
evaluate the general equilibrium adjustments necessitated by the imposition of
FAR (Floor Area Ratio) restrictions on the central business district of a
4' Most of the interest in and research on development constraints has been
directed toward its distributional and price effects [see Ohls et. al., 1974;
White, 1975; Grieson and White, 1981; Elliot, 1981; Rosen and Katz, 1981; Mark
and Goldberg, 1986; Sherman-Rolleston, 1987; Rose, 1989]. Analysts have studied
its effects on urban land and property markets, in general, to conclude that land
use zoning inflates land and property prices and that density zoning distorts
similarly property markets. However, the effects of zoning have not yet been
studied in the context of a general equilibrium model, involving both households
and firms. Given its documented effects on land and property pricing, it can be
very well hypothesized that zoning must play a major role in the amenity
capitalization process.
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circular city. In his model, he introduced a three-sector economy with
households, office activity and industrial production. Office activity,
however, was assumed to be exclusively concentrated in the central business
district, while manufacturing activity was assumed to exclusively -take place
in a suburban subcenter. Hence, the model did not exactly deal with a single
decentralized activity and its intracity distribution as dictated by the
government-imposed density regulation.
4. The Capitalization Literature: Concluding Remarks
Obviously, most of the interest in and research on capitalization has
been directed toward the residential land market, with the commercial land and
property markets receiving only a marginal, if any, attention. Within this
context, the literature has well established the capitalization of transport
costs and other amenities across space within monocentric cities, the "dual"
capitalization of amenity differences by both residential land rents and labor
wages within a system of cities, and the "dual" capitalization of transport
costs by both residential land rents and labor wages across centers within
multinodal metropolises.
What seems, however, to be missing from this literature is a much more
thorough look at the capitalization process, which takes into account the way
commercial land markets operate and linked to the residential and labor
markets of urban areas. To study capitalization in such a context, an
explicitly spatial model, incorporating land and space consumption by firms
and allowing for a variety of supply conditions in the commercial land market,
must be developed.
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Chapters II, III, and IV discuss in detail and Appendix I summarizes
such a model, especially designed to thoroughly address capitalization issues
within multicentric metropolises.
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Chapter II.
A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF A TWO-CENTER,
TWO-SECTOR CITY
To set the basis for analyzing capitalization within nonmonocentric city
settings, a simple theoretical model of a two-center, two-sector metropolis,
fully incorporating land and space consumption by firms was developed.
Similarly to its monocentric counterparts [i.e., Muth, 1969; Mills, 1972;
Wheaton, 1974], the model provides a static rather than a dynamic theory
[Wheaton, 1982, 1983] and a theory of long run rather than short run
adjustments in the market [Sullivan, 1986; see note 3].
Being an analytic or explanatory [Wheaton, 1979] rather than a policy-
oriented model [Lowry, 1965; Ingram, 1979; Kain, 1987], its underlying
objective is not to replicate a realistic city, but to provide an easily
comprehensible and analytically tractable framework within which to address
the issue(s) at hand. As such, the model simplifies behavioral relationships
and ignores a number of real world complexities, which, at the same time, are
sources of analytical inconveniences: the presence of a variety of household
and firm types within urban areas; the variety of trips made toward employment
districts; the presence of agglomeration economies or external economies of
scale in production; the locational interdependency of firms and the presence
of a variety of externality effects in the urban land market.'
s' The extent to which the relaxation of some of these and other more
specific assumptions is likely to affect the theoretical conclusions is discussed
in the concluding sect-ion of the dissertation, which explores avenues for future
research.
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Yet, despite its simplifying assumptions, the model sheds considerable
light to the way the capitalization of production amenities works and to the
magnitude of the compensating variations across centers in commercial rents
and wages it eventually produces. This chapter describes the two-center city
featured in the general model, discusses household and firm equilibrium in the
city's residential and commercial sectors, and highlights the basic
interactions between the output market, the labor market, and the market for
residential land.
1. The General Model
The model features a simplified, linear city of a unit's distance width,
built on a homogeneous plain (Figure II-1). The city's land is allocated to
Nh identical, one-worker households and two commercial centers--Center 1 and
Center 2--developed at prespecified locations, with a fixed distance S from
each other's edges.' The two centers are specialized in the production of
service output, which is sold outside the city. In equilibrium, they are
assumed to employ fully the city's labor force.
In the absence of cross commuting, the labor demanded for production in
each subcenter is provided by those households located in each subcenter's
labor market area.' Firms, then, located at Center 1 draw their workers from
that subcenter's adjoining residential areas spanning from T. to T, and from T2
to T,. Similarly, firms located at Center 2 draw their workers from
'' The assumption of a fixed distance between the two subcenter's edges
(rather than between the two subcenter's midpoints) reduces the number of
nonlinear equations and hence facilitates the derivation of numerical solutions
to the model (see Chapter IV).
7' The conditions under which cross commuting patterns may prevail are
incorporated in the discussion of Model II in Chapter III.
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FIGURE II-1
A Simplified Two-Center City
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their neighboring residential areas, spanning from T, to T4 and from T. to T,.
Workers are assumed to commute daily toward their respective employment
locations. Intracenter commuting, however, is ignored, so that the distance
traveled by the workers does not include any commuting beyond the edges of the
two commercial sites.
A general long run equilibrium in the city requires that its residential
land market, labor market, and commercial land and property markets be cleared
simultaneously through appropriate rent and wage adjustments. The number of
households (Nh) and their consumption characteristics, the production
characteristics of firms, and the base wage in Center 2 (W2) are given
exogenously. The city's residential land rents (P,(T)), the two subcenters'
commercial land rents (RL,), those subcenters' floor space rents (R,), and
Center 1's labor wages (W,) are determined by the model. Household and firm
equilibrium in the city's various markets is in detail discussed below.
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2. The Residential Sector
In such a simplified model, the city's Nh identical households derive
utility from the consumption of land (q) and other nonland goods (X) bought at
a unit price. To facilitate the analysis, these households are assumed to
consume the same amount of land across locations. Their underlying economic
objective, then, is to choose their other, nonland consumption in a way that
will maximize their utility, U(X,q), subject to their budget constraint.
Assuming for simplicity that those households' wage earnings are their only
source of income, demand for nonland goods can be expressed as:
X = WI-PI(T)q-kT >0 (1I.1)
where:
W,: households' yearly wage earnings at employment center i;
P,(T): yearly rental expenses on residential land per unit of this land;
k: yearly transport costs per unit T, the distance traveled by the
workers.
The households' nonland demands, as well as the city's residential land
rents and subcenter wages that determine these demands, must comply with a
number of equilibrium conditions in the urban residential market. Free
competition between the city's residential land and its neighboring rural
locations ensures first that the annual land rents that those households
located at the city's outer borders pay (P,(T 0 ), P2(T6)) be equal to the annual
rent that the rural land commands (P,). Assuming for simplicity equal
agricultural rents at both of the city's outer borders, the following
condition(s) must hold:
P1 (TO) = P2 (T 6 ) = PA (11.2)
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In the long run, the residential land rents (P,(T)) prevailing within
these borders should adjust in a way that the city's identical households
achieve the same level of welfare, independently of where they locate or where
they are employed. Otherwise, utility maximizing consumers would have an
incentive to move to a higher utility location, and equilibrium would be
disrupted. Given the households' fixed land consumption across locations, the
equal utility condition clearly requires that households also consume the same
amount of nonland goods across space. Given the nonland consumption
expression in (II.1) and condition (11.2) above, two sets of equilibrium
conditions are then derived.
The first set of these conditions require that the pattern of
residential land rents across a subcenter's supporting residential area
reflect fully the transport cost differentials of workers employed at that
subcenter. This is signified in the following relationships, derived by
applying the equal nonland consumption condition first to workers employed at
C1 and located at T0, T2, and T3 , and then to workers employed at C2 and located
at T, T4, and T.:
P,(TI) = PI(T 2)
P,(T,)q = PA q+kt,
P, (T2)q = PI(T,)q+kt3  (11.3)
P2 (T4) = P2(TS)
P2(T4)q = P2 (T3 )q+kt 4
P2 (T,)q = Pq+kt, (11.4)
The tn are defined as in Figure II-1. P*(T,) in (11.3) and P2 (T,) in
(II.4) denote the residential land rents that households employed at Center 1
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and Center 2, respectively, and located in the city's middle border (T,) pay.
To ensure the stability of this border and the continuity of development in
the city's inner residential zone, the following complementary condition(s)
must hold:
PI(T) = P2 (T3 ) 2 PA (11.5)
A second set of equilibrium conditions require that the wage differences
between the city's two commercial subcenters reflect fully the transport cost
differentials of the more distant households employed in each of these
subcenters. Alternatively, this requires that wage differences between
centers reflect fully differences in the land expenses of those households
located at the two subcenters' edges. These conditions are signified in the
following relationships, derived by applying the equal nonland consumption
condition first to workers located at T. and employed at Center 1 and
Center 2, and then to workers located at T., T6, or T1 , T4 and employed at
Center 1 and Center 2, respectively:
WI-W 2 = k(t3 -t4 ) (11.6)
WI-W 2 = k(t,-t6) (11.7)
Wi-W 2=[Pi(T 2)-P2(T,)]q (11.8)
Finally, for the urban consumers and the residential market to achieve
their long run equilibrium, the city's residential land rents should adjust in
a way that the households' land demands in each residential zone be equal to
the supply of this land (Figure II-1). Given the city's unitary width and the
households' fixed land consumption across space, the following relationships
must then in the long run hold:
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11T4  t4  1 T6  t6Nh3 = - TdT = -- ; Nh 4 = j TdT =-; (II. 10)
q , q q T, q
where:
Nh,+Nh 2+Nh +Nh4 = Nh. (I1.11)
3. The Commercial Sector
The city's firms participate in four closely linked submarkets: the
market for service output and the labor, property and land markets, which
provide direct (labor, floor space) and indirect (commercial land) inputs for
the production of service output. The market for commercial capital, assumed
to be abundant and mobile, is a national market and, as such, exogenous to
this model.
3.1 The Market for Service Output
Service output is marketed nationally in a perfectly competitive market.
Such services in the two commercial subcenters are produced through a simple,
constant returns production process involving the use of fixed proportions of
labor (N) and floor space (Qs,) to firm output. In such a case, then:
Qs1  as
(II.12)
N1 an
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where as and an denote the fixed floor space and labor demanded per unit of
the service output produced. The total production costs at each alternative
site are then the sum of labor wages, floor space rents, and some other
production costs, assumed to be exogenously determined. Such exogenously
determined costs may be transport costs related to highway accessibility, or
tax payments and other costs related to the use of local public services. In
a long run equilibrium in the city's output market the total production costs
per worker employed should be equal across the city's alternative commercial
locations. Otherwise, cost minimizing employers would have a incentive to
move to the least cost location, and a disequilibrium situation would prevail.
Therefore:
Qs1  Qs2
W,+R 1 - +CE, = W2+R---+CE2  (11.13)
Ni N2
where:
W1 : wage level at employment center i;
R, : equilibrium rents per unit of floor space at center i;
CE1 : exogenous production costs per worker at center i;
Qs, : floor space demand at center i;
N1 : labor demand at employment center i.
3.2 The Labor Market
The service market's labor basis consists of the city's Nh identical,
one-worker households. In a long run equilibrium in each subcenter's and the
city's labor market, the labor demanded for the production of service output
at each subcenter should equal the number of households located in each
subcenter's labor market area. Likewise, the total labor demanded in the city
should equal the city's total number of households. Assuming a normal
location pattern without cross commuting on the part of workers employed in
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either of the city's subcenters and given the configuration of the two-center
city pictured in Figure II-1, the following conditions must hold:
N1 = Nh1+Nh 2 =(t+t 3 )/q (11.14)
N2 = Nh,+Nh 4=(t,+t,) /q (11.15)
N1+N2 = Nh =(t+S+t6 )/q (11.16)
where:
N, :labor demand at center i;
Nhn:number of households located in each of the city's residential
zones;
t, :distances between the center's edges and residential borders;
S :linear distance between the two subcenters' inner edges;
q :household land consumption.
3.3 The Commercial Property Market
Each subcenter's property market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
In such a market, the floor space needed for the production of service output
is produced according to a simple, constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas
function. In such a case, then:
Qsi=K bL l-; O<b<l (11.17)
where:
K,: the capital demanded at center i;
L,: the commercial land demanded at center i.
Given the competitive market conditions under which this space is
produced, long run profits (1T) should be spatially invariable and equal to
zero. Therefore:
- 40 -
'n = RQs,-RLL,-rK,=0,
R1 = [RL,L,+rK /Qs,, (II.18)
where:
R1 : annual equilibrium rents per unit of floor space at center i;
RL,: annual commercial land rents per unit of land at center i;
r : the exogenously determined, annual rental cost of capital.
Cost minimization yields the demand functions for capital and land
(11.19) and (11.20), respectively. Incorporating these demand functions into
the zero profit condition (11.18) yields the long run rental cost for floor
space (11.21):
1-b
as bRL1
K,=- N
an (1-b)r
b
as (1-b)rL, =- N b
an bRL,
RI=CORLI 1-b
CO=rbbb( 1-b)b1l
(II.19)
(11.20)
(11.21)
3.4 The Commercial Land Market
Each subcenter's commercial land market is assumed to be homogeneous.
In the absence of intracenter differentiations, the firms' rent for commercial
land (RL,) and, consequently, commercial space- rents (R,) should not vary
within each center (Figure II-1). In the long run, commercial land rents
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or:
where:
(RL,) should be such so that the land demanded (L,) for production at each
subcenter equals its supply. Given the city's unitary width, the following
conditions must then hold in equilibrium:
L,= t2  (11.22)
L2 =t, (11.23)
4. Market Interactions
The equilibrium conditions discussed so far establish some basic
relationships among the output market, the labor market, and the market for
residential land. Taken together, equilibrium conditions (II.14)-(II.16)
clearly require that a higher demand for labor by either of the city's
subcenters be associated with a larger residential area supporting that center
and higher commuting costs for its most distant worker. In turn, as (11.3)
and (11.4) indicate, such higher commuting costs should always result in
greater residential land rents at that subcenter's edges and, as evident from
(11.6) and (11.7), higher relative labor wages.
These effects are formally derived by solving equations (II.14)-(II.16)
and (II.6)-(II.7) for t1, t3, W, each as a function of NI, and t4, t, each as a
function of N2:
Ni Nh S Ni Nh S
t = q -+--- ; t- = q
2 4 2q 2 4 2q
N 2 Nh S .N2 Nh S
t, = q -- -- 4 ; t, = q 4 -- ;
2 4 2q 2 4 2q
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kq Nh
W1 = W2+-(N 1-N 2 ) = W2+kg N,-- (11.24)
2 2
Using then (11.24) together with (II.3)-(II.4), the response of the two
subcenter's adjoining residential land rents and Center 1's labor wages to
changes in center employment can be derived:
k ka PA +-t 1_ a PEA+-t 6
q qap1 (T2) k 8P2(T4) k )W1
->0 ;== ->0; - = kq>0
8N1 N, 2 8N2 N2  2 aN,
(11.25)
Furthermore, given the city's fixed workforce in (11.16), the greater
Center 1's (Center 2's) employment, the smaller the employment at Center 2
(Center 1). It can then be argued that the greater the labor size
differential between the two subcenters, the greater the differential between
the residential land rents at those subcenters' edges, and the greater their
wage differential will be. These effects are signified in (11.26) below:
a(P,(T 2)-P2(T4)) k a(N,-N 2) k a(W,-W 2) kq a(NI-N 2) kq
=_=_>_ - = ->0>0
a(NI-N 2 ) 2 8(N,-N 2) 2 8(Ni-N 2) 2 a(N,-N 2 ) 2
(11.26)
The equilibrium conditions, then, discussed in this chapter establish
some basic relationships among labor size, labor wages, and residential land
rents. They are clearly insufficient, however, for completely determining the
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equilibrium pattern of commercial land and space rents across the city's
subcenters.
To determine a complete spatial equilibrium in the city, the model must
incorporate the factor demand functions in the commercial property market and
must specify the exact relationship between each subcenter's commercial and
adjoining residential land. Such specifications, however, depend on how the
commercial land and property markets operate. For this reason they are
incorporated in the discussion of Chapter III, where a number of alternative
land market specifications are adopted to complete the model and, at the same
time, address the central questions of the dissertation.
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Chapter III.
ALTERNATIVE LAND MARKETS
Four alternative models of the commercial land market are discussed in
this chapter to address the central questions of the dissertation: how the
capitalization of production amenities works within multinodal metropolises,
and what role local development constraints play in this process.
Model I portrays a perfectly competitive land market, with equal
commercial and residential land rents at both subcenters' edges. In Model II,
binding land constraints are introduced at Center 1, creating thereby a
segmented land market and unequal residential and commercial land rents at the
constrained center's edges. In Model III, a density regulation in the form of
a limit on Center l's capital/land ratio is assumed, creating thus a regulated
and, hence, an inefficient commercial land market. Model IV, introducing both
land constraints and a density regulation at Center 1, features a commercial
land market constricted by development moratoria.
In each of these models, firms and households choose between centers on
the basis of the intercenter distribution of amenities, but in the light of
institutional rigidities in the commercial land market their choice may not be
unrestricted. In the absence of other differentiations between centers,
development restrictions interact closely with production amenities to
determine the pattern of firm location and spatial price equilibria in the
city. In examining these derived equilibria,.inferences are made with respect
to the relative impact of production amenities on the resultant pattern of
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intercenter rent and wage differences and, whenever applicable, the exact role
that development restrictions play in influencing the capitalization process.
1. Model I: A Competitive Land Market
Model I features a two-center city with perfectly competitive,
nonsegmented and nonregulated land market, where households and firms freely
bid for a share of the city's land. This unconstrained competitiveness of the
land market is signified in the following relationships, suggesting that
neighboring commercial and residential rents be equal at the subcenters'
edges:
RLI = P1 (T,) = Pj(T 2) (III.1)
RL2 = P2 (T 4 ) = P2(Ts) (111.2)
In the absence of regulatory controls over the city's commercial land
market, the production of floor space at each center must obey the demand
functions (11.19) and (11.20), and the long run rental cost of floor space
must comply with (11.21). Together with the "border" conditions (III.1)-
(111.2), the model's equilibrium conditions now form a system of 17 equations
with 17 unknowns, rendering it thereby mathematically solvable.
Assuming at first equal or no exogenous production costs at the city's
subcenters (CEI-CE 2=0), a perfectly "symmetrical" city with no land rent,
space rent, or wage differentials across its commercial subcenters will
result. Given the assumption of a spatially homogeneous land and conditions
(11.12) and (11.24), the equal cost condition (11.13) can now be modified as:
as
.- (Ri -R2)+(Wl-W2) =0;
a,
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or:
a. kq
(RI-R2)+-(NI-N) = 0 (111.3)
a,, 2
The above condition alone precludes employment size and commercial space
rent differences of the same sign between the city's subcenters. Yet, this
condition may support both equal employment sizes and floor space rents, or
labor size and floor space rent differentials of an opposite sign between the
two centers. This latter solution would, however, suggest that larger
(smaller) subcenters must in equilibrium command lower (higher) space rents,
and would thus contradict (111.1), (111.2), (11.21), and the summary
conditions (II.24)-(II.26). By contradiction, then, the only feasible
equilibrium solution is that of equal employment size and commercial space
rents at the two centers. Given the equilibrium conditions just mentioned,
equal employment sizes at the two subcenters imply, in turn, equal residential
and commercial land rents and equal wages. This case of the simple
symmetrical city, portrayed in Figure III-1 and summarized in Proposition 1
below, constitutes the base case of this analysis against which alternative
models will be examined.
FIGURE III-1
Competitive Land Rents; CA=O
RL RL
Center 1 Center 2
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Proposition 1: In a perfectly competitive city without any land supply
restrictions, regulatory controls, or production cost differentials across
centers, no variations in land rents, commercial floor space rents, or wages
should in equilibrium prevail.
To examine the amenity capitalization process, Center 1 is now assumed
to present an exogenous production cost advantage, C, (=CE2 -CE,>O), over
Center 2, so that in equilibrium:
-(i- )(lW)= CA (111.4)
an
The presence of such a production cost advantage at Center 1 disturbs
the symmetry in the locational and pricing patterns observed in the base case
just examined. As shown in Figure 111-2, locational demand for the endowed
center in this case is higher, exerting thereby an upward pressure on its
employment size, its adjoining residential land rents, its commercial land and
space rents, and its labor wages. As Center 1 expands at the expense of
Center 2 and its supporting residential area, the commuting costs of the most
distant worker employed at Center 2 decrease, exerting thereby a downward
pressure on its residential land rents, commercial land rents, and floor space
rents. Center 1 will continue to expand at the expense of Center 2, but only
until increases in its space rents and wages erode its initial advantage. In
the long run, such a demand imbalance between the two centers is likely to
result in higher land rents, higher space rents, and higher wa'ges at Center 1,
and lower commercial land and floor space rents at Center 2. The higher the
advantage differential between the city's subcenters, the higher Center l's
labor size, commercial land and space rents, the lower Center 2's labor size
and respective equilibrium prices, and, consequently, the higher the price
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FIGURE 111-2
Competitive Land Rents; CA>0
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differentials between the two centers.
To formally demonstrate the equilibrium effects of the production
amenity, (11.3), (II.4), (11.21), (11.24), (11.25), and (1I.1)-(III.2) are
incorporated into the equal cost condition (III.4) to yield implicit function
(111.5):
as a. kq
-CoP ofaC 4) -O+-(NJ-N2) = CA;
a. a, 2
or:
1-b 1-b
a. NJ Nh S a. 3Nh S NJ Nh
-C, P+k + -- -- C, P2+k -- +k NJ-- -CA= 0an 2 4 2q a, 4 2q 2 2
(III.5)
Differentiating (111.5) implicitly yields the effect of Center l's
advantage on the two subcenters' employment size:
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-Ck(1-b)[P(T 2)b+P2T4)-b]+2kg
dN2  dN
- =--- <0
dCA dCA
(111.6)
The associated changes in those subcenters' commercial land and space
rents, as well as Center 1's labor wages can now easily be determined.
again (11.21) and (11.25):
dRL1  dP,(T 2 ) k dN
-
.- --- >0;
dCA dCA 2 dC
dR COk(1-b)
dCA 2P,(T 2 )b
dN,
->0;
dCA
dRL2  dP2 (T 4 ) k dN2
=- - <0;
dCA dCA 2 dCA
dR2  COk(1-b)
dCA 2P2(T4 )
dN2
-- <0;
dCA
dW, dN1
- = kq - >0
dCA dCA
Therefore:
d(RLI-RL2) d(PI(T 2 )-P 2(T4) dN1
=k-
dC A dC A dC A
a. d(R1 -R2 ) as 1-b RI R2
--- = AP-k---- +
a,, dCA a, 2 'P1(T2) 2(4)
>0;
dN,
->0;
dCA
d(W,-W 2 ) dN,
= kq - >0,
dCA dCA
where:
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dN
dCA
Using
(111.7)
(111.8)
a. d(R1-R 2 ) d(Wj-W2)
-- + =1 (111.9)
an dCA dCA
as (1-b) Ri R 2
Given (III.6)-(III.7) and assuming that q > - -
an 2 PI(T2) P2 (T4)
(III.10) must hold:"'
as d(R,-R 2 ) d(P,(T 2 )-P 2 (T,)) d(RL,-RL2 ) d(W1-W2)
- < q =q <1
an dCA dCA dCA dCA
(III.10)
Moreover, since there are no rent or wage differentials between the two
centers when CA=0, and (III.4)-(III.5) and (III.9) hold unconditionally for
all CA>O, (III.11) must also be valid:
a.
-- (RI-R2) < q(PI(T 2)-P2 (T,)) = q(RLI-RL2 ) = (Wl-W 2 ) < CA
(III.11)
Hence:
Proposition 2: Under competitive market conditions, differences in
production amenities between centers are exactly capitalized into the sum of
those centers' floor space rent and wage differences. Differences in floor
space rents do reflect differences in commercial land rents, while wage
differences equal differences in the residential land expenses of those
households located at the subcenter edges. Under normal conditions, wage
differences will likely exceed differences in space rents per worker; thus,
wages capitalize a larger share of the production amenity than space rents.
8' Given (11.12), (11.20), and (III.1)-(III.2), when the centers are of
equal size, the inequality above becomes q>L,/N,. This condition requires that
residential land consumption be greater than the land per worker needed for
production at each center. Empirically q ranges from 20,000 to 40,000 square
feet, while Li/Ni may not exceed the 2,000 square feet. Thus, under normal
conditions, the inequality holds.
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Evidently, then, the assumed difference in production amenities between
the city's subcenters does produce compensating variations in land rents,
floor space rents, and wages. The expressions in (111.8) validate the
assertion that the higher the production cost differential between the city's
subcenters, the higher these compensating variations will be. In this two-
center city, however, there is a limit to how large Center l's cost advantage
and, consequently, how high these price differences can be. Given the fixed
distance, S, between the two centers, if Center 1 becomes too advantageous
(and hence too large), then Center 1 workers would pay a higher price for land
at Center 2's inner edge than Center 2 workers. Center 2 would thus cease to
exist. To justify, then, the existence of the less advantageous subcenter in
this model, Center l's advantage must be such that:
P,(T4)RL2=P2(T4) (111.12)
The equality in (111.12) will hold in the extreme case Center 1 is endowed
with its maximum advantage. In such a case, Center 1 workers will occupy
entirely the city's inner residential strip, while Center 2 workers will be
confined to that subcenter's outer residential area. The resultant city will
then be as portrayed in Figure 111-3. As also shown in this figure, t3=S and
t4=0. Applying these boundary solutions to (11.24) determines Center l's
employment size, which, when incorporated into the equal cost condition
(111.5), yields Center l's maximum advantage in (111.13):
as Nh aS Nh S
C,,,x = kS+C,--- P,+k- - CO PA+k --- (1I11I. 13)
an 2 an .2 q
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FIGURE 111-3
Competitive Land Rents; CA=CN
Using, then, (11.8), as well as (III.1)-(III.2), the associated
maximum land rent, space rent, and wage differentials between the two centers
are derived:
max(RL-RL2 )=kS/q>O;
a
-(RI -R2)=CA..x-kS; max(W1 -W2)=kS>0 (III.14)
Hence:
Proposition 3: Under competitive market conditions, there is a maximum
cost advantage that more advantageous subcenters can command without
threatening the existence of less advantageous subcenters. In equilibrium,
such an advantage ultimately results in the maximum positive land rent, floor
space rent, and labor wage differentials across a city's commercial
subcenters.
2. Model II: A Segmented Land Market
In Model II, Center 1 is assumed to be segmented by a binding constraint
on its commercial land area, such that L1=rl<L,". The term r1 denotes the
exogenously determined maximum land area that Center 1 can occupy, while L,"
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Center 1 Center 2
(II.3)-(II.4),.
denotes the land area that this subcenter would occupy in the absence of any
development restriction.
The presence of such a constraint at Center 1 does not affect the
production of floor space at Center 1, but does affect the competitive
relationship between that subcenter's commercial and its adjoining residential
land. Since Center l's outer edge is no longer the result of free competition
between the city's commercial and residential sectors, "neighboring" rents at
that subcenter's edges need not be equal. Thus, border condition (III.1) need
not hold. Model II can then be solved using the general equilibrium
conditions already discussed in Chapter II and -the "border" condition (111.2).
Given Center l's exogenously determined land area, these equilibrium
conditions now form a solution system of 16 equations with 16 unknowns.
To examine the effects of the development restriction, consider again
the competitive city in Model I (Figure III-1) and assume that a binding
constraint, confining that subcenter's total land area to rl, is imposed.
Such a constraint ultimately causes Center l's labor size to fall and
Center 2's labor size to rise. As Center 1 shrinks, its residential land
rents and labor wages fall. As Center 2 grows, its residential land rents,
commercial land rents, and floor space rents rise. Subsequently, such
adjustments create a production cost differential and, therefore, a demand
imbalance between the city's subcenters. Given, then, Center 2's increased
production costs, for equilibrium to be restored in the city, Center l's
commercial land and space rents have to rise both above their competitive
equilibrium. level and above Center 2's respective equilibrium prices.
Figure 111-4 below portrays this spatial equilibrium. To formally
derive the adjustments portrayed in this figure, the price of land needed to
equate land demand in (11.20) with the constrained supply (rl) at Center 1 is
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FIGURE 111-4
Segmented Land Rents; CA=O; rl<L,"
RLI
RL2
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Center 1 Center 2
first derived. Incorporating this along with (II.3)-(II.4), (11.21), (11.24),
and (111.2) into the equal cost condition (111.3) yields (111.15):
kq
-- CRL11-b ,P2(4) -b+-(NI -N2) = 0;
a. a. 2
or:
a1 b N b 1-b 1~b a. 3Nh S N1 NhC, - --- E - -a: L --- +k N, - = 0
a, r[1 b a, 4 2q 2 2
(III.15)
The effects of an increasingly binding constraint, effectively limiting
rl, on the two subcenters' employment basis can then be determined by
implicitly differentiating (111.15) to yield (111.16):
- 55 -
Nr1
2- _ b b-1
as k(1-b) 1b1-b anr N
1+ - CO 2P2(4b +kg /Cor- 
--- 
-s r1 Ni
aL 2P(T) b aJ
Therefore:
dN2  dN
- = --- <0.
drl drl
(III.16)
Using again (11.20), (11.21), (11.25), and (111.3), the associated
changes in the two subcenters' adjoining residential land rents, their
commercial land and space rents, and Center 1's labor wages can be determined
as follows:
dP1 (T2 ) aP,(T 2 )
drl Nl
dN
>0;
dr1
dP2 (T 4 ) aP2(T 4 ) dN2
-- <0;
drl aN2 drl
aRL1 BRL, dN
8r1 BN, drl
1-b aNi b r1
-r-- -
b2 an N
dN
drl
-'''1'
-1 r1 b <0;
dRL 2
dr1
dP2 (T4)
= <0;
dr1
dR2 an dW
drl drl a. drl
<0, since:
dR2  C,(l-b) dRL2
- 2b<0;
drl RL2b drl
dW awl dN
and: - = - - >0.
drl 8N1 drl
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dN1
drl
dRL,
drl
dR,
(III. 17)
In summary, then, the equilibrium adjustments described in (111.16)-
(111.17) clearly suggest that:
d(RL,-P,(T2)) d(P1 (T2 -P 2 (T4 )) d(RL-RL2 ) d(R-R 2 ) d(W,-W 2)<0; >0; <0; <0; >0
dr1 drl dr1 drl drl
(III. 18)
Hence:
Proposition 4: As a constraint on a subcenter's commercial land area
increasingly binds, the higher the positive rental gap between its commercial
and adjoining residential land, the larger the positive commercial land rent
and space rent differences, and the higher the negative wage differences
between this and an otherwise similar but nonconstrained subcenter in the same
metropolitan market.
To examine now how the amenity capitalization process works in the
presence of land constraints, a production cost differential (CA=CE2 -CE>0) is
assumed to exist between the city's subcenters.
As already documented, in the absence of the constraint, positive
differentials in residential and commercial land rents, space rents, and labor
wages are sustained between the two centers. Yet, as a constraint is imposed
on Center 1, the more advantageous of the two centers, rents and wages at both
centers have to appropriately adjust to restore equilibrium in the city.
These adjustments are still given by (111.18), which holds for all CA>0.
Following, then, (111.18), as an increasingly binding constraint is imposed on
Center l's commercial land, the positive commercial land and space rent
differences. between the city's subcenters are reinforced, while their wage
(and residential land rent) differences are clearly weakened. Given the equal
cost condition in (111.4), it can then easily be inferred that the development
restriction shifts capitalization away from wage (and residential land rent)
and toward floor space rent (and commercial land rent) differences in the
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FIGURE 111-5
Space Rent and Wage Capitalization in Segmented Land Markets
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Center l's Land Area
city. Yet, the magnitude of space rent and wage capitalization in the
presence of land constraints is highly conditional, depending on the
restrictiveness of these constraints.
As Figure 111-5 clearly illustrates, for mild enough constraints, wage
differences between centers still capitalize most of the advantage to the
firm. Yet, as the constraint reaches a certain threshold value, designated
rl,, the fixed advantage difference between the two centers is equally
capitalized by space rent and wage differences. By incorporating this
equality into (111.4), solving for N,, and substituting this into (111.15), it
follows that rle must fulfill (111.19) below:
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Nh CA 1-b b as -
2 2kq b a
rl, = (III. 19)
CA as Nh S CA 1~b 1-b
-- +4- C 0 PA +k---k---
2 an 2 2q 4q
As r1 falls below rl, but without yet reaching another threshold value,
designated rl, space rent differences begin capturing more and wage
differences less of the difference in locational value between centers. Once
r1 reaches rl 0 , wage differences dissipate, and space rent differences
capitalize the full amount of the cost advantage difference between centers.
Incorporating this into the wage expression in (11.24), solving for N,, and
substituting this into (111.15), yields rl in (111.20) below:
b1
Nh 1-b as l-b
- r- 
-- C 0
2 b a n
rl, (111.20)
CA as Nh S 1-b 1-b
I-+ C 0 P +k--k-
2 an 2 2q
With yet more binding restrictions rendering r1 lower than r10, wage
differences will become negative, and space rent differences will exceed the
value of the two subcenters' initial advantage differential. The more
stringent Center l's land restriction, the more pronounced the negative wage
and positive space rent differences between the two centers.
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Hence:
Proposition 5: Advantage differentials between constrained and otherwise
similar but nonconstrained subcenters are always capitalized into positive
commercial land and space rent differences between centers. Commercial land
rent differences are always higher than wage (or residential land rent)
differences, but the magnitude of space rent capitalization as well as the
extent and sign of wage (or residential land rent) capitalization are highly
conditional, depending on the degree to which land constraints bind. In
particular (Figure 111-5; (III.19)-(III.20)):
as
if rl,<rl<L " 0<-(R-R2 )<(W1-W2)<CA;
an
as
if rlo<rl<rl, 0<(W1 -W2)<-(R-R2)<CA;
an
as
if rl<rl (Wl-W 2)<O<C<--(Rj-R2). (111.21)
an
In the presence, then, of increasingly binding land constraints, space
rents are seen to capitalize more, and wage differences less, locational
value. When evaluated at the selective and increasingly restrictive zoning
limits of rl, and r1o, the marginal effect of the advantage on space rents
(wages) is also seen to increase (decrease), suggesting that zoning limits may
have nontrivial second-order effects in the capitalization process.''
The marginal advantage effects exceed unity, and space rent differences
between centers always exceed the value of the two subcenters' initial
advantage difference when a cross commuting situation prevails in the city.
At rl, - (R,-R 2)=0.5C, and thus d( -R,) =0.5. At r1,,
aean ,dR R a. dA
a (Rl-R2 )=CA, and thus aiC- d - . A general, formal proof of such
effects, however, requires the evaluation of the following derivative:
a,_d 2(R, -R.)
an dCAdr1
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In particular, for any C,O in this model, there is a "sufficiently" binding
land constraint, rlc, beyond which the rent offer of Center 2 worker for
residential land at Center l's inner edge exceeds the rent offer of Center 1
workers for these locations, such that:
P2(T)>:P,(T1 ) (111.22)
In such a case, the residential area between the two centers.will be occupied
by Center 2 workers, while Center l's outer residential zone will be occupied
by both Center 1 workers and those workers employed at Center 2 who cannot be
accommodated elsewhere. A unidirectional commuting for Center 1 workers and a
cross commuting situation for Center 2 workers will thus prevail.
FIGURE 111-6
Segmented Land Rents; CA>O, rl<rlc
RLI
RL2
P2 (T ... ... P2(T)
Center 1 Center 2
The resultant city will be as portrayed in Figure 111-6. To reflect its
structure, the equilibrium conditions discussed so far have to only slightly
be modified. Conditions (II.14)-(II-15), (11.6), and (11.8) need not hold,
while, given (11.7) and noting that t,=0, the boundary solutions and the wage
expression in (11.24) have to be replaced by the following:
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Nh r1 Nh r1
t= --q-S--; t 3 = 0; t 4 = S; t = -
2 2 2 2
W1 -W2 = -k(rl+S) (111.23)
To derive the critical value of rl, r1c, beyond which (111.22) and
(111.23) hold, it suffices to note that, at rlc, t 1=Nl/q. Applying this to
(11.24), incorporating the resultant NI into (111.15), and solving for r1c
yields (111.24):
1-b ba I-
C,(Nhq-2S) r- -
b a n
1
r1c - (111.24)2q - ] b
as Nh I~b
--- C 0 PA +k- +kS+C A
Using, in addition, (11.20), (II.3)-(II.4), (11.8), and (111.4), it
follows that for any rl<rlc, the resultant compensating differentials in land
rents, floor space rents, and labor wages must satisfy the inequalities below:
b
a. Nh S 1-b Nh
RL1 -RL2 > r- - PA+k-
a-n r1c 2 q b 2
as 
-s(1 
.5-- (RI-R 2)>C,+kS; W,-W2<-S(I.5
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Hence:
Proposition 6: If sufficiently binding, constraints on a subcenter's
commercial land may necessitate cross commuting on the part of workers
employed at the city's unconstrained subcenter(s). Compared to their levels
under a normal commuting pattern, commercial land and space rent differences
must be higher, while wage differences must be smaller. Most importantly,
under such a cross-hauling pattern, the compensating space rent differential
between centers must always be greater than those subcenters' initial
advantage difference.
3. Model III: A Regulated Land Market
In Model III, Center 1 is assumed to be regulated by a binding
constraint on its capital/land ratio, such that c1, < cl1". The term c11
denotes the exogenously determined maximum allowable density at Center 1,
while c1" denotes the density at which commercial development would occur in
the absence of any regulation.
This restriction does not alter the competitive relationship between the
regulated subcenter's commercial and its adjoining residential land, but does
constrain the demand for capital and land at this center. Floor space at
Center 1 is still produced according to (11.17), but factor intensities need
not comply with the demand functions (II.19)-(II.20). Given the regulation
and the production function (11.17), the constrained demands for capital and
land at Center 1 are now given by (11.26) and (11.27). Combining them with
(11.18) gives (111.28) in place of the competitive market condition (11.21):
K = cl 1 -b~Qs1  (111.26)
Li = cl,bQs (111.27)
Rl=r cl,'1-b+RLI c 11~b (111. 28)
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Model III can then be solved using the general equilibrium conditions
presented in Chapter II, the border conditions (III.1)-(III.2), the
constrained demand functions (III-26)-(III.27), and the long run cost function
of floor space (111.28), as applied to Center 1 locations. Together with the
exogenous regulation, these conditions now form a system of 16 equations with
16 unknowns.
To trace now the impact of the regulation, a binding density limit, cl,,
on Center 1 of the competitive city is assumed. Given that factor intensities
at Center 1 no longer represent the optimum, least cost combination of capital
and land inputs, floor space at this center is produced at a higher cost and,
as a result, firms prefer Center 2's nonregulated locations. Consequently,
Center l's employment size falls and Center 2's rises. As Center 1 shrinks,
its commercial and residential land rents, as well as its labor wages must
fall, while as Center 2 grows its land and space rents must rise.- This
produces a production cost differential between the two centers and, for
equilibrium to be restored, Center l's space rents must rise above those
prevailing at Center 2. The resultant city is portrayed in Figure 111-7
below.
FIGURE 111-7
Regulated Land Rents; CA=0, cl1<c1I
RL 1 RI 2
P, (T . . ::: : . : : ::: : : . P2(T)
Center 1 Center 2
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To formally demonstrate the impact of the regulation, the equal cost
condition (111.3) is combined with (11.21), (111.28), (11.24), (II.3)-(III.4),
and (III.1)-(III.2) to yield implicit function (111.29):
a s Ibb as
a rcl1b-+RLIc1- -cORL 1 l-b = 0
an an
or:
I-b
as N1 Nh S a. 3Nh S NI Nh
-11- rc1 I+PA+k K+-- ----CO PA+k ----- +kq N-=0
a n 2 4 2q a n 4 2q 2 2
(111.29)
The effects of an increasingly binding constraint, effectively limiting
c1l, on the two subcenters' employment size can now easily be determined.
Differentiating (111.29) implicitly yields (111.30):
dN1 bP1(T2)-r(l-b)c11
>0
dc1, k +C k(1-b) C1Ib+a kc 
c11 -4+C0  c1''-kc,'
2 2P2(T4)b a.
dN2  dN,
= -
---- <0
dcl1  dcli (111.30)
Using then (111.30) along with (11.21), (11.25), and (111.3), the
parallel changes in the two subcenters' commercial and residential land rents,
space rents, and Center l's labor wages can be determined as follows:
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dRL_ dP1 (T2 ) dNl dRL 2  dP2(T) dN
>0; = <0;
dcll dN dcll dcll dN dc 1
dR dR2  an dW dR2  C,(1-b) dRL2
- = - - -- <0, since: = - <0;
dc 1  dc 1  as dc1  dc 1  P2 (T 4 )b dc1
dW, dW, dN,
and: -= -- >0 (111.31)
cl dN dc 1
Consequently:
d(RL-RL2) d(R1 -R2 ) d(W-W 2)
- >0; <0; >0;
dell dc 1  dcll
(111.32)
Hence:
Proposition 7: As a constraint on a subcenter's capital/land area ratio
increasingly binds, the higher the negative land rent and wage differentials
and the larger the positive commercial space rent differences between this and
an otherwise similar but nonregulated subcenter in the same metropolitan
market.
To examine now how the capitalization process works in this model,
Center 1 is assumed to have a production cost advantage (CA=CE 2 -CE >0) over
Center 2. Under competitive market conditions, a pattern of positive
compensating differences in commercial land rents, space rents, and wages
would prevail in the city. Once, however, Center 1 becomes regulated, the two
subcenters' land rents, space rents, and labor wages have to adjust
accordingly, to e ualize production costs between centers. These adjustments
are still given by (111.32), which obviously holds for all C A0.
Following, then, (111.32), it can clearly be inferred that the density
regulation strengthens the effects of the advantage on the two subcenters'
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space rent differences, but at the same time weakens its effects on those
subcenters' land rent and labor wage differences. By reinforcing the positive
compensating differential in space rents and by narrowing down the wage (and
land rent) differential, the development regulation increases in effect the
share of the advantage that is capitalized by the former and, at the same
time, decreases the share of the advantage that is capitalized by the latter.
Thus, in contrast to what happens in the absence of regulatory limits, and
depending on how restrictive Center l's regulation is, a range of different
capitalization magnitudes may prevail in the city. These capitalization
outcomes can best be illustrated using Figure 111-8.
FIGURE 111-8
Space Rent and Wage Capitalization in Regulated Land Markets
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As this figure clearly shows, when c11 is regulated to be below a
certain threshold density limit, designated cl,, wage differences between
centers must still capitalize a higher share of the advantage than that
capitalized by those centers' floor space rent differences. As, however, the
density limit reaches this threshold value (cl), the fixed advantage
difference between the two centers gets equally capitalized by space rent and
wage differences. Incorporating this equality into the equal cost condition
in (111.4), solving for NJ, and substituting this into (111.29) gives the
following implicit function to be solved for cle:
1-b
as Nh S CA a Nh S CA CA
- r c1,-l P +k--k--I c1,-' ---- 0 P A+k--k---
an 2 2q 4q a, L 2 2q 4q 2
(111.33)
As c11 falls below cl, but without yet reaching another threshold value,
designated clo, space rent differences begin capturing more, and wage
differences less, of the difference in locational value between centers. Once
c11 reaches clo, wage differences dissipate, and space rent differences
capitalize the full amount of the two subcenters' advantage difference.
Incorporating this into the wage expression in (11.24), solving for N1 , and
substituting this into (111.29) yields the following implicit function of cl:
1-b
a S Nh S as Nh S
-- r cl-+ PA+k--k- cl 0 _b ----C PA+k--k- = CAa 2 q an 2 q
(111.34)
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Finally, as Figure 111-8 clearly illustrates, once Center l's regulatory
limit falls below c10, the two subcenters' wage differences become negative,
and space rent differences exceed the value of the initial intercenter
advantage differential in the city.
This analysis leads to Proposition 8 below.
Proposition 8: Advantage differentials between regulated and otherwise
similar but nonregulated subcenters are always capitalized into positive space
rent differences between these subcenters. Yet, the magnitude of space rent
capitalization, as well as the extent and sign of wage (or residential and
commercial land rent) capitalization are highly conditional, depending on the
degree to which the density regulation binds. In particular (Figure 111-8;
(rII.33)-(III.34)):
as
If cle<cil<clI" 0<-(R -R2)<(W1-42)<CA;
aa
if clo<cl <cl, e <W,-W2)<-(R1-R2)<CA;
an
as
if cl1<cl, (W1 -W2)<O<CA<-(Rl -R 2 ) (111.35)
an
As shown in Figure 111-8 and documented by (III.31)-(III.32), the more
stringent the constraint for a given production cost advantage at Center 1,
the higher the positive space rent and the smaller the negative land rent
(both residential and commercial) and wage differentials between the city's
subcenters. The increase (decrease) in the share of the advantage capitalized
by space rents (labor wages) tends to suggest that, similarly to zoning
limits, density regulations may also have second-order effects in the
capitalization process. When, again, evaluated at selective and increasingly
binding density limits, the marginal effects of the advantage on space rents
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(wages) are seen to increase (decrease). 0'
There is, however, a limit to how stringent Center l's regulation and,
consequently, how high these compensating land rent, space rent, and wage
differences can be. If Center l's regulation becomes too rigid, and hence
Center 1 too small, Center 2 workers will pay a higher price for land at
Center i's inner edge and, as a consequence, Center 1 would cease to exist.
To justify, then, the existence of Center 1 in this case, Center l's
predetermined capital/land area ratio must be such so that in equilibrium:
P,(T 2)=RLP 2(T2 ) (111.36)
In the extreme case in which the equality in (111.36) holds, Center 1's
capital/land area ratio will presumably be set at its minimum, and the
resultant city will be as portrayed in Figure 111-9.
FIGURE 111-9
Regulated Land Rents; cl,=cloln
RL2
RLP2(T) .. ... P2 (T)
P, (T ) ..... ... ............ . .
Center 1 Center 2
At c1,, -s-(R,-R 2 )=0.5CA, and thus -d(R,&) -0.5. At c1,,
as-(R-R2)=C, and thus A d(- -1. A general, formal proof of sucha. 1R-2 =A and ths - Ag
effects, however, requires the evaluation of the following derivative:
. nd2(R -R)
an dCAdcl,
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In such a city, t3=0 and t4=S. Applying these boundary solutions to
(11.24) yields Center l's threshold employment size, which, when incorporated
into (111.29), gives rise to implicit function (111.37) through the solution
to which clin can be determined:
1-b
as  7 Nh S a. Nh
- rcl1,Inl+c1-j PIn +k--k- - --- kS-CA=0
a n 2 q a n 2
(111.37)
Using (11.8), (11.24), (III.1)-(III.2), and (111.4), the resultant
minimum negative land rent and wage differences and the maximum positive space
rent differences in the city can be determined as follows:
min(RLI-RL2 )=-kS/q;
as
max -(R-R 2 )=CA+kS; min(WI-W 2 )=-kS. (111.38)
an
This analysis gives rise to Proposition 9 below.
Proposition 9: There is a limit to the maximum regulation that can be
imposed on the capital/land area ratio of an advantageous center without
threatening its existence. If imposed, such a regulation will result in the
maximum positive floor space rent and minimum negative land rent and wage
differential between this and other nonadvantageous and nonregulated
subcenters.
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4. Model IV: A Segmented and a Regulated Market
In Model IV, Center 1 is assumed to be both regulated and segmented by
binding constraints on its commercial land and development density. Taken
together, Center l's restrictions determine in effect exogenously that
subcenter's building capacity, Qsj, and, consequently, its employment size,
N1 . Using (11.12) and (11.17), these are given by (111.39):
Qs1 = rlcl,' <Qs"
N= rlclb <N1 " (111.39)
as
The two restrictions, then, also mirror the effect of building moratoria
often imposed on "congested" centers. Given the exogenously determined values
of these restrictions, Model IV can easily be solved using the general
equilibrium conditions applied to Model III but border condition (III.1).
These conditions now form a system of 15 linear equations with 15 unknowns.
To analyze the combined effect of these constraints, consider the base
city in Model I (Figure III-1) and assume that binding ceilings on both
Center l's commercial land area and capital/land ratio are imposed, such that
rl<L " and cl<cl 1 . From (111.39), such constraints limit Center 1's labor
size and increase Center 2's employment basis. As Center 1 shrinks, its labor
wages and its residential land rents must fall, while as Center 2 grows, its
commercial and residential land rents and floor space rents must rise. Given,
then, Center 2's increased production costs, for equilibrium to be restored in
the city Center l's space rents have to rise above their competitive
equilibrium level and above Center 2's floor space rents. Whether, however,
commercial land rents.at Center 1 will ultimately fall or rise depends on
- 72 -
FIGURE III-10
Segmented and Regulated Land Rents; CA=O; rl<L1"; cl,<cl "
RLI RL2
P, (T ... . .. . ''': : .. p2(T)
Center 1 Center 2
whether the effect of the land or density constraint on Center l's land rents
prevails. Figure III-10 depicts the resultant city on the assumption that the
effect of the zoning constraint on commercial land rents overshadows the
effect of the density regulation on these rents.
To formally demonstrate these adjustments, (111.18) and (111.32) from
Model II's and Model III's analysis are utilized. It is important to note at
this point that the sign of the differentials below signify the adjustments
occurring as both rl and cl are increased or, equivalently, as both the
zoning limit and the density regulation are relaxed.
aRLI aRL <dRL, = rl+ cl, 0;
Brl a1,
aR1  aR,
dR, = - rl+ cl, <0;
Brl a1,
aRL BRL2dRL2 = r1 + cl, <0;
arl cl,
aR2 8lR 2
dR2 = r1 + - cl, <0;
arl ac1,
dW, - rl+ cl, <0;
Brl acl,
(III.40)
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Thus, the following adjustments occur as both Center l's zoning limit
and density regulation increasingly bind:
d(RL -RL) < 0; d(RI-R 2 )>O; d(W1-W2)<0 (111.41)
Hence:
Proposition 10: As restrictions on a subcenter's commercial land and
capital/land ratio increasingly bind, the smaller the negative labor wage and
residential land rent differences and the higher the positive space rent
differences between this subcenter and other unconstrained and nonregulated
centers. The sign of the commercial land rent differences between centers is
ambiguous because of the opposite effects that the two restrictions have on
the constrained subcenter's commercial land rents.
Proposition 10 and (III.40)-(III.41), upon which this is based, hold for
all CA20. This sets the basis for examining how zoning limits and density
regulations interact to influence the capitalization process.
In the absence of these restrictions, advantage differences between the
two centers would still be capitalized by both space rent and wage differences
between the two centers, with the latter likely to absorb the bulk of any
advantage difference to the firm. Following (III.40)-(III.41), however, as
both binding zoning limits and density regulations are imposed on the city's
more advantageous center (Center 1), compensating space rent differences will
further be reinforced, while wage (and residential land rent) differences will
further be weakened. It should be noted here that (111.40) makes clear that
the effect of both constraints on space rents and wages will be more
pronounced than the effect of either land on density limits operating alone in
the commercial land market.
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FIGURE III-11
Space Rent and Wage Capitalization in
Segmented and Regulated Land Markets
Figure III-11 depicts the range of resultant capitalization magnitudes
and at the same time compares them with the results of Model II
(or Model III), where only one of the two constraints is imposed on Center l's
land market (perforated line). Following Figure III-11, once the two
constraints become binding (i.e., restrict Center l's employment size below
its competitive equilibrium level), they are again seen to shift
capitalization away from wage (and residential land rent) and toward space
rent differences in the city. As the two constraints become rigid enough so
that N, reaches some critical value, designated N,, advantage differences are
equally capitalized by space rent and wage differences between centers. N,
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$/worker
CA
N(rCl,cl,) N,(r l, c) N,( L,*,c1*)
Center l's Employment Size >
can then be determined by (111.42) below, derived by equating space rent with
wage differences, inserting this equality in the equal cost condition (111.4),
and subsequently solving the latter for N,.
CA Nh
N, = - +- (111.42)
kq 2
As the constraints become even more restraining so that N, falls below
Ne but does not yet reach some lower value of N,, designated No, the fixed cost
advantage difference between the two centers is capitalized by higher space
rent and lower wage differences. At No, this is fully absorbed by space rent
differences. No can then be determined by (111.43), derived by equating wage
differences to zero.
Nh
No = (111.43)
2
Finally, as Figure III-11 again shows, land and density constraints that
render Center 1 smaller that its critical size in (111.43) will result in
negative wage differences and space rent differences that exceed the value of
the two subcenters' initial cost advantage difference. This is the inevitable
result of over-restricting Center 1. As its wages shrink relative to
Center 2's, its space rents must sufficiently rise to compensate for its lower
wages.
This analysis leads to Proposition 11 below.
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Proposition 11: Cost advantage differences between centers that are both
segmented and regulated and otherwise similar but nonrestricted centers are
always capitalized by positive space rent differences between these centers.
Yet the magnitude of space rent capitalization, as well as the extent and sign
of wage (or residential and commercial land rent) capitalization are highly
conditional, depending on the degree to which development constraints bind.
In particular (Figure 111-11; (III.42)-(III.43)):
as
if Ne<Ni<Ni" 0<-(R-R2 )(W1-W 2 )<CA;
an
as
if No<N <Ne O<(W 1-W2)<-(R,-R2)<CA;
a8n
as
if NI<NO (Wi-W2)<O<CA<-(Rj-R 2)- (111.44)
an
Similarly to what happens in Model II, space rent differences will
always be higher than the two subcenters' initial advantage difference when a
cross commuting situation prevails in the city. Such a location and pricing
pattern can be triggered by constraints stringent enough to ensure that
the rent offer of Center 2 workers for land at Center l's inner edge will be
higher than the rent offer of Center 1 workers for this land:
P2 (T,)>P,(T) (111.45)
In such a case, the residential area between the two centers will be occupied
by Center 2 workers, while Center l's outer residential strip will be occupied
by both Center 1 workers and those workers employed at Center 2 that cannot be
accommodated elsewhere. A unidirectional commuting for Center 1 workers and a
cross commuting situation for Center 2 workers will thus prevail in the city,
which will be as portrayed in Figure 111-12.
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FIGURE 111-12
Segmented and Regulated Land Rents; CA 0, N1 <Nl,
RLI
RL2
P2(T .... . . P (T)
~A A
Center 1 Center 2
Equilibrium in such a city need not comply with (II.14)-(II.15), (11-6),
and (11.8), while (11.24) needs to be replaced by (111.23). Given (11.24) and
noting that at Nic, Ni=tl/q, the critical value of NJ, Nic, beyond which cross
commuting prevails can be obtained as follows:
Nh S
Nic = - - - (111.46)
2 q
It follows, then, that for any N,<Nic commercial space rent and wage
differences must satisfy conditions (111.47):
-(RI -R2) > CA+kS; W, -W2<-kS (111.47)
This special case is summarized in Proposition 12 below.
- 78 -
Proposition 12: If sufficiently binding zoning limits and density
regulations are imposed on a subcenter with a cost advantage, then cross
commuting on the part of some workers employed at the unconstrained subcenter
becomes necessary in equilibrium. Under such a cross commuting situation, the
space rent and wage differentials between the two commercial locations are
likely to be higher than they would be if a more "normal" locational pattern
prevailed. Furthermore, the compensating space rent differences between these
centers are likely to exceed the value of any initial advantage difference
between them.
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Chapter IV.
MODEL SIMULATIONS
Simulation techniques have traditionally been used as a means to provide
numerical solutions to models that cannot be analytically solved or provide
additional numerical support to analytical solutions. In such a case,
simulated examples can make the structure of explanatory models more easy to
understand, highlight behavioral relationships, and better demonstrate their
underlying premises [Ingram, 1979].
The simulation examples presented here are merely intended to lend
numerical support to the propositions advanced in the previous chapter and to
shed some light to the magnitude of capitalization effects. To illustrate the
propositions, four simulation series of a competitive (Model I), a segmented
(Model II), a regulated (Model III) and, finally, a segmented and regulated
land market (Model IV) within a two-center city were developed. Similarly to
the theoretical models just discussed, the simulated examples presented here
do not attempt to replicate any specific, real world city; they just provide a
numerical interpretation of the simplified, two-center metropolises modeled in
Chapter III.
This chapter discusses the common exogenous parameters and different
assumptions underlying these simulations, briefly discusses the computation
techniques employed, and links the simulation results to the propositions they
were intended to illustrate.
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1. Common Exogenous Parameters
Naturally, the four simulation series differ in the basic assumptions
inherently built in each model, but they are comparable in the assumed values
of common exogenous variables. These are presented in Table IV-1. As the
table shows, the two-center city simulated each time was assumed to be
inhabited by 1,000,000 identical, one-worker households. To avoid lengthy
commuting, the city's width has been adjusted to 2 miles, while the distance
between the inner edges of its subcenters was set to 6 miles.
TABLE IV-1
Values of Exogenous Parameters
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of households, Nh :1,000,000.00
Distance between the centers'inner
edges, S, in miles : 6.00
City width, tw"', in miles : 2.00
2. Household Equilibrium
Household utility function, Xq-; a : 0.50
Household land consumption, q, in acres : 0.07
Agricultural land rent, P., $/acre : 7,500.00
Annual commuting cost, K, in $/mile : 350.00
Annual base wage at Center 2, W2  : 20,000.00
3. Firm Equilibrium
Firm production function, Qs1=Kb L1-b; b : 0.77
Commercial floor space/worker, in sq.ft : 250.00
Annual rental of capital, r, in $/sq.ft : 7.00
" For the sake of analytical simplicity, tw in Chapter II
and Chapter III was assumed to equal unity.
Household utility was assumed to be of a simple Cobb Douglas form with a
land coefficient of 0.5. Each household was assumed to consume 0.07 acres of
residential land and spend annually $350 per mile for commuting. The annual
agricultural land rent or, equivalently, the Qpportunity cost for residential
development was assumed to be $7,500 per year at both of the city's outer
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borders. Households employed at Center 2 were assumed to earn $20,000 yearly.
For the production of service output in the two commercial centers, 250
square feet per worker were assumed to be needed. The capital used for the
production of this space was assumed to be more productive than land. Thus,
the capital coefficient in the simple Cobb Douglas production function for
floor space was set to 0.77. The exogenous annual rental cost of capital was
set to $7 per square foot.
2. Simulated Examples
The assumptions underlying the simulated cities and a summary of the
simulation results are presented in Table IV-2. The endogenous variables in
each model were computed with the aid of simple computer algorithms, which
provided for the solution of nonlinear equations (i.e., 111.5) through the
Newton-Ramphson iterative method. The error margin in these algorithms was
set to ld-12, and in most cases 6-10 iterations proved enough for converging
the solution to the models with such a high precision."'
The simulation results demonstrate the distinct features of the four
alternative models and exemplify the way the "dual" capitalization process
works in each. Simulations 1-3 refer to Model I, Simulations 4-6 to Model II,
Simulations 7-9 to Model III, and Simulations 10-12 to Model IV. Each of
these simulations is briefly discussed and linked to the theoretical
proposition it exemplifies.
"' The computer algorithms were written in BASIC. Dvorak and Musset [1984]
discuss in detail the use of the language in the "small computer field" and the
application of the Newton-Ramphson iterative method to the solution of nonlinear
equations. See Appendix II for a brief discussion of the procedure.
Appendix II also presents the complete computer simulation outputs, which, in
addition to the summary results presented and discussed in this chapter, include
boundary solutions.
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TABLE IV-2
Computer Simulation Examples
Endogenous Variables "
Exogenous Exogenous
Cost Restriction
Advantage on
SIM /worker Capital
MODELS # Centers /year Land /Land
I. 1. Center I
Center 2
Commercial
Land in
sq. miles
3.42
3.42
Capital
/Land
Ratio
1.42
1.42
Labor
Supply
Annual
Residential
Land Rents
/acre
500,000 129,385.00
500,000 129,385.00
Annual
Commercial
Land Rents
/acre
129,385.00
129,385.00
Annual
Commercial
Space
Rents Yearly ''
/sq.ft Wages
$9.85 S20,000.00
9.85 -
2. Center 1
Center 2
3. Center 1
Center 2
II. 4. Center 1
Center 2
5. Center 1
Center 2
6. Center 1
Center 2
III. 7. Center 1
Center 2
8. Center 1
Center 2
9. Center 1
Center 2
IV. 10. Center 1
Center 2
11. Center 1
Center 2
12. Center 1
Center 2
S1,000
S2.229 d/ -
- 1.20
S1,000 1.20
S1,000 0.02
- 3.62 1.49 549,108 136,107.09 136,107.09 9.97
- 3.22 1.35 450,892 122,662.92 122,662.92 9.73
- 3.84 1.58 609,445 144,366.96 144,366.96 10.11
- 2.94 1.26 390,555 114,403.65 114,403.65 9.58
- - 4.95 458,478 123,701.27 451,397.19 13.13
- 3.58 1.48 541.522 135,068.73 135,068.73 9.95
- - 5.60 504,302 129,973.86 510,844.35 13.51
- 3.40 1.41 495,698 128,796.15 128,796.15 9.84
- - 51.62 46,459 114,360.00 4,705,623.07
- 6.00 1.58 953,541* 144,410.00 144,410.00
- - 0.30 10.56
-
-
- 3.56
$1,000
S1,000
- 0.30 11.60
- - 3.38
- 0.08 " 24.84
- - 3.84
- 1.20 4.20
S1,000 1.20 4.20
S1,000 1.20 3.00
22.52
10.11
- 466,035 124,735.68 124,735.68 12.54
1.47 533,965 134,034.32 134,034.32 9.93
- 512,029 131,031.60 131,031.60 12.90
1.40 487,971 127,738.41 127,738.41 9.82
- 390,493 114,395.09 114,395.09 22.50
1.58 609,507 144,374.92 144,374.92 10.11
- - 403,855 116,224.17 1,014,569.44
3.80 1.56 596,145 142,545.83 142.545.83
- - 403,855 116,224.17 1,541,055.64
3.80 1.56 596,245 142,545.83 142,545.83
- - 311,678 112,885.14 1,458,396.82
4.30 1.60 688,322'' 145,885.87 145,885.00
17.45
10.08
20,941.09
22,097.39
19,204.28
20,082.44
17,896.50
19,349.10
20,230.52
17,901.41
18,157.48
All numbers have been rounded up to two decimal points;
bThese were evaluated at the subcenters' edges;
Center 2's base wage was set exogenously to $20,000 per
This represents the maximum advantage that Center 1 can
In this simulation, 348,940 of these workers must cross
year;
command:
commute:
" This represents the maximum constraint that can be imposed on Center 1;
' In this simulation, 73,261 of these workers must cross commute.
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21.45 18,157.48
9.82 -
23.37
10.13
17.690.00
-
-
2.1 Model I: A Competitive Land Market
Simulations 1-3, portray the perfectly competitive city, where
households and firms freely bid for a share of the city's land. Equal
neighboring residential and commercial land prices at the subcenters' edges
present a distinctive feature of the simulated cities.
Simulation 1, in particular, portrays the symmetrical city which results
if no production cost differentials, land supply restrictions or regulatory
controls are assumed at any of the city's commercial locations. As such, the
simulation clearly demonstrates Proposition 1.
Simulation 2, introducing a production cost differential of $1,000 per
worker at Center 1, shows how capitalization works in the absence of
institutional rigidities in the city's land market. Center 1, the more
advantageous center, commands higher commercial space rents and higher wages
than Center 2, simply because it becomes larger, induces higher commuting and
ultimately commands higher residential and commercial land rents. Yet, the
magnitude of the advantage-induced space rent differences between the two
centers is trivial ($59) compared to the magnitude of the resultant wage
differences between these centers. This provides considerable numerical
support to Proposition 2, suggesting that, under normal conditions,
wage differences are likely to capitalize the bulk of the two subcenters'
initial advantage difference.
In Simulation 3, a maximum advantage of $2,229 per worker is introduced
at Center 1, along the lines suggested by equation (111.13). Consistent with
Proposition 3, this maximizes the space rent ($132) and wage differences
($2,097) between the two centers, but not their relative magnitude. Once
again, wage differences between the two centers are seen to account for most
of the capitalization, as Proposition 2 suggests.
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Taken together, the three simulations show that in competitive land
markets space rent differences between centers do reflect differences in
residential and commercial land prices, but not the full value of any
difference in production cost advantages between these centers. This is
simply because there are also wage differences between centers, which under
normal conditions capitalize most of the advantage difference to the firm.
These conclusions may substantially be altered once Center l's land market is
assumed to be segmented by binding land constraints, regulated with respect to
its commercial density, or both be regulated and segmented in a binding
fashion. Simulations 4-12 were developed to illustrate exactly how
capitalization outcomes differ in such alternative land markets.
2.2 Model II: A Segmented Land Market
Simulations 4-7, featuring long run equilibria in segmented.land
markets, clearly suggest that in the presence of binding zoning limits,
commercial land and space rent differences between centers do not reflect
differences in the price of their adjoining residential land. Such a gap
between adjoining residential and commercial pricing presents the distinctive
feature of segmented land markets.
In Simulation 4, Center l's land area is restricted to about a third of
its competitive market size. As a result, its employment size, residential
land rents, and labor wages fall, but in order to equalize demand with the
constrained supply, its commercial land and space rents rise dramatically
above their competitive equilibrium levels. With commercial land rents at
Center 1 rising at about three times that center's residential land rents and
Center 2's respective land rents, a large rental gap between Center l's
commercial and adjoining residential land emerges, and a pattern of large
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positive commercial space and land rent differences between the two subcenters
is sustained, as Proposition 4 would imply.
Simulation 5 maintains Center l's restriction but, in addition,
introduces a $1,000 cost advantage per worker at Center 1. In Simulation 5,
the $1,000 advantage difference between the two centers is capitalized into a
wage difference of only $82.44, a trivial amount compared to the $917.56 space
rent difference per worker between the two centers. When compared with
Simulation 2, Simulation 5 clearly gives credence to Proposition 5, suggesting
that such highly restrictive zoning limits do shift amenity capitalization
almost completely away from wage and toward space rent differences between
centers. Comparing the effects of the advantage in the cities portrayed in
Simulation 5 and Simulation 2 also provides support to the assertion that
zoning limits help produce stronger (weaker) marginal amenity effects on space
rents (labor wages).
Simulation 6 exemplifies the case in which zoning limits are so
restraining that about a third of Center 2's workers are forced to cross
commute. With a constraint of such a magnitude, the commercial land and space
rent differences between centers substantially rise, and the negative
residential land and wage differences between these centers dramatically fall.
Space rent differences per worker ($3,102), in particular, rise to more than
three times the amount of the initial advantage difference between the two
centers, as Proposition 6 would suggest.
2.3 Model III: A Regulated Land Mfarket
In Simulations 7-9, portraying a city with a regulated land market, the
competitive relationship between residential and commercial land rents is
notably restored, but commercial space rents to longer follow movements in
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residential or commercial land rents. Such a divergence invariably
characterizes regulated land markets.
In Simulation 7, for example, as a restriction limits Center l's
capital/land ratio at about a fourth of its competitive level, its land rents
fall. Yet, at the same time, forcing firms to consume much more land and much
less capital than what the minimum cost combination dictates raises Center l's
production costs so much that its commercial space rents significantly rise,
as Proposition 7 would imply. As a result, a pattern of positive space rent,
but negative commercial land rent and labor wage differentials emerges in the
city.
Simulation 8 maintains this same density limit but, in addition,
introduces an advantage difference of $1,000 between the two centers.
Similarly to what happens in the case of segmented land markets, space rent
differences capitalize a larger ($770) and wage differences a smaller ($230)
share of the advantage than that they do in the absence of such a density
regulation (Simulation 2). As such, the simulation clearly demonstrates
Proposition 8, suggesting that, similarly to land constraints, density
regulations tend to shift capitalization away from wage and toward space rent
differences between centers. Comparing the effects of the advantage in the
cities portrayed in Simulation 8 and Simulation 2 also supports the assertion
that, similarly to zoning limits, density regulations help produce stronger
(weaker) marginal amenity effects on space rents (labor wages).
In Simulation 9, Center l's regulatory limit is set at its minimum,
along the lines suggested by (111.37). This maximizes the positive space rent
and minimizes the negative commercial land rent and wage differences between
the two centers. Notably, space rent differences per worker between the two
centers ($3,100) exceed the value of the two subcenters' initial advantage
difference, as suggested by Proposition 9. Obviously, the drop in commercial
land rents at Center 1 is not sufficient to offset the enormous increase in
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the cost of providing floor space at Center 1 dictated by such a rigid density
limit.
2.4 Model IV: A Segmented and Regulated Market
Simulations 10-12 portray a land market, which is not only segmented by
zoning limits, but also regulated with respect to its commercial density.
Hence, the three simulations maintain the zoning limit assumed in the case of
the segmented land market but, in addition, introduce a binding density limit
at Center 1. In the presence of the binding zoning limit, and irrespectively
of the density limit, neighboring commercial and residential land rents must
remain unequal.
In Simulation 10, the combined effect of two restrictions causes
Center 1's employment and labor wages to fall well below their competitive
market solutions. Given the rigidity of the land constraint (compared to the
relatively mild density regulation), Center l's commercial land rents rise to
about nine times Center 2's respective rents, but still less than they would
in the absence of the density limit. The land constraint and density
regulation, on the other hand, reinforce each other in producing larger space
rent increases at Center 1 than those produced by the land constraint alone.
As a result of these adjustments, a pattern of large positive space rent and
negative wage differences emerges in the city, supporting thus Proposition 10.
In Simulation 11, a production cost advantage difference of $1,000
between the two centers is again introduced. This is capitalized into large
space rent differences ($2,907), but negative wage differences between the two
centers. Again, space rent capitalization is stronger and wage capitalization
weaker than they would be in the absence of both, or the presence of just one,
of the two development restrictions. Proposition 11, then is well
demonstrated by this simulation.
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In Simulation 12, Center l's employment is constrained to be about two
thirds of its competitive market size. Evidently, Center 1 becomes too small
and Center 2 too large, and, as a consequence, 73,261 of Center 2 workers must
cross-commute. Under such a cross-hauling pattern, the positive differences
in commercial space rents between the two centers are seemingly higher, and
their negative wage differences smaller, than they would be under a more
normal location pattern. In particular, the two subcenters' space rent
differences ($3,310) do exceed the value of their initial advantage
difference, as Proposition 12 would require.
3. Model Simulations: Concluding Remarks
The simulation results, then, have illustrated how capitalization works
in competitive land markets; have substantiated the first-order effects that
development constraints have on the capitalization process; and have provided
numerical support to the assertion that development restrictions may also have
nontrivial second-order effects in this process.
Most importantly, perhaps, besides demonstrating the theoretical
propositions, the simulation results have shed light to the range of different
capitalization outcomes in alternative land markets. Overall, they supported
the conclusion that for capitalization outcomes to substantially differ across
markets, development restrictions must be quite constraining. Evidently, with
mild restrictions, either on a subcenter's total land area or capital/land
ratio, the magnitude of space rent and wage capitalization is not likely to
dramatically differ in competitive, segmented, or regulated markets.
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PART 1:
AN OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
The capitalization of urban amenities has been a central focus for
academic research because of its strong implications for urban land and real
estate pricing. The urban economics literature has so far established the
mechanism through which transport costs are capitalized by residential land
prices within monocentric cities, the process through which land rents and
wages "dually" capitalize intercenter differences in transport costs within
multicentric cities, and the process of the "dual" capitalization of
productive and nonproductive amenities by land prices and wages within a
system of cities. This last class of intercity analyses cleared up the
misconception that only land prices capitalize locational value and gave
credence to the argument that urban locations must best be viewed as tied
bundles of rents, wages, and spatial amenities.
What, however, these analyses have seemingly ignored is the active
presence of firms in the land market, the way they use space and consume land,
and, perhaps most importantly, the role that variations across space in the
supply characteristics of land and allowable development densities play in the
capitalization process. Against this background, Part 1 of the dissertation
proceeded with the exploration of these largely unaddressed issues. This
concluding section of Part 1 provides a review of the modeling approach and a
summary of the major findings of the theoretical study.
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1. The Modeling Approach
Building on the principles of the traditional land market theory, four
simplified models of a two-center city have been developed to examine how the
capitalization of production amenities works in alternative land markets, and
how this eventually helps determine intercenter variations in commercial land
rents, floor space rents, and wages.
Following the tradition of the existing multicentric city [i.e., Clapp,
1983] and interarea analyses [i.e., Roback, 1982], the models have explicitly
considered the supply of and the demand for labor. In contrast, however, to
these analyses, they have accounted fully not only for the demand, but also
for the supply of commercial land and floor space. As such, they have allowed
for binding zoning limits and/or density regulations to be present in the land
market of urban areas.
In particular, Model I was developed to examine capitalization in
competitive land markets; Model II, Model III, and Model IV were designed to
mirror the effects of zoning limits, density regulations, and growth moratoria
on the capitalization process. For the sake of analytical simplicity, the
models assumed linear two-center cities, similar residential markets across
centers, fixed land consumption by urban households, uniform transport costs
per unit distance across markets, and fixed distances between the centers'
inner edges. In addition, the models employed fixed Leontief technologies in
the output market, utilized neoclassical production functions in the
commercial property market, and assumed no agglomeration economies. Any
amenity differences between locations were thus assumed to be exogenously
determined.
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In each of these models the analysis focus was on how rents and wages
adjust in response to an exogenous production advantage at one of the city's
subcenters. The model solutions evolved around three fundamental premises:
that prices in the commercial land, property, and labor markets are the result
of a general equilibrium process tending to clear simultaneously these
markets; that, as such, commercial pricing is linked in some ways to pricing
in the labor and the land market; and, lastly and most importantly, that price
differentials across space are largely the result of an amenity capitalization
process, which, in turn, may greatly be affected by the presence of binding
development controls.
The findings were summarized in a number of propositions, which were
then demonstrated through a series of simulated examples. The major
theoretical conclusions are highlighted below.
2. Capitalization in Alternative Land Markets
The analysis has clearly shown that, similarly to what happens between
metropolitan areas, a "dual" capitalization of amenity differences between
centers is taking place in the land and labor market within metropolitan
areas. As a result of this process, not only wages, but also land prices and
commercial space rents must vary between centers to allow consumers to'enjoy
equivalent welfare and firms to produce at equal costs, regardless of
location.
Rather than, however, follow the tradition of intercity Models that have
labor wages share advantage differences with land prices [Roback, 1982;
Blomquist et. al. 1988], the models consider capitalization by such direct
components of the firm production costs as floor space rents and labor wages.
As such, residential land prices indirectly capitalize whatever advantage
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difference is shared by labor wages, while commercial land prices, again
indirectly, capitalize that portion of the advantage necessary for the land
and property markets to jointly clear.
2.1 Capitalization in Competitive Land Markets
In a competitive land market, free bidding between the residential and
commercial sectors ensures equal neighboring residential and commercial land
rents. Consequently, more advantageous, and hence larger, centers command not
only higher residential land prices and higher wages, but also higher
commercial land and real estate prices than smaller and less advantageous
centers.
All other things being equal and under normal conditions, wage
differences (as well as differences in residential and commercial land rents)
are likely to capitalize most of the advantage difference to the firm.
Alternatively, floor space rents in competitive land markets must only
negligibly reflect locational value.
2.2 Capitalization in Segmented Land Markets
In the presence of binding zoning limits in the commercial land market,
adjoining commercial and residential land prices need not be equal. Thus
variations across centers in commercial land and space rents need not reflect
variations in residential land prices.
Capitalization in segmented land markets is still shared by labor wages
and space rents, but the relative capitalization magnitudes depend on how
restrictive the zoning limits applied to the most advantageous center are.
The more restraining these limits, the higher the share of the advantage that
is capitalized by floor space rents and the lower the share that is
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capitalized by labor wages (and residential land prices). Seemingly, then,
zoning limits shift capitalization away from wages and toward commercial space
rents.
2.3 Capitalization in Regulated Land Markets
In markets which are regulated with respect to their commercial density,
the competitive relationship between residential and commercial land is
maintained, but space rents need not move in a parallel fashion with
residential land prices. Commercial land is now inefficient, and the
additional production costs incurred by this inefficiency must be reflected in
higher space rents. Hence, in the presence of regulated markets, it is
variations in commercial land prices and not space rents that reflect
differences in residential land values.
Similarly to what happens in land constrained markets, capitalization in
regulated markets depends on how rigid the regulation applied to advantageous
centers is. Ceteris paribus, the more restrictive density limits are, the
higher the share of the advantage that is capitalized by floor space rents and
the lower the share that is capitalized by labor wages (and residential and
commercial land prices). Again, density limits are seen to shift
capitalization away from wages and toward floor space rents.
2.4 Capitalization in Segmented and Regulated Markets
In markets which are restrained with respect to both their commercial
land and density or, equivalently, restricted by building moratoria, the
competitive relationship between the commercial and residential market is
still disturbed. The more restrictive building moratoria are, the higher the
space rent and the lower the wage differences between centers, suggesting
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thereby that the restrictions again shift capitalization away from wages and
toward floor space rents.
3. Concluding Remarks
In summary, then, the analysis has clearly shown that neither space rent
nor wage differences alone account fully for any difference in locational
advantages that may exist between centers. Ceteris paribus, and under normal
conditions, wage differences are likely to account for the bulk of this
advantage, with floor space rents (per worker) absorbing only a trivial
amount. Once, however, binding zoning limits or density regulations are
applied to advantageous locations, space rents begin picking up more and wages
less locational value.
These conclusions are largely based on the assumption that any
endogenous benefits or costs to either firms or households (i.e.,
agglomeration economies or congestion externalities) are not at works and that
residential land markets are similar across centers. A number of alternative
assumptions provide fruitful directions for future refinements of the
theoretical models. These may include the effect of agglomeration economies
at production sites, exogenous advantages to households, differences across
centers in residential land markets (i.e., residential land consumption or
transport costs) along with variable residential densities, or alternative
assumptions on the "location" of development restrictions (i.e., development
restrictions are present at both or at the least advantageous location). Such
and other extensions of the theoretical model are discussed in the final
section of the dissertation.
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PART 2
SPACE RENT CAPITALIZATION:
THE CASE OF GREATER LOS ANGELES
Chapter V.
ANALYZING CAPITALIZATION IN THE COMMERCIAL
REAL ESTATE MARKET
The theory developed in Part 1 sets the appropriate stage for
empirically analyzing capitalization and pricing issues with contemporary
multinodal metropolises. Building on this analysis, Part 2 of the
dissertation presents an attempt to test some of the implications of this
theory and at the same time provide a consistent explanation for the existence
of space rent differences in Greater Los Angeles or, as it is more formally
termed, the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim Standard Consolidated Statistical
Area.
In this introductory chapter of Part 2, the main empirical implications
of the theory developed in Part 1 are thoroughly discussed, the previous
empirical work on capitalization and intrametropolitan commercial pricing is
reviewed, and, finally, the empirical study that stemmed out of the
theoretical work is outlined.
1. Analyzing Capitalization: Theoretical Implications
The theory advanced in Part 1 of the dissertation has a number of
important empirical implications with respect to the existence and magnitude
of compensating differences in commercial space rent and wages within
metropolitan markets. The following discussion of the main theoretical
notions advanced and their implications sets the basis for evaluating existing
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studies on intraurban pricing and designing appropriate tests of the
capitalization propositions.
[1] Intercenter space rent and wage differentials are -the
result of a "dual" capitalization process taking place in the
labor and the commercial land market of multicentered urban areas.
As such, neither space rent nor wage differences can fully
capitalize whatever production advantages may exist between
centers."'
Derived out of the analysis of all models, this directly suggests that
neither space rent nor wage differences alone may be good indicators of
differences in locational value. Consequently,- one cannot estimate the full
valuation of urban amenities by the firm when only rent or only wage equations
are estimated. To estimate the full valuation of productive amenities, both
space rent and wage equations must be empirically developed [see Roback, 1982;
Blomquist, 1988].
[2] Only in competitive land markets differences in space
rents across centers can fully be explained by differences in
residential land prices or differences in locational advantages
alone. In noncompetitive markets residential values or locational
advantages may be poor predictors of intercenter differences in
commercial space rents.
Stemming out of the analysis of the competitive model (Model I), the
clear implication of all this is that if residential land values or locational
amenities cannot fully explain intercenter differences in locational rents
within a metropolitan market, binding development restrictions must be present
in the commercial land market of this metropolitan area. This seemingly
12/ This argument always applies to the case of competitive land markets.
In constrained markets, however, there are certain values of zoning limits and
density regulations (see Chapter III) at which space rents fully capitalize
amenity differences between centers. Nevertheless, these conditions are too
restrictive to affect the generality of this argument.
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provides for a powerful test of the competitive assumption and an empirically
testable hypothesis for verifying the presence of binding zoning limits,
density regulations, or growth moratoria in a decentralized metropolitan
market.
[3] In the light of government interference which limits
commercial development through zoning limits and/or density
regulations, space rents capitalize more locational value. In
particular, commercial rents absorb more locational value at
centers which are more constrained with respect to their
commercial land (than those that are less constrained) and at
centers which are more restricted with respect to their commercial
density (compared to those which are less restricted).
Emanating out of the analysis of the segmented and/or the regulated land
market (Models II, III, and IV), this suggests that the share of locational
amenities capitalized by space rents is conditional on the level of
development restrictions. This points to the strong role that the latter may
play in the capitalization process and, at the same time, suggests that the
inclusion of land supply variables in hedonic equations is imperative for a
well specified model of intrametropolitan rent differences. Seemingly, a
failure to fully account for the supply side of land may lead to misspecified
empirical models and a misinterpretation of their results.
The most prominent example of such a potential misinterpretation is the
role that amenity variables play and the interpretation of their "true'
effects. Hedonic regressions controlling just for spatial amenities may
potentially lead to the conclusion that, if statistically insignificant, these
do not provide benefits to urban firms and thus do not affect location
decisions. Yet the "true" positive impact of spatial amenities cannot be
identified unless supply variables are controlled for in the hedonic (rent or
wage) equation. Only in a competitive market will amenity variables fully
explain variations in space rent differences across space. In a
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noncompetitive market, amenity variables alone can explain little of observed
variations in space rents.
[4] The marginal effects of spatial amenities are
conditional on the level of development restrictions. They are
higher in constrained communities and weaker at nonconstrained
ones.
This points to the possible interaction between development constraints
and locational amenities, which was contemplated in Chapter III and
demonstrated by a number of simulation examples discussed in Chapter IV. To
capture such a interplay between development costraints and spatial amenities,
hedonic models must assume a multiplicative or a nonlinear functional form.
As already suggested in the relevant literature, a failure to account for such
an interaction between explanatory variables, in general, may provide for an
important source of specification errors in hedonic equations [Bartik and
Smith, 1989].
[5] In the presence, then, of development controls,
capitalization and the resultant observed variations in space
rents and wages across intrametropolitan locations can
potentially be explained not only on the basis of spatial
differentiations from the demand side, but also from spatial
differentiations from the supply side of the commercial land
market.
Presenting a synthesis of the above conclusions, this strongly suggests
that, overall, urban locations must ultimately be viewed not only as tied
bundles of rents, wages, and urban amenities, but as bundles of rents, wages,
spatial amenities, and local development restrictions. Alternatively, space
rent and wage differences across locations are equalizing differences not only
for differences in production amenities across space, but also for differences
in land supply characteristics and development densities. A complete
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empirical model of price (space rent or wage) differences between centers,
therefore, must fully account not only for differences in locational
advantages (that may potentially affect the firms' production costs), but also
for differences in zoning limits and density regulations.
Accounting for the presence of development controls may be extremely
important when significant variations across space in floor space rents exist,
in spite of rather narrow differences in production amenities. In fact, the
theory tends to suggest that, under such a scenario, much of the variation in
space rents may be the result of differences in the rigidity of development
constraints rather than differences in locational advantages alone. Notably,
in the absence of development constraints, variations in spatial amenities may
create big wage rather than big space rent differences.
2. Past Empirical Studies: A Review and Criticism -
The preceding discussion points directly to some of the deficiencies of
existing empirical studies on intrametropolitan pricing and sets the basis for
properly analyzing capitalization from the empirical perspective. Notably,
empirical work on the intraurban level has been confined to very few,
scattered pieces of research; in the absence of an explicitly spatial,
comprehensive theoretical framework to guide them, these represent simple
applications of the Hedonic theory to the labor or the commercial real estate
market [i.e., Eberts, 1981; Wheaton, 1984].
2.1 Wage Capitalization
Postulating that wage gradients result from the spatial decisions of
utility-maximizing workers and the labor requirements of cost-minimizing
firms, a number of authors have attempted to investigate the existence of
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intraurban wage differentials. None of them, however, directly dealt with
office employees, and most of the authors have been criticized because of
their approach and their use of unreliable or insufficiently disaggregated
data on wages.
Among these authors, Segal [1960], who failed to consistently prove the
existence of negative wage gradients in the New York market, has widely been
criticized because of the lack of adequate observations, which greatly reduced
the vigor of his analysis. Other authors, such as Ehrenberg and Goldstein
[1975; 1976] and Wachter [1972], have largely been criticized for not directly
dealing with the continuous spatial variation in wages within urban labor
markets [Eberts, 1981].
Eberts [1981] made the first successful attempt to empirically ascertain
the nature of intraurban wage differentials, using extensive databases on
service employee wages and community characteristics. Focusing, in
particular, on the Chicago labor market, he tested for the existence of a
statistically significant correlation between the accessibility to Chicago's
urban core and existing differentials in wages paid to five groups of public
employees across the area's communities.
His wage equations accounted for the airline distance from Chicago's
urban core and controlled for the socioeconomic structure of the communities,
their organization structure, their ability and propensity to pay employees,
as well as some selected worker characteristics. With R2s ranging from 30% to
31%, the explanatory power of the alternative wage equations he estimated is
poor, but the regression results largely substantiate the hypothesis that
urban wage gradients do exist. The wages of four out of the five labor groups
examined by Eberts [1981] were found to exhibit a negative relationship with
dis ance from the urban core, the largest employment concentration in the
Chicago area. In particular, administration wages were found to decrease on
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average $24 per mile, clerical wages $10 per mile, police wages $12 per mile,
and public works wages $9 per mile. The slope of the wages of fire employees
was found to be almost zero, possibly because, Eberts hypothesizes, of their
strong labor unions. Yet, he admits that a labor union variable contributed
very little to the explanation of wages paid to any labor group. The omission
of locational demand and supply variables along the lines suggested so far
might have very well been responsible for the relatively poor results of the
study.
Most recently, Gyourko and Tracy [forthcoming] have tested for the
existence of compensating wage differentials generated by variations in fiscal
variables across 125 U.S. cities. They suggested that, with cost of living
held constant, variations in such fiscal variables, as state and local taxes
or corporate tax rates explain as much of the variance in intrametropolitan
wages as do differences in worker characteristics. This study, however, is
not exactly intraurban; the units of analysis (cities) are not concentrated in
a specific metropolitan area, but are rather dispersed in a number of
metropolitan areas in the country.
2.2 Space Rent Capitalization
The studies on intrametropolitan commercial pricing are by and large
capitalization studies. They attempt to explain differences in space rents on
the basis of such locational attributes, as distance from the CBD, access to
white collar labor, other accessibility advantages related to highway systems,
or effective tax rates. Yet, similarly to prior theoretical analyses, none of
these studies has attempted to incorporate the supply side of land and account
for the role that variations in land supply characteristics may play in the
capitalization process.
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Existing studies on intrametropolitan pricing fall into two broad
categories: [1] those attempting to model variations across urban submarkets
in commercial space rents and [2] those that attempt to model variations in
such rents within more narrowly defined urban areas.
Analyzing Intrametropolitan Variations in Space Rents
Clapp's [1983] and Wheaton's [1984] analyses seek, in general, to model
and explain space rent differences across locations within a broader market
area. Differences in locational attributes across space become thus
increasingly important.
Clapp [1980] hypothesized that market rents on office-commercial space
result from the competing bids of office activities and the spatial
distribution of supply. He further hypothesized that central locations must
be more advantageous than others because of the need for face to face
contacts, but also assumed that suburban nodes must exert some decentralizing
force as well. The latter is thought to be related to shorter commuting on
the part of workers employed at suburban centers. Thus, Clapp suggested, the
production costs of firms, in addition to wages and the cost of space, must
include the costs of trips to the central business district, as well as the
cost of trips to specialized suburban nodes.
Utilizing Coldwell Banker data on annual quoted rents on 105 buildings,
Clapp estimated a number of price equations to explain the strong negative
rent gradient produced by the centralizing pull of downtown Lds Angeles and
the decentralizing forces that suburban concentrations exert. In addition to
the centralizing force of the CBD and the pull of suburban nodes, he
demonstrated the importance of a number of building and neighborhood
characteristics in determining floor space rents in the Los Angeles area. His
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beta coefficients indicated that access to the CBD was at least twice as
important as any of the other locational determinants considered in the study.
Together, these variables explained 67% of the observed variation in annual
quoted space rents.
Clapp contended that his estimated reduced form provided estimates for
implicit market prices for the different locational attributes of office
properties. Given, however, the theory so far developed, the full value of
these attributes (or amenities) is expressed by the sum of price and wage
differences. Proxied by commuting time, the latter were also found by Clapp
to be important.
Using average rent data on office buildings in the Boston metropolitan
area, Wheaton [1984] also estimated a number of alternative rent equations
across jurisdictions. These accounted for the role of such locational
advantages, as good access to white collar labor, access to major-highways,
and low tax rates. He found that access variables were important across a
number of alternative model specifications, but that tax payments or tax rates
never had a significant impact on gross rents. He attributed this to a price
elastic spatial demand for property. In the face of a spatially competitive
market, he concluded, land or property owners and not tenants must bear the
burden of tax differences across jurisdictions.
This conclusion does not contradict the way capitalization works in a
competitive land market, where wages (which reflect fully variations across
locations in land prices) and not rents absorb amenity/disamenity values. Yet,
this could better be illustrated by accounting for the presence of zoning
limits, density regulations, and other institutional restrictions in the
Boston metropolitan area and demonstrating that their effect on commercial
rents was in fact unimportant.
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Analyzing Variations in Space Rents within Urban Submarkets
In contrast to the studies just reviewed, Hough's and Kratz's [1983] and
Brennan's, Cannaday's, and Colwell's [1984] studies mostly stress the effect
of micro-location factors and qualitative characteristics of buildings on
space rent determination.
Using standard econometric techniques, Hough and Kratz [1983] examined
variations in office rents across 139 buildings in downtown Chicago. They
considered a number of extrinsic characteristics of these buildings, such as
their distance from the CBD, distance from commuter transportation, or parking
facilities, and a number of intrinsic building characteristics, such as the
type of construction, rentable area, number of floors, well appointed lobbies,
the presence of prestigious tenants, their proximity to complementary firms,
the extent of safety features, the number and speed of elevators, and the
quality of architecture. They find that radial distances to the nearest
commuter stations, the building's total gross floor area, whether a restaurant
or a snack shop is present, and whether or not the building has been
designated as a Chicago landmark explain the 60% of the variation in average
annual rents per square foot.
Brennan, Cannaday, and Colwell [1984] on the other hand, presented a
different approach to the analysis of rent differentials within the Chicago
CBD. Arguing that the use of the building as the unit of observation
precludes considering the effect of lease terms on rental rates, their unit of
analysis was the office unit rather than the office building.
Using actual transaction data on 29 office units, their ten-variable
regression equations produced an R2 of more than 80%. Their hedonic equations
included such variables as the the amount of 'stop", whether the lease
included a CPI escalation clause, the size of the unit, its percent of
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nonusable area, the size of the building the unit is located, the vertical
location of the unit in the building, and, finally, the building's distance
from certain streets and the city center.
2.3 Past Empirical Studies: Concluding Remarks
First, by uncovering significant variations across locations in labor
wages [Eberts, 1981] and commercial space rents [Clapp, 1983; Wheaton, 1984],
existing intraurban studies have provided some evidence on the existence of
"dual" capitalization within metropolitan markets. This evidence, however, is
indirect and, perhaps, less appealing than that provided by existing interarea
studies. In these studies, such as Roback's [1982] or Blomquist's et. al.
[1988], both land prices (or proxies of them) and wages are regressed on the
same set of amenity variables to show that both factor prices capitalize to
some extent amenity variations across regions or urban counties. As such,
these interarea studies have definitely provided more compelling tests of the
"dual" capitalization hypothesis than the intraurban studies just reviewed.
Second, by implicitly assuming perfectly competitive markets, the
hedonic models that these studies have employed may be misspecified. In the
case of studies on commercial pricing, the use of individual office leases or
office buildings as the unit of their analysis did not help, since land
availability, for example, may vary not across sites but rather across broader
commercial locations.
Finally, to the extent that they fail to caution for the fact that the
hedonic models they employ cannot be used to provide estimates of implicit
prices for locational attributes or characteristics, these studies are
misleading. In many instances, their underlying assumption is that
differences in space rents reflect fully differences in amenity values. Even
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in the face of constrained markets this may not be true, because there are
also wage differences between locations that may capitalize some of the
difference in locational value.
2. The Empirical Analysis: An Overview
In contrast to prior empirical work, the study presents an attempt to
test for the presence of and explicitly examine the role that local
development constraints play in the capitalization process. Focusing on the
capitalization of urban amenities into commercial space rents in the greater
Los Angeles area, the analysis builds on the theoretical work to evolve around
a number of closely related empirical questions:
[1] Is the commercial land market in Greater Los
Angeles competitive? Do differences in housing prices
or locational advantages alone explain differences in
commercial space rents across centers?
[2] If present, do development constraints play
a strong role in the capitalization process as the
theory suggests? In other terms, are space rents
higher in cities that are more constrained with
respect to land than others that are less constrained?
Do space rents in nodes with more strict density
constraints capitalize more locational value than
space rents in nodes with less or no density
restrictions? Is amenity capitalization stronger at
more--as opposed to less--heavily constrained or
regulated centers?
[3] Then, coupled with spatial amenities, do
development restrictions help explain well variations
across commercial nodes in space rents?
In addressing these questions, the empirical study identifies and models
differences in commercial space rents across 33 office-commercial nodes in the
Los Angeles area. The methodology employed combines elements from both
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categories of commercial pricing studies described above. First, using a set
of rental property data from Coldwell Banker, the study draws from the Brennan
et. al. [1984] and the Hough and Kratz methodology [1983] to estimate price
indices, or "effective" rents across nodes. Then, similarly to Clapp's [1981]
and Wheaton's [1984] approaches, it develops a number of hedonic price
equations to model these variations as a function of locational attributes or
characteristics.
The data utilized to estimate these models included an extensive
database on space rents and property characteristics from Coldwell Banker and
a set of data on housing rents/prices, locational advantages, and land and
density restrictions in a number of commercial nodes in the greater Los
Angeles area. These data are not without limitations. Asking rents instead
of contract rents were available; building quality variables were
insufficient; housing price data represent urban aggregates rather than more
localized, "border" data; and data on land availability could be translated
into dummy rather than numeric variables.
Yet, despite such data deficiencies, the statistical model
specifications and the estimation results provide conclusive answers to the
questions posed above in a manner supportive of the theoretical propositions.
Because, however, of the data limitations just mentioned, the results
presented in this part are merely intended to be only illustrative of the
method suggested by the analysis in Part 1 of this dissertation.
Chapter VI proceeds with the description of the study area and its
commercial nodes. Chapter VII discusses the estimation of subcenter
"effective" rents. Finally, Chapter VIII presents the statistical model
specifications and discusses the estimation results.
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Chapter VI.
URBAN SUBCENTERS
IN THE LOS ANGELES-LONG BEACH-ANAHEIM SCSA
The intensity of commercial activity in Greater Los Angeles, the
multicentricity of the area, and the resurgence of development regulations in
most of its cities during the recent years make it, perhaps, the most eligible
metropolitan area for this analysis. This chapter describes the study area,
identifies its most important urban submarkets, and discusses the selection of
a number of commercial nodes within their boundaries.
1. The Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim SCSA"'
Greater Los Angeles is formally termed by the U.S Census as the Los
Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim Standard Consolidated Statistical Area (SCSA). It
encompasses four Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)--Los Angeles-Long
Beach, Oxnard-Simi Valley-Ventura, Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, and
Riverside-San Bernandino-Ontario and, as shown in Map VI-1, extends
geographically over five urbanized counties--Los Angeles, Ventura, Orange,
Riverside, and San Bernandino. Each of these metropolitan areas or counties
is characterized by considerable commercial activity, spatiall'y allocated in a
number of commercial submarkets. These are listed in Table VI-1.
"' Most of the discussion in this section is based on information obtained
from ULI's "Market Profiles" (various issues) and comparable information obtained
from various zoning ordinances.
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Map VI-1
The Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim SCSA
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Table VI-1
Commercial Submarkets in Greater Los Angeles
Urban Counties
Los Angeles"' Orange' Ventura*' Riverside" San Bernandino"
Cerritos Airport Area Ventura Riverside San Bernandino
Hollywood Central County
LA Downtown Newport Center
LA Suburban North County
Pasadena/Glendale South County
San Fernando Valley West County
San Gabriel Valley
South Bay
West LA
Wilshire
Source: Coldwell Banker; Torto-Wheaton
Notes:
' The Los Angeles county is incorporated into the Los Angeles-Long
Beach MSA;
b/ Orange county is incorporated into the Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden
Grove MSA;
'' Ventura county is included in the Oxnard-Ventura MSA;
d/ Riverside and San Bernandino counties are included in the Riverside-
San Bernandino-Ontario MSA.
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The Los Angeles metropolitan area (4,000 square miles) is undoubtedly
the biggest financial "center" of the West. The majority of multi-tenant
space in the area, mostly highrise, is located in eight different urban
submarkets: Downtown Los Angeles specialized in finance; the Hollywood market
specialized in the entertainment industry; Wilshire District; West Los
Angeles; Glendale/Pasadena; South Bay specialized in the aerospace industry;
San Fernando Valley specialized in high-tech industries; and the relatively
new submarket of San Gabriel Valley.
Most of these areas seem to be confronted by an insufficient supply of
commercial land and strict zoning regulations, which have substantially
limited the availability of development opportunities in the region. The
passage of Proposition U by the city of Los Angeles in 1986 has downzoned
allowable FARs to half of their previous maximums, making thus developable
sites for highrise office space even more scarce. The central part of the San
Fernando Valley is perhaps the area that was hardest hit by the new
regulations. As a result, new commercial development is now forced to occur
north of Ventura Boulevard toward the Van Nuys Airport area or in the less
"crowded" submarket of San Gabriel Valley.
The Oxnard-Ventura metropolitan area (1,843 square miles), which
encompasses Ventura county, has emerged as another attractive alternative for
businesses wishing to relocate outside the Los Angeles basin. Mostly
specialized in the service sector, the area constitutes a single office
submarket. This includes the Ventura coastal plain and the county's
technology corridor, which straddles the Los Angeles/ Ventura county line and
stretches along the Ventura freeway (101). These areas have approximately 4.4
million square feet of prime office space in multi-tenant buildings of over
20,000 square feet each. Approximately, eighty percent of this space was
built after 1980. On average, office buildings are lowrise and in business
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park settings. Given the fast pace of development during the recent years and
fears of uncontrolled growth, a number of zoning regulations are in place in
the most of the county's cities to guide new commercial development.
The Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove metropolitan area (786 square miles),
extending over Orange county, is one of California's three largest high-tech
and manufacturing centers. The expansion of the industrial sector during
recent years has been accompanied by the expansion of the business service
sector with law firms, financial institutions, and insurance companies often
being relocated from the Los Angeles metropolitan area, or opening regional
branches in the county. Major office submarkets include the Airport Area,
Central County, Newport Center, and the North, South, and West Orange county.
Most of office development, mostly highrise, is located in the Airport/South
County submarkets, which host approximately 50% of existing office space.
Today, commercial development in the area is confronted with tightening
development restrictions, likely to affect both the cost and intensity of
future development.
The Riverside-San Bernandino metropolitan area (27,308 square miles),
encompassing the San Bernandino and Riverside counties, is one of California's
largest metropolitan areas. The area's economy is dependent on its industrial
base and its increasingly expanding service sector. Approximately 9 million
square feet of office space in buildings over 5,000 square feet are located
there. Most of this space is concentrated in the two broader submarkets of
San Bernandino and Riverside. Office buildings are primarily lowrise, but a
non-negligible number of highrise buildings are located in the two central
cities of the area--Riverside and San Bernandino. The pro-growth sentiment
that exists and the financial assistance given by the public sector may be
some of the reasons behind the location of many new businesses in the area
during the last ten years.
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2. Urban Subcenters in Greater Los Angeles
For the purpose of this research, commercial nodes or urban subcenters
are operationally defined as spatial peaks in office service activity within a
metropolitan market. By all accounts, Greater Los Angeles is a multi-nodal
area. The Coldwell Banker database on commercial buildings in the various
submarkets of the area provided a solid basis for identifying its most
important subcenters.
The structure of this database is described in Table VI-2. Available
data for each building regularly surveyed include information on its
submarket location, its city/area location, the type of rent reported
(i.e., gross or net), the low and high range of current asking rents, as well
as the height, size, and age of buildings for which asking rent data are
available.
The locational information provided by these data, however, left no
other choice but that of considering the various cities or towns in Greater
Los Angeles as the geographical units of reference in this analysis. The only
exception is the city of Los Angeles, where location information allows the
identification of a number of important commercial nodes within its
boundaries.
Given the floor areas and the city/area location of those buildings
which are regularly surveyed and, most likely, offer multi-tenant space, it
was possible to identify 23 cities and 10 subcenters within the city of Los
Angeles with considerable commercial activity. Shown in Map VI-2, these
constituted the subcenter sample of this analysis. Notably, only subcenters
with more than 1 million square feet in competitive office space have been
selected. The inclusion of smaller subcenters in the sample would undoubtedly
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Table VI-2
Commercial Building Data
Data
Type
Qualitative
Qualitative
Qualitative
Qualitative
Numeric
Numeric
Qualitative
Numeric
Numeric
Numeric
Coldwell Banker
Description"
Buildings in central cities
that are regularly surveyed b'
Buildings in suburban areas
that are regularly surveyed ''
Submarket within which the building
is located '/
City/Area location
Low Range of asking rents *'
High range of asking rents
Type of rent reported '
Year the structure was built
# of floors in the structure
Total floor area (in square feet)
Description in the case of DVI and SVI refers to the case the
t.he dummy variable is assigned the value of 1;
b/ It is most likely that regularly surveyed buildings offer multi-
tenant rather than single-tenant office space;
C/ See Table VI-1;
d/ In the case of most buildings, city location is given. The only
exception are buildings located in the Los Angeles City, for which
specific area location within the city is provided;
e/ For all of the buildings a low range of asking rents is provided;
' A high range of asking rents is reported for some of the buildings
(mostly highrise);
'' Whether gross rents, rents net of taxes, net of taxes and utilities,
or net of taxes, utilities, and maintenance expenses are reported is
specified.
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Variable
Name
DVI
SVI
SUBMARKE
BANK
LRATE
HRATE
LTYPE
YEAR
FLOORS
AREA
Source:
Notes:
T
Hap VI-2
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim SCSA:
Selected Subcenters
santa Monteo
L E G E N D
Subcenters within the Los Angeles City
1. Los Angeles Downtown
2. Canosg Park
5. Century City
4. Hollywood
5. LAX (LA Airport)
6. Mid Nilshire
7. Park Mile/Miracle Mile
9. Van Nuys/Encino
9. Venice
10. Mestwood
Other Cities/Areas
Pasadana
GOemmdoral LaVerne I
create problems regarding the estimation of "effective" subcenter rents
(discussed below). 14 '
Table VI-3 below lists the selected nodes and their characteristics with
respect to total square footage, average space rents, as well as the average
age, height, and floor size of their commercial buildings. The Los Angeles
downtown (34,267 sq.ft) and Irvine in Orange county (20,000 sq.ft) are the
largest commercial nodes in Greater Los Angeles, but not the nodes with the
highest average rents. Estimated as the average of the low and the high range
of the asking rents reported, these range from $12.02 in San Bernandino to
$23.81 in Westwood. The average age of buildings in these subcenters ranges
from 6.43 years in Brea/La Habra to 35.62 years in the Hollywood area. The
average height of commercial buildings ranges from 2.22 floors in Westlake
Village (part of Thousand Oaks) to 20.1 floors in Century City within the
"' The intensity of office service activity within these towns (or groups
of towns) can be evaluated using one or more of the following measures:
1). Office employment-to-population ratio: This measure is often proposed
in the literature as a good indicator of the intensity of a specific activity
within a metropolitan market. If higher than the one observed in neighboring
municipalities, or as McDonald [1987] suggests, municipalities that are closer
to the central business district, it may very well signify the existence of local
employment peaks. If high enough, this ratio may also signify large urban
subcenters whose workers cross-commute.
2). Office employment-to-total land area: Such or similar measures,
utilizing office space instead of office employment, are preferable to simple
land use utilization measures (i.e., office employment/office space-to-commercial
land area), in that the latter overlook important differences in density
variations and, as such, prevent proper comparisons across towns. Office
employment(office space)-to-total land area ratios can be used similarly to
employment-to-population ratios to evaluate the existence of significant urban
subcenters.
3). Alternatively, location quotient-type of measures, utilizing office
employment-to-population ratios, or the ratio of office employment (office space)
to total developable land area can be used and evaluated against a benchmark
value.
However, such considerations as the number of observations (buildings)
available in each city and, most importantly, the overall size of the sample
suggested that the cities be selected solely on the basis of their size (in terms
of square footage). The use of such measures as those discussed above would
possibly result in the inclusion of a small number of smaller cities and the
exclusion of a larger number of larger cities in the sample. This would
considerably limit the size of the sample, and would hinder the proper estimation
of hedonic rents in smaller cities.
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Table VI-3
Greater Los Angeles:
"Average" Subcenter Characteristics
Competitive Average Average Average
Square Average Building Building Floor
Cities/ Feet Rents Age Height- Size
Subcenters (in 1000s) ($/sqft) (years) (floors) (sqft)
1.Los Angeles City
* Los Angeles Downtown 34,267 $22.95 29.12 19.25 16,738
* Canoga Park 5,613 17.81 9.00 3.99 23,807
* Century City 8,473 22.68 15.76 20.10 19,050
* Hollywood 3,014 13.28 35.62 8.82 11,198
* LAX (LA Airport) 3,652 14.95 13.75 8.90 20,433
* Mid Wilshire 9,487 14.80 27.54 9.60 15,207
* Park Mile/Miracle Mile 4,462 17.74 19.86 7.28 22,127
* Van Nuys/Encino 7,588 18.14 13.50 5.85 17,560
* Venice 1,247 19.25 12.23 5.23 23,126
* Westwood 5,935 23.81 12.92 10.65 14,554
2.Anaheim 3,122 14.08 11.40 3.69 16,917
3.Beverly Hills 8,515 21.86 19.95 6.81 15,691
4.Burbank 4,897 17.86 9.23 6.65 16,241
5.Costa Mesa 3,057 15.14 7.79 4.63 23,544
6.Covina/Glendora 1,196 16.09 8.47 2.87 19,790
7.Culver City 2,577 16.24 8.61 3.27 17,307
8.Glendale 2,920 17.79 11.96 7.00- 13,099
9.Huntington Beach 1,488 14.58 7.50 3.77 14,897
10.Irvine 20,320 16.50 9.42 3.78 18,999
11.Brea/La Habra 1,801 14.88 6.43 2.70 29,898
12.Long Beach 6,193 16.83 12.21 7.22 16,700
13.Newport Beach 3,312 19.16 14.76 3.55 12,878
14.Orange 5,059 15.46 9.83 5.50 25,789
15.Pasadena 5,506 17.21 17.40 5.66 15,753
16.Pomona/LaVerne 1,314 15.61 10.00 3.18 32,508
17.Rancho Cucamonga 1,304 15.31 4.47 2.21 29,675
18.Riverside 4,215 12.12 12.32 2.36 23,687
19.San Bernandino 3,021 12.02 8.68 2.22 19,415
20.Santa Ana 5,692 13.93 13.04 4.20 22,732
21.Santa Monica 5,293 21.81 9.50 4.70 26,533
22.Torrance 4,996 16.26 7.33 3.30 22,245
23.Ventura/Ojai 1,025 12.45 13.14 2.24 12,605
24.Westlake Village 1,252 14.94 7.52 2.22 24,578
Source: Calculated on the basis of data provided by Coldwell Banker
(see Table VI-2).
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city of Los Angeles. Lastly, average floor size ranges from 11,198 square
feet in Hollywood to 32,508 square feet in Pomona/La Verne.
Evidently, then, there are significant variations across centers not
only in size, but also in such characteristics, as the age and height of their
office-commercial buildings. Consequently, differences in those subcenters'
average rents may reflect not only variations across centers in locational
demand and land supply characteristics, but also variations in their mix and
characteristics of buildings.
To control for such differentiations and isolate the effect that
locational factors have on differences in floor space rents, hedonic price
analysis is used here to estimate "effective" subcenter rents. The
theoretical basis of the estimation procedure, as well as the estimation
results are discussed in Chapter VII, which follows.
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Chapter VII.
ESTIMATING "EFFECTIVE" SUBCENTER RENTS
The ultimate objective of the empirical research is to model variations
across centers in space rents within the greater Los Angeles area, in order to
identify the role that spatial amenities and local development restrictions
(if present) play in the capitalization and pricing process.
Given that office space is a highly differentiated or heterogeneous
good, both in terms of quality and structural characteristics, average rents
cannot be used as a basis for such a modeling. Following Hough's and Kratz's
[1983] and Brennan's, Cannaday's, and Colwell's [1984] methodologies, the
standard hedonic framework is, therefore, utilized here to estimate hedonic or
"effective" subcenter rents, or, as often termed in the relevant literature,
"iquality-controlled" rental prices."'
In this chapter the basic methodology of the hedonic framework is
briefly discussed, the statistical model specifications adopted and the data
utilized to estimate subcenter "effective" rents are presented, and, finally,
the hedonic rent estimates are reviewed.
IS/ Commercial pricing studies have employed hedonic regressions mostly to
explain differences in space rents, rather than to estimate quality-controlled
prices [Hough and Kratz, 1983; Brennan, Cannaday and Colwell 1984; Clapp, 1981;
Wheaton, 1984]. This is in contrast with housing studies, where the technique
has quite often been being used as a means for estimating price indices [i.e.,
Goodman, 1978; Follain and Malpezzi, 1980; Ozanne and Thibodeau, 1983]. Ball
[1973] provides a comprehensive review of early housing studies based on the
hedonic regression technique, while Quigley [1979] discusses a number of issues
associated with the application of the technique to the case of housing markets.
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1. Hedonic Price Equations"'
The hedonic framework views the price of a heterogeneous commodity as a
vector of the "implicit" or "shadow" prices of its utility-bearing attributes
or characteristics. These prices are determined through the interaction of
the consumers' value functions and the producers' offer curves.
Alternatively, the market price of hedonic goods is determined by the
interplay between the demand and supply schedules of its characteristics
[Rosen, 1974]."7
Given, the so called identification problem, the relationship between
market price and hedonic attributes is econometrically stated as the reduced
form:
P(z) = P'z, (VII.1)
where P(z) is the price of the commodity, z a vector of its utility-bearing
attributes, and P' a vector of the implicit, "shadow", or hedonic prices of
these attributes, which are thought to contribute toward its price.
Two methodological issues are involved in specifying such a reduced form
equation. The first is which hedonic attributes or other explanatory
variables to include in the hedonic model. Ideally, a well-specified model
16/ Early contributions to the Hedonic technique were first made by Court
[1939] and later Griliches [1971], who introduced techniques of hedonic price
analysis, in which the valuations of various components can be implicitly
determined through standard regression techniques. Despite such early
contributions to the hedonic technique, the clear theoretical justification for
at least the basic principles underlying the procedure were set out by Rosen
[1974] in his analysis of hedonic goods.
17/ First made by Rosen, such a statement illustrates the similarities
between hedonic analysis and the economics of spatial equilibrium and equalizing
differences.
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should include all hedonic characteristics of the property and should control
for the whole array of other factors that may influence price. The former
(hedonic attributes) involve the characteristics and quality of the unit, the
quality and characteristics of the building the unit is located, and the
characteristics of the lot the space is built on. The physical
characteristics of units/buildings are numerous; they include age,
architectural style, specific architectural features, quality, size in terms
of square footage, and height. Location characteristics include neighborhood
composition, neighborhood quality and amenities, access to the central
business district, access to other service clusters in the area, access to
major highways, public transportation stations, airports, or white collar
labor pools. These and similar attributes are quite often considered in
existing hedonic studies.
Depending on the exact definition of the model's dependent variable and
its time reference, a number of other explanatory variables may need to be
included in the hedonic regression. The hedonic modeling of market leases,
for example [Brennan et. al. 1984], in addition to property attributes, would
require the inclusion of such terms of the lease, as length, time initiated,
and the presence of "stops" or "escalation clauses". The modeling of asking
rents, on the other hand, would possibly require the inclusion of the time the
unit remained in the market unrented, or the landlords' expected returns
[Stull, 1978]. However, as it is always the case, the choice of the variables
to use in a hedonic model is always constrained by the data available.
The second methodological issue involved in hedonic analysis is what
functional form the hedonic model must assume. The Hedonic theory does not
provide any basis for the a priori determination of the functional form,
simply because hedonic equations reflect both supply and demand factors.
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As a result, the functional form of hedonic regressions has been conjectural
in treatment. Clapp [1983], for example, used a semilogarithmic form, arguing
that such a form is convenient when continuous distance variables are
involved. This form allows prices to change exponentially, rather than
linearly with distance. Wheaton [1984], on the other hand, used a linear
form. Linear functions are often considered as quite convenient. Their
coefficients are directly interpreted as "shadow" prices and thought of as
quite suitable in the estimation of demand elasticities [Lancaster, 1971].
The implicit assumption, however, embedded in linear hedonic specifications is
that the marginal utilities associated with each attribute are constant, an
assumption which runs against the "principle" of satiation.
Recently, it has been suggested that the Box-Cox transformation be used
to evaluate the fit of alternative model specifications.' In their hedonic
analysis of office space rents, Hough and Kratz [1983] experimented with a
linear, a semilogarithmic, a loglinear, and a logarithmic model. Based on
Box-Cox tests, they concluded that the linear and semilogarithmic model
performed better than the other functional forms. Likewise, Brennan,
Cannaday, and Colwell [1984] experimented with linear, logarithmic,
semilogarithmic, loglinear, and reciprocal functional forms. Based on a
series of Box-Cox/Box-Tidwell transformations and likelihood ratio tests, they
concluded that their loglinear and semilogarithmic models were superior to
other forms. These findings tend to support contentions by other analysts
that the Box-Cox technique tends to reject linear forms in favor of
multiplicative ones [Goodman, 1978].
18 For details see Box and Cox [1964]; Box and Tidwell [1962]; Kowalski and
Colwell [1986]. Bartik and Smith [1987] provide a good review of the problems
associated with the use of the procedure.
- 124 -
2. The Hedonic Model
In specifying, then, the hedonic model in this study, the independent
variables to be included in the reduced form were selected, and the functional
form of the model was specified.
2.1 The General Model, Variables, and Data
The hedonic models developed here utilize the Coldwell Banker data in
Table VII-2 to develop quality-controlled rent estimates for each subcenter
included in the sample. As already mentioned, these data include a low and a
high range of asking rents, which set the basis for calculating the average
asking rent at each location (the dependent variable in the hedonic model), a
number of qualifying characteristics of the rent reported (gross, net of
taxes, net of taxes and utilities, net of taxes and utilities and other
operating costs), and a limited number of building attributes (the year each
structure was built, it size, and its height).
Although these data are also segmented by city or area location, the
number of observations at certain cities or areas (i.e., Pomona/La Verne,
Westlake Village) is too small to warrant the estimation of hedonic equations
at each of them. Thus hedonic equations by submarket, including locational
dummies for commercial nodes (cities or areas) within each of these
submarkets,.were finally considered. These were of the general form of:
R = f(X1,X2,. .X1,SUB1 , SUB 2, SUB., INT,, INT2,. -INT., DI, D2 . -D)
(VII.2)
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where:
R
X1, X 2, X3,,...
SUB1 , SUB2,...
INT,, INT2, .. .
D,, D2, D,, D4
In particular:
X)=Year
X=Height
X>=Areaf 1
D=Gross
D2=Netax
D3=Unknown
D4=Range
: average building gross rents per square foot;
: building attributes;
: locational dummies denoting subcenter location;
: interactive terms between building attributes and
locational dummies.
: qualifying characteristics of the rent reported.
: year the structure was built;
: number of floors;
: total floor area/# of floors;
: a dummy variable {1,0}; gross=1 denotes
buildings for which a gross rent is reported;
: a dummy variable {1,0}; netax=l denotes
buildings for which the reported rent is net of
taxes;
: a dummy variable {1,0}; Unknown=1 denotes
buildings for which the type of rent was not
reported;"'
: a dummy variable {1,01} range=1 denotes
buildings for which a 'low" as well as a "high" rent
is reported.20'
Variable Effects
The Year variable may capture at least two effects: the effect of newer
and possibly more energy efficient buildings on asking rents and the effect of
older, historic buildings. With the former effect likely to prevail, a
significantly different from zero, positive Year coefficient is expected.
The Height variable is included to capture the rent premium that higher
buildings may command. Naturally, then, a significantly different from zero,
positive coefficient is expected.
"' There are a number of buildings for which it is not specified whether
the reported rent is gross, net of taxes, or net of taxes, utilities, and
operating expenses. Instead of arbitrarily classifying the reported rents as
gross, or net, or excluding them altogether from the sample, it was thought of
as more suitable to represent them by this dummy variable.
20' Whenever appropriate, an interaction term between Range and Height was
also included in the hedonic model.
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The Areaf1 (floor area per floor) variable was used in place of total
floor area, simply because the latter is to some extent collinear with Height.
Along with Year, Areafl is considered as a measure of the building's
responsiveness to the tenant's needs. As such, the Areafl variable reflects
the effect of contiguous space, which may be thought of as an advantage to
those firms that may want to expand at some point in the future. A
significantly different from zero, positive coefficient for Areafl is thus
expected.
The Gross, Netax, and Range dummies reflect identity effects. These
were included to capture the difference that the type of rent reported makes.
With the effect of reporting asking rents net of taxes, utilities, and
operating expenses reflected in the intercept of the regression equation,
Gross and Netax are both expected to have a significantly different from zero,
positive coefficient. When included alone, Range is expected to produce a
positive effect. When interacted with Height, however, its effect is
expected to be larger. In other terms, the higher the number of floors in the
building, the greater the divergence between the low rent and the average rent
estimates.
Data Deficiencies
The regression model above is not without problems. First and foremost,
asking rents are not the result of actual market transactions. As such,
these may not represent market equilibrium rents, but just the landlords'
perception of what their space is worth on the current market. It would,
therefore, be much preferable to use contract rent data (controlled for the
time the lease was signed, the lease concessions made, escalation clauses,
workletters, etc.) in.place of asking rents, but Coldwell Banker's contract
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rent database for Greater Los Angeles is less extensive, more noisy, and less
detailed than the one used in this study.21'
Second, factors that may affect variations across buildings in average
asking rents have not been incorporated into the model. Asking rents may vary
considerably with such factors, as the time the commercial space has been in
the market unrented, as well as the landlord's expected returns. Notably,
factors that affect asking rents have not yet thoroughly been investigated by
the empirical literature. Stull [1978] poses a number of interesting
questions the answers to which would suggest a set of appropriate independent
variables to be included in such a hedonic model. Do landlords have a
fallback strategy? Do they customarily begin their search for a tenant by
asking a high rent, which they gradually lower over time? Do they consider
the trade off between expected return and expected "waiting" time?
Third, the quality of the structure and its immediate surroundings is
missing from the data. Variables such as the architectural quality of the
structure [Hough and Kratz, 1983], internal amenities, such as lobbies and
elevators, external amenities, such as parking, the "character" of surrounding
buildings or, in general, the quality of their neighborhood, simply, were not
available [Brennan et. al., 1984].
Fourth, the hedonic regressions above ignore differences in asking
gross rents attributable to differences in micro-location factors.
The latter may include distance to freeways, distance to public transport
stations, distance to other public amenities, proximity to retailing
establishments, or access by higher income clients.
21/ In Schmenner's [1981] study on intrametropolitan industrial rents, for
example, the omission -of data on lease terms might have been responsible for the
poor results obtained.
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Finally, the hedonic regression does not control for differences in
tenant characteristics. As such, the estimated price function is an average
market price function, which, by definition, does not especially refer to a
specific consumer group.
2.2 Functional Form(s)
The hedonic regressions estimated here are presented in (VII.3). These
were of a linear (linear in the dependent variable and the characteristics)
and a semilogarithmic (linear in the dependent variable and log in the
characteristics) form. Box-Cox transformations were not done, but the R2 and
standard errors of the linear and semilogarithmic equations can directly be
compared in this case to indicate the model with the best fit.
R =a1+bX 1+b2X2+. .biXi+ciSUB+c 2SUB2+cMSUBm+dD+d 2D2+dnDn
eR =a+b 1 X1 +b 2X2+. .biXiI+cSUB+c 2SUB2+cMSUBM+diDi+d 2D2+dnDn
(VII.3)
2.3 Estimation Results
Given the data deficiencies, the estimation results of the semilogarithmic
equation (see Appendix III) are quite satisfactory and marginally better than
those of the linear equation. The explanatory variables have by and large the
expected sign, and in most submarkets variations in such factors as those
considered helped explain well over 50% of the variation in average
gross rents. In some of these submarkets (i.e., Hollywood, San Gabriel
Valley, West Los Angeles, North and Central Orange County) the unexplained
variance is relatively small, but in a few other (i.e., Wilshire District,
Riverside, Ventura) this is quite significant. Although definitely not a
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I.
rule, it seems that the hedonic model works better in smaller and possibly
more homogeneous markets, where differences in location and quality may be
less discernible.
Given the estimated coefficients of the semilogarithmic equations, the
"effective" average gross rents for a 7-story, 10-year old building, of 19,602
square feet per floor, with both a low and a high rental rate reported have
been computed. Figure VII-1 and Table VII-1 present the estimated "effective"
subcenter rents and provide for their comparison with the average existing
rents in these centers.
Figure VII-1".'
Greater Los Angeles:
Effective Vs "Average" Subcenter Rents
| 1 |1 41 | | 110112 1 14 116 118 120 2214
* 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
Selected Subcenters
Average Rents a Hedonic Estimates
"'/ The asterisks in Figure VII-1 signify subcenters within the city of Los
Angeles. These are presented in the same order they appear on Table VI-3 and
Table VII-1.
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Table VII-1
Greater Los Angeles:
Commercial Space Rent Estimates
Average Hedonic
Cities/ Rents Rents
Subcenters ($/sqft) ($/sqft)'
1.Los Angeles City
* Los. Angeles Downtown $22.95 $20.67
* Canoga Park 17.81 20.77
* Century City 22.68 21.74
* Hollywood 13.28 15.53
* LAX (LA Airport) 14.95 15.74
* Mid Wilshire 14.80 14.74
* Park Mile/Miracle Mile 17.74 18.51
* Van Nuys/Encino 18.14 19.99
* Venice 19.25 19.52
* Westwood 23.81 22.73
2.Anaheim 14.08 16.08
3.Beverly Hills 21.86 24.24
4.Burbank 17.86 19.99
5.Costa Mesa 15.14 16.04
6.Covina/Glendora 16.09 19.41
7.Culver City 16.24 19.25
8.Glendale 17.79 18.61
9.Huntington Beach 14.58 15-.83
10.Irvine 16.50 19.28
11.La Brea/La Habra 14.88 13.54
12.Long Beach 16.83 17.73
13.Newport Beach 19.16 21.67
14.Orange 15.46 16.05
15.Pasadena 17.21 18.53
16.Pomona/La Verne 15.61 11.70
17.Rancho Cucamonga 15.31 20.01
18.Riverside 12.12 16.72
19.San Bernandino 12.02 14.61
20.Santa Ana 13.93 15.44
21.Santa Monica 21.81 24.14
22.Torrance 16.26 18.76
23.Ventura/Ojai 12.45 16.94
24.Westlake Village 14.94 15.30
Average 1989 gross rents for a 10 year old, seven-story
building of 19,602 square feet per floor.
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Notably, "effective" rents give a somewhat different picture than that
the average subcenter rents reflect. As already mentioned, the diversity
between average and effective rents is solely attributable to the different
"mix" of commercial buildings in the various centers considered in the
empirical study.
As Figure VII-1 and Table VII-l also show, there are wide differences in
the "effective" rental price of office space across centers in the greater Los
Angeles area. These range from a low of $11.70 in Pomona/La Verne to a high
of $24.24 per square foot in Beverly Hills. Buildings in the Los Angeles
downtown command an effective rent of $20.67, which is notably lower than
other subcenters in the Los Angeles city, such as Westwood ($22.73) or Century
City ($21.74), and other cities included in the sample, such as Santa Monica
($24.14).
Since differences in building characteristics across centers are
presumably controlled for by the hedonic estimates, any differences in
effective rents must be accounted for by differences in those centers'
locational attributes. This notion is further explored in Chapter VIII, which
follows.
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Chapter VIII.
ANALYZING THE PATTERN OF "EFFECTIVE" RENTS
In this chapter, the hedonic estimates presented in Table VII-1 are
utilized to test some of the implications of the theory developed in the first
part of this dissertation and, at the same time, provide an explanation for
the observed differences in these rents across centers.
Given the subcenters' "effective" rent estimates, data on housing rents
and/or housing prices, as well as data on locational advantages and
development restrictions across the 33 selected centers in the Los Angeles-
Long Beach-Anaheim SCSA, two empirical tests are made possible:
[1]. A simple, preliminary test for the presence of binding
development constraints in the greater Los Angeles area. This
examines the extent to which locational advantages and/or housing
prices (rents) alone explain differences in space rents across
centers.
[2]. A direct test of the role that local development
restrictions play in the amenity capitalization process. This
involves the testing of those theoretical propositions suggesting
that in the presence of binding development controls space rents
begin capturing more locational value; the examination of the sign
and magnitude of marginal amenity effects; and the exploration of
the extent to which, together, locational advantages and
development constraints can better explain intercenter differences
in floor space rents.
1. Testing for the Presence of Development Constraints
Building on Model I's analysis of the competitive land market, the first
test requires the testing of the null hypothesis that the commercial land
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market in Greater Los Angeles is competitive. In such a market, intercenter
variations in commercial space rents must be explained by intercenter
variations in residential land prices. Alternatively, variations across
centers in commercial space rents must be explained by variations across
centers in locational advantages. At the same time, however, differences in
residential land markets between centers must be accounted for. This suggests
a role for both residential land prices and locational advantages in the
statistical model, despite the risk of running into multicollinearity
problems. The test of the competitive market assumption, then, requires the
estimation of the alternative, general models in (VIII.1) below:
[1] R = f(RPrice)
[2] R = f(CA)
[3] R = f(CA, RPrice)
(VIII.1)
where:
RPrice: residential land prices (or proxies for land values)
CA : a vector of spatial amenities
The specific null hypothesis underlying the reduced form [1] is that
intercenter differences in space rents are solely attributable to differences
in residential land prices between centers. The null hypothesis underlying
statistical equation [2] is that interecenter differences in commercial space
rents can solely be explained by differences in locational advantages between
centers. Statistical equation [3] combines features from both equation [1]
and equation [21; the inclusion of residential values, in addition to spatial
amenities, is exactly intended to control for differences in residential land
markets between centers. In particular, differences in residential land
values are considered to be a summary measure for any advantage differences
that may exist between residential markets (i.e., differences in the quality
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of public services or differences in the level of property tax rates). In
addition, this variable controls for additional firm benefits associated with
higher residential values, such as better environment or access to higher
income clientele, from the consumption side of the commercial real estate
market.2
1.1 The Variables and Data
The data required for and the variable proxies used in the estimation
of these models are discussed below. The final variables selected for
inclusion in the econometric models are listed in Table VIII-1.
1]. Residential Land Values. Directly suggested by the theoretical
analysis of the competitive city in Part 1, this variable is crucial to the
testing of the competitive market assumption. Yet, consistent and reliable
information by city on the price of residential land bordering commercial
development does not exist.
In the absence, then, of such information, it must necessarily be
assumed that residential land prices can reasonably be proxied by median
housing values or median contract apartment rents, which are more readily
available. Variations in binding residential densities may make this
assumption less appealing, but, on the other hand, the nature of the median
estimates may alleviate to some extent this problem.24'
23/ Residential land values may also, to some extent, be' a proxy for the
areas' redevelopment potential. Higher residential land prices may minimize the
potential for redevelopment, often taking place in central and older residential
sections of central cities. However, such an interpretation is more relevant in
the case noncompetitive markets are assumed. Different redevelopment potential
in these markets may affect the degree to which zoning limits bind.
24/ A hedonic representation of housing values would be much more
preferable. Census data, however, are insufficient, and reliable data on an
array of housing attributes could not readily be made available from other
sources.
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Table VIII-1
Empirical Data: Definition of Variables
Variable Variable
Name Type Source Description
R Numeric Estimates "Effective" subcenter rents, 1989
based on
Coldwell Banker
Data
RRent Numeric 1980 Census Median contract rents
RValue Numeric 1980 Census Median housing values
Educ1 Numeric 1980 Census % of persons 16 years old or older
that attended 12 years of schooling
or more
Capital Numeric County and City Capital expenditure of local
Databook 1988 governments per capita 1984-1985
Access Numeric Maps # of hwys passing through the
community & # of airports
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The only source of readily available data on housing values or apartment
rents by city is the 1980 Census of Population and Housing [Chambers of
Commerce, 1980]. This provides direct information for each of the 23 cities
and indirect information by census tract for the remaining areas included in
the sample. Given Coldwell Banker's geographic definition of the 10
subcenters within the city of Los Angeles, their corresponding census tracts
were identified and median subcenter housing values and apartment rents were
computed for each.
There are relative advantages and disadvantages in using housing values
or apartment rents as proxies for residential land prices. The advantage of
using housing values rather than apartment rents is that the former may be a
better proxy for the value of residential land than the latter, which may also
reflect the effect of rent controls, which are prevalent in some of the cities
included in the sample. The advantage, however, of using the latter lies in
the fact that apartment units more directly compete for urban land with the
commercial sector than single family units. Usually, more intensive uses,
such as multifamily housing, are found in central parts of the city, where
commercial development is located, while less intensive uses, such as single
family housing, are located in more remote suburban areas.
Often made in cross-sectional studies, the implicit assumption in using
1980 in place of 1989 prices is that relative housing prices and apartment
rents across centers have not significantly changed since 1980. The
assumption may not be unreasonable, provided that the relative demographics
and locational attributes across cities have not significantly changed over
this time period.
2]. Locational Advantages. As far as the advantage variables are
concerned, the theory does not explicitly specify which are the variables that
affect the firms' production costs and therefore the firm advantages that
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different urban locations offer. Consequently, the identification of these
variables involves considerable experimentation with the data and a review of
the findings of past empirical studies.
Effective tax rates is, perhaps, the most widely discussed--and, at the
same time, the most controversial--variable examined in past empirical studies
of nonresidential location and pricing [Erickson and Wasylenko, 1980; Wheaton,
1984]. Unfortunately, however, it is unlikely that nontrivial tax rate
variations across the 33 communities included in the sample exist.
Proposition 13 in California has specified a maximum statutory rate of 0.5% of
assessed value, which most of communities in the state use. In the absence,
then, of intejurisdictional variations in tax rates, it seems unwarranted to
consider this variable.
Within this context, a number of other advantage variables, which are
expected to have a positive effect on commercial space rents, were considered
and tested in preliminary regressions. The ones that were finally utilized in
the statistical models are discussed below."'
"' Besides the variables discussed here, a number of additional variables
were initially considered, but finally excluded from the equations because of
their poor performance across all alternative model specifications discussed in
this and the following section. These were the following:
Educ2: # of persons 16 years old or older, who attended 16 or more years
of schooling [Census of Population, 1980]. It was used as a proxy for the
concentration of white collar labor. Because of its strong correlation with
Educl, it was used in place, and not in addition to this variable. In the case
of subcenters within the city of Los Angeles, the city average was used.
Distancel: Distance from the Los Angeles downtown. This was measured along
major highways connecting the various subcenters with the Los Angeles downtown.
The assumption underlying its use is that the concentration of banking and
finance establishments in the Los Angeles downtown must provide for cost
advantages and, hence, exert a major centralizing pull on office-commercial
activities in the greater Los Angeles area. This is consistent with the contact
hypothesis discussed by Clapp [1980] and Tauchen and White [1980].
Distance2: Distance from nearest urban concentrations. For subcenters in
Los Angeles and Ventura county, Los Angeles downtown was considered to be the
center of attraction. For subcenters in Orange county, distances were measured
from Anaheim. For subcenters in Riverside and San Bernandino county, distances
from Riverside were considered. Again, this variable was intended to be used in
place of, rather than in addition to, Distancel.
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Educl: # of persons 16 years old or older, who attended 12 years of
schooling or more [Census of Population 1980]. The variable is a proxy for
the concentration of white collar labor, which a number of past empirical
studies have found to play a crucial role in the location of business and
nonresidential pricing patterns [i.e., Archer, 1983; Wheaton, 1984].
In the case of subcenters within the city of Los Angeles, the city average
was used. The use of city averages instead of localized data within the
city of Los Angeles seems more reasonable, because of the large size of
these subcenters, their spatial proximity, and, consequently, the small
likelihood that localized labor markets within the city itself
exist.
Access: the # of highways passing through the communities plus the
number of existing airports in these communities, both taken from area
transportation maps. The availability of a diverse highway network and
airports facilitates the movements of employees and, as such, provides
significant advantages to urban firms. Notably, the availability of
airports, a factor which has not often been considered in empirical studies,
may be critically important for many businesses--especially those related to
the entertainment industry and those involving activities that are often being
conducted outside the subcenters. This composite variable is the basic
accessibility measure examined in this study.
Capital: the local government capital expenses per capita, 1984-1985
[County and City Databook, 1988]. This variable may reflect the scale and, to
a certain extent, the quality of urban infrastructure. As such, it may
capture the effect of differences in the efficiency of transport network
across the area's various centers.
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1.2 Statistical Models
Given the data just described, the following simple linear regressions
were estimated:
[1.1] R = b + bIRRent
[1.2] R = bo + biRValue
[2.1] R = bo + b1Educl + b2Access + b.Capital
[3.1] R = bo + biRRent + b2Educl + bAccess + bCapital
[3.2] R = bo + b1RValue + bEducl + bAccess + bVCapital
(VIII.2)
1.3 Estimation Results
The results of the statistical estimation of the simple regression
models in (VIII.2) are displayed in Table VIII-2. Notably, the five models
perform very poorly. In Models [1.1] and [1.2], the coefficients of the
housing value (RValue) and housing rent (RRent) variables have the correct
sign and are statistically significant, but the unexplained variance in both
models is quite large. Evidently, RValue performs better than RRent, possibly
because of external constraints, in the form of rent controls, imposed on the
latter.
Model [2.1], regressing space rents solely on the set of advantage
variables, exhibited a very poor fit. In Model [3.1], which, in addition to
the advantage variables, includes housing rents, the effects of neither the
housing rent nor the advantage variables (with the exception of capital) are
statistically different from zero at the 95% level of confidence. This may,
to a certain extent, be due to a collinearity problem between the model's
independent variables. The explanatory power of Model [3.2] is stronger than
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Table VIII-2
Regression Results: Testing for the Presence of Development Constraints
Dependent Variable: 1988 Annual Average Asking Rent per square foot
Statistical Models
1.1 1.2 2.1 3.1 3.2
Independent
Variables:"'
Constant 13. 15NNN 13.50MMM 12. 6 12. 74NNN 11.37
(+5.64) (+10.15) (+2.85) (+2.91) (+3.10)
RRent 0.016"" - - 1.39E-2 -
(+2.20) (+1.29)
RValue - 4.94E-5NNN - - 4.9lE-5N"
(+3.71) (+3.82)
Educl - 5.62E-2 -4.29E-2 -1.86E-2
(+0.97) (-5.81E-2) (-0.36)
Access - - 0.11 0.30 0.76""
(+0.35) (+0.85) (+2.40)
Capital - - 7.56E-3. 6.33E-3" 4.64E-3
(+2.34) (+1.89) (+1.67)
N 33 33 33 33 33
R2 0.14 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.48
R2 -adjusted 0.10 0.29 0.13 0.15 0.41
Standard Error
of Regression 2.83 2.53 18.17 2.76 2.30
' The numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are t-statistics. One,
two, and three asterisks next to the regression coefficients denote
statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level of confidence,
respectively.
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the explanatory power of other models, but it again seems that Educ1 and
RValue are to some extent collinear. By looking across rows in Table VIII-2
it also becomes evident that the sign and the magnitude of the Educ1
coefficient is quite sensitive to the specification of the model. In the
absence of RRvalue and RRent, the variable has the correct sign; on the
contrary, in the presence of these variables, Educl has the wrong sign.
The estimated statistics and the poor fit of these simple regression
models suggest that neither housing prices nor locational advantages (at least
those considered here), together or alone, can explain to a satisfactory
degree differences in commercial rents across centers. The null hypothesis
that the commercial land market in Greater Los Angeles is competitive must
then be rejected in favor of the alternative one, which invalidates this
competitive market assumption. In the face, then, of a noncompetitive market,
and in the absence of variables to control for the supply side of- this market,
the hedonic models above may be misspecified and their estimation results
misleading. Consequently, it would be premature to conclude that spatial
amenities such as those considered are not capitalized to some extent by floor
space rents. It remains, therefore, to be seen whether the inclusion of
spatial variations in land supply characteristics and development densities
significantly improves the explanatory power of the hedonic model.
2. Testing the Capitalization Hypothesis
Suggesting that binding development controls may be present in Greater
Los Angeles, the simple tests just discussed have set the stage for the second
test of this study. Presenting a direct test of the capitalization
propositions developed in the theoretical part, this attemps to test the
general null hypothesis that development restrictions do not play a role in
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influencing the capitalization process and, eventually, in determining the
magnitude of spatial variations in commercial pricing. Building on the
analysis of the noncompetitive cities (Models II, III, and IV), the simple
regression models in [l]-[3] above have thus been expanded to include measures
of local development controls:
[4] R = f(C,, Cons)
[51 R = f(C, RRent, Cons)
[6] R = f(CA, RValue, Cons)
(VIII.3)
where:
CA : a vector of spatial amenities
RRent : median contract rents, 1980
RValue : median housing values, 1980
Cons : a vector of land supply characteristics
The data used for the estimation of these models, as well as the
alternative functional forms that these models assume are discussed below.
2.1 The Variables and Data
The advantage, as well as the housing value and apartment rent variables
have already been described when discussing the first test of this study. The
data collected on three types of development controls--zoning restrictions,
density regulations, and growth moratoria--are described in Table VIII-3 and
briefly discussed below."'
1]. Zoning restrictions. These refer to measures of land availability.
Such measures were collected from the commercial sections of the various
"' Only the variables that have been used in the final regression equations
are described here. Additional data collected, but not finally used, included
FAR limits.
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Table VIII-3
Development Restrictions: Definition of Variables
Variable Variable ,
Name Type Source Description
Landl Dummy Planning, Landl=l denotes communities that
Redevelopment, are severely constrained with
Departments, CB respect to their commercial land
Land2 Dummy Planning, Land2=1 denotes communities that
Redevelopment, are moderately constrained with
Departments, CB respect to their commercial land
Height Numeric Zoning Ordinances, Average height limits imposed
Zoning Maps on office-commercial developments
HRestr Dummy Zoning Ordinances Hrestr=1 denotes communities that
Zoning Maps impose height restrictions
on commercial development
Growth Dummy Planning, Growth=l denotes communities that
Redevelopment, are land constrained and at the same
Departments, CB time impose growth moratoria on
commercial development
"' CB: Coldwell Banker
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planning and redevelopment departments of the cities included in the sample
and from the local offices of Coldwell Banker's commercial division. Mostly,
the data obtained were in the form of vacant land zoned commercial as a
percentage of the total commercial land in the area or in the form of precise
acreage figures. The former were often given in terms of a range, while the
latter were available for only half of the communities included in the sample.
For this reason, the percentage estimates obtained were subsequently
used to construct dummy variables in place of a single continuous variable for
the availability of vacant land zoned commercial. The two dummies--Landl and
Land2--denote the areas which are considered to be severely and moderately
constrained with respect to their commercial land, respectively. The default
dummy denotes the remaining communities, that is, those which are not being
confronted with land scarcity problems. Anecdotal evidence presented in
various Urban Land Institute publications [ULI, 1986-1989] tends to support
this classification.
2]. Density regulations. These refer to the height limits that local
governments impose on commercial development. They were taken from the zoning
ordinances of the communities included in the sample. Often, the average or
most prevalent limit was considered as the most representative of each
community or subcenter included in the sample. Only those limits applied to
business districts or to areas designated as office-commercial were
considered.
3]. Growth moratoria. These refer to regulatory actions enacted by
communities. desiring to limit the amount of commercial space to be built per
year. They were taken from zoning ordinances. Temporary or short-term growth
controls, which are slated to last less than a year, or conditional moratoria,
which have not yet been enacted, were not considered. Notably, the few
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communities with persistent growth control measures are, at the same time,
confronted with severe land scarcity problems.
2.2 Statistical Models
Given the amenity data and the restriction variables just described,
three sets of alternative statistical model specifications have been
developed. As already mentioned, the models in (VIII.4) explore the null
hypothesis that land constraints do not play a strong role in the
capitalization process. If this is the case, the inclusion of supply
variables must not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model,
and the regression coefficients of these variables must be statistically
insignificant.
[4] R = a + +bC +. . .+bmCA. + c Consi + ...c Consn
R =a + alRRent + bICAl +. . +bCAm + cICons, + ... c cConsn
R a. + alRValue + bICAI +. . +bmCAm + cICons + ... c cConsn
[5] R = ao + WAdv(bo + bCons + ... b Consn)
R =a + aRRent + WAdv(bo + bCons + .+. bnCons )
R =a + aRValue + WAdv(bo + bCons + .b. bCons )
[6] R =(b + , CAl+ b2CA2 +. . +bCA)*(cO + cICons + . .. cnCons )
R = a1 RRent + (bo + bICA+ b2CA2 +.. .+bmCAm)*(cO + cICons + ...c Consn)
R =aRValue + (b + bCA1 + b2CA2 + . .+bCAm)*(co + cICons + ... c Cons.)
(VIII.4)
where:
C Al , . . . Cm : a set of advantage variables
ConsI,.. .Consn : a set of variables representing development constraints
In particular:
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CA1  Educ1
CA2  : Access
CA, Capital
WAdv Weighted Advantage Index, calculated on the basis of
the linear models in [4] above.
Consi Landl: A dummy variable [1,0); Landl=1 denotes
communities which are severely constrained with
respect to their commercial land;
Cons2  Land2: A dummy variable [1,0}; Land1=1 denotes
communities which are very/moderately constrained with
respect to their commercial land;
Cons, : Restr: A dummy variable 11,01; Restr=1 denotes
communities that impose height limits on commercial
buildings;
Cons : HRestr: H*Restr; where H: Height limits (in feet)
Cons, : Gro: A dummy variable [1,0}; Gro=1 denotes communities
that restrict the amount of office-commercial space to
be built per year.
The first set of alternative models in [4] simply build on the reduced
forms in [l]-[3] to explore the specific null hypothesis that in the light of
development restrictions, rents do not absorb more locational value. While,
then, maintaining the housing value/rent and advantage variables, the models
enter, also linearly, a number of land supply characteristics--Landl, Land2,
Hrestr, Restr, Gro--,which are expected to be statistical significant and, as
such, notably improve the explanatory power of the hedonic model. If this is
the case, the null hypothesis can be invalidated, and it can be concluded
that, in the face of institutional restrictions on the operation of the
commercial land market, space rents do in fact absorb more locational value.
By definition, the linear forms in [4] discard any interaction that may
take place between spatial amenities and development restrictions. As such,
they cannot.be used to analyze the strength of the marginal amenity effects on
space rents. To detect such effects, the regression model has to be expanded
to include interaction terms between each advantage and each constraint
variable. This would, however, add an excessive number of independent
variables to the model, which would, in turn, significantly limit the
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equation's degrees of freedom and, ultimately, the reliability of the
estimation results. To circumvent this problem, the statistical results in
[4] were utilized to develop weighted advantage indices (WAdv). Interacting
these with all constraint variables in [5] can help reject the specific null
hypothesis that, in the presence of development restrictions, spatial
amenities do not have a stronger marginal impact on space rents. However, the
estimation of weighted indices from the linear equations in [4] (which exclude
interaction effects) and the exclusion of the five individual constraint
variables from [5] (due to the limited number of observations) present two
notable weaknesses of these models.
By employing a multiplicative, nonlinear functional form, the
statistical models in [6] circumvent the problems associated with the use of
advantage indices and the problems associated with the exclusion of the
"individual" effect of development restrictions. Yet, the biggest, perhaps,
advantage of this nonlinear specification is that it allows for the
interaction of each advantage variable with each constraint variable, without
adding an excessive number of parameters to be estimated. Given the limited
number of observations in the sample, this presents, perhaps, the most
critical advantage of the model. Notably, given the overidentified nature of
the equation, for the algorithm to properly converge to a solution, the
coefficient of one of the model's independent variables must be set
exogenously.
2.3 Estimation Results
The estimation results are displayed in Table VIII-4, Table VIII-5, and
Table VIII-6. Evidently, the coefficients of.all variables representing
spatial amenities and development restrictions are statistically significant,
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and the goodness of fit of these regression models presents a significant
improvement over the fit of the simple regression models already displayed in
Table VIII-2.27'
Looking at Table VIII-4, in particular, it becomes clear that in the
presence of variables representing development constraints, spatial amenities
acquire their expected sign and are of a statistically significant magnitude
at high levels of confidence. This contrasts sharply with the models in
Table VIII-2, where, in the absence of supply restriction variables, spatial
amenities--Educl, Access, Capital--hardly displayed statistically significant
coefficients. RRent, however, still behaves erratically, and although the
RValue coefficient has the correct sign, this is only significant at the 80%
level of confidence.
The effect of development constraints, on the other hand, appears to be
quite strong, indicating that these must be binding. Evidently, the magnitude
of the land restriction dummies is consistent with the definition of the
variables (see Table VIII-3). All else being equal, space rents in severely
constrained communities (Landl=l) are by $4.18 higher than space rents in
nonrestricted communities. Similarly, space rents in communities which are
moderately constrained with respect to their commercial land (Land2=1) are
higher by only $2.17 than space rents in nonconstrained communities.
27/ The effect of FAR limits was also tested in preliminary regressions.
Apparently, these are less widespread than height limits, as only 11 communities
(which also have height limits) have such regulations in place. The effect,
however, of FAR limits appeared to only be negligible and, hence, this variable
was excluded from all regression models. A number of possible explanations can
be advanced with respect to the weak effect of these limits on floor space rents.
First, this may be due to the various variances and FAR bonuses that cities
(i.e., West Hollywood) offer in exchange for the development of residential units
in commercial complexes. Second, FAR limits may be less binding than height
limits. Third, FAR limits may be less enforceable than height limits. Finally,
FAR and height limits may be correlated to some extent; the only possible way
that the two density measures should differ is through setback provisions. Yet,
a simple correlation coefficient between the two variables in the 11 communities
could not unequivocally substantiate this explanation.
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Table VIII-4
Linear Regression Resultsl: Testing the Capitalization Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: 1988 Annual Average Asking Rent per square foot
Statistical Models
4.1 4.2 4.3
Independent
Variables:"'
10. 29"""
(+6.18)
10. 39"""
(+6.59)
-3. 26E-4
(-7.92E-2)
Constant
RRent
RValue
Educ1
Capital
Access
7. 71E-2"""
(+2.81)
5.44E-3"""
(+4.67)
0.42"
(+3.45)
4. 18"
(+9.80)
2. 70N"
(+5.65)
-5. 28E-2"
(-5.67)
+1. 36""
(+2.70)
4.49"""
(+8.74)
9.82E-6
(+1.62)
5. 74E-2"m
(+2.65)
4. 86E-3NmN
(+4.49)
0.52"""
(+4.27)
4. 06""
(+10.03)
2. 76NNN
(+6.34)
-5. 11E-2Nm
(-5.80)
+1. 33"N
(+2.81)
3.92"""
(+6.70)
N
R2
R2-adjusted
Standard Error
33
0.93
0.91
0.88
"' See Table VIII-2.
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10.29""m
(+6.32)
7. 56E-2Nm
(+3.94)
5.40E-3NNN
(+5.08)
0.42"""
(+3.86)
4. 18'""
(+10.17)
2.71NNN
(+6.04)
-5. 27E-2"*
(-5.84)
+1. 35""
(+2.77)
4.47"'"
(+9.02)
Land1
Land2
Hrestr
Restr
Gro
33
0.93
0.91
0.90
33
0.94
0.92
0.86
Furthermore, communities without height restrictions (Restr=O) have
lower rents than communities with such restrictions in place. As evident in
the sign and magnitude of Restr and HRestr, the less binding these
restrictions are (i.e., the lower the limits imposed), the smaller their
positive effect on floor space rents.
Persistent growth control measures also appear to strongly affect
commercial space rents. All else being equal, communities with such controls
(Gro=1) appear to have significantly higher space rents than communities
without such controls. Apparently, the effect of growth controls on space
rents is somewhat stronger than the effect that land constraints have on these
rents. This may be attributable to the fact that communities with growth
moratoria also face severe shortages in their commercial land.
The statistical models in Table VIII-5, which test for interaction
effects between development constraints and spatial amenities, also display
promising results. Interestingly enough, both the RRent and RValue
coefficients have the correct sign. Yet, in contrast to what was observed in
the previous models, only the RRent coefficient is statistically significant
at the commonly accepted confidence level of 95%. Notably, the weighted
advantage index in these models has a strong positive effect, which, as
hypothesized, also depends on how severe land constraints are, whether or not
communities have height restrictions in place, and whether or not these
communities have enacted growth control moratoria.
In particular, the effect of locational advantages on space rents is
seemingly higher in communities which are severely constrained with respect to
their commercial land than in those which are less constrained, stronger in
communities which impose more stringent height limits than in those imposing
less relaxed height limits, and stronger in communities which attempt to
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Table VIII-5
Linear Regression Results2: Testing the Capitalization Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: 1988 Annual Average Asking Rent per square foot
t-statistics in ( )
Statistical Models
5.1 5.2 5.3
Independent
Variables:'
10. 72"""
(+9.76)
10.65NNN
(+8.83)
6.18E-5"
(+2.00)
10. 91*N
(+10.01)
RValue
WAdv
WAdv*Land
WAdv*Land2
WAdv*HRestr
WAdv*Restr
WAdv*Gro
N
R 2
R2-adjusted
Standard Error
0.99"""
(+6.86)
10.54"""
(+9.68)
0.38"""
(+5.89)
-8.30E-3*"
(-6.00)
0. 22NNN
(+3.06)
0.67NN
(+8.89)
33
0.92
0.90
0.94
0.98"""
(+6.05)
0.53"m
(+9.44)
0.38"""
(+5.67)
-8.16E-3NNN
(-5.84)
0. 22*NN
(+3.00)
8.67NNN
(+8.15)
33
0.92
0.90
0.96
7.53
(+1.51)
1. 02""
(+6.77)
0.64wN
(+8.89)
0.46"""
(+5.97)
-9. 94E-3NNN
(-5.90)
0. 27NNN
(+3.07)
0. 74*N
(+7.28)
33
0.92
0.90
0.94
a See Table VIII-2.
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Constant
RRent
control commercial development within their boundaries through the enactment
of growth control and building moratoria than in those they do not.
Lastly, the results of the nonlinear models displayed in Table VIII-6,
which allow for interaction between each individual spatial amenity and
development restrictions, lead to quite similar conclusions. All equation
parameters, but those of RRent or RValue, are statistically significant at
commonly accepted levels of confidence. This simply suggests that the effect
of all locational amenities are strongly dependent not only on the presence,
but also the rigidity of development constraints.
The strong statistical significance of the interaction variables in
these models provides credence to the assertion that in the presence of
development controls the marginal effects of spatial amenities on space rents
are stronger. This ultimately supports the conclusion that an interplay
between a location's amenities and development restrictions does take place to
ultimately determine its locational rent. The relative magnitude of effects
is similar to those discussed above. Space rents in severely constrained
communities, communities that have strict height limits, and communities that
have growth moratoria in place absorb more locational value.
In comparing the R2s and standard errors of the three sets of models, it
becomes apparent that the simple linear models in Table VIII-4 perform
marginally better than the models with the interaction forms and those with a
nonlinear specification. This does not have, however, to lead to the
conclusion that spatial amenities do not closely interact with development
restrictions. If this were true, the relevant parameters of the nonlinear
model would not appear to be statistically significant, and the fit of the
nonlinear regression models would not be as strong as it now appears
to be.
- 153 -
Table VIII-6
Nonlinear Regression Results: Testing the Capitalization Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: 1988 Annual Average Asking Rent per square foot
Statistical Models
6.1 6.2 6.3
Estimated
Parameters:
24. 73""
(+3.75)
0. 16"N
(+2.60)
0. 01E -1""
(+3.14)
0. 44""
(+3.82)
0.10" '
(+3.35)
0. 68E-1 N
(+3.26)
-0. 14E-2""
(-3.40)
0. 36E -1 "
(+2.65)
0.111"
(+3.17)
0. 11E-2'
(+0.41)
24. 23"
(+2.99)
0. 15""
(+2.49)
0. 11E-1"'
(+2.89)
0. 44""
(+3.77)
0.11"'*
(+3.15)
0. 71E-1"
(+3.04)
-0. 14E-2"
(-3.21)
0. 38E -l""
(+2.50)
0.11"'N
(+3.11)
0. 94E-5d/
(+1.52)
20. 56"'"
(+3.37)
0. 10'
(+1.86)
0.87E-2"""
(+2.91)
0. 53"""
(+4.17)
. 0.N13"'
(+3.49)
0.89E-1""
(+3.24)
-0. 17E-2"NN
(-3.47)
0. 46E -1""
(+2.63)
0.13'
(+3.52)
N
R2
R2-adjusted
Standard Error
33
0.93
0.91
0.90
33
0.93
0.91
0.92
See Table VIII-2;
b' The access coefficient, b2, was exogenously set to 1;C/ Coefficient of RRent;
d/ Coefficient of RValue.
33
0.94
0.91
0.88
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Overall, then, the statistical results lead to the rejection of the
general null hypothesis that development constraints do not play a strong role
in amenity capitalization; dismiss the more specific null hypothesis that in
the presence of development controls space rents absorb more locational value;
and give some credence to the assertion that the marginal amenity effects are
stronger in more restrained as opposed to less restrained communities. Taken
together, the results provide a well-supported explanation for the observed
differences in space rents across commercial nodes in Greater Los Angeles.
It is important to note that the estimated hedonic price models cannot
be used to estimate the full valuation of urban amenities by commercial firms.
As already mentioned and documented in the theoretical analysis, part of
amenity values is also capitalized by wage differences between locations. The
full value of urban amenities can only be given by the sum of space rent and
wage differences (per worker). Again, wage equations could not be estimated
here, simply because of the absence of reliable data on wages at the subcenter
level.
Part 2's concluding section, which follows, provides a brief review of
the empirical study, gathers together its major findings, and draws its
overall conclusion.
- 155 -
PART 2:
SPACE RENT CAPITALIZATION IN GREATER LOS ANGELES
Suggesting that simple applications of the Hedonic theory to the
commercial real estate market may be quite misleading, the theoretical study
pointed directly to the deficiencies of existing empirical studies on
intrametropolitan commercial pricing [i.e., Clapp, 1983; Wheaton, 1984].
Presenting simple hedonic representations of commercial space rents within
urban markets, these studies have altogether ignored the supply side of the
commercial land and real estate market and the way it influences amenity
capitalization. Building, then, on the theoretical study and the deficiencies
of prior empirical work, the present empirical study has tested for the
presence of development restrictions and has thoroughly explored the role they
play in the capitalization process.
1. The Methodological Approach
The principal hypothesis the study sought to empirically address is that
development restrictions, if present, do in fact play a strong role in the
capitalization process and, as such, help explain to a large extent
intercenter. differences in commercial space rents within metropolitan markets.
In the absence of wage data at the subcenter level, the empirical
research was confined to the econometric analysis of space rent capitalization
across 33 commercial subcenters in the greater Los Angeles area, 10 of them
located within the city of Los Angeles. Selected solely on the basis of
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square footage information provided by Coldwell Banker, these centers may
represent the largest commercial centers in the five-county statistical
consolidated area.
Utilizing a Coldwell Banker database on average building rents and a
number of such building characteristics as age, height, and floor area,
"effective" subcenter rents were first estimated and their pattern analyzed
through standard econometric techniques.
In particular, a number of alternative statistical model specifications
have been developed to analyze this pattern: a simple linear model, where
space rents were assumed to solely reflect differences in residential house
values and/or locational advantages; an extended linear model, accounting in
addition for local development controls; a linear model with interactive terms
between spatial amenities and development restrictions; and, lastly, a
nonlinear, multiplicative model. Their statistical estimation has produced
very promising results.
2. Empirical Findings
In particular, the empirical results gave rise to the following set of
conclusions:
1]. The commercial land market within the greater Los Angeles area is
not competitive. Evidently, government interference has created binding
development constraints, which are strongly intervening with the
capitalization of spatial amenities into commercial space rents. This was
apparent in the inability of residential house values and/or locational
advantages alone to explain these differences and the strong statistical
significance of the supply variables, once included in the hedonic equations.
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2]. Development constraints do in fact play a strong role in the
capitalization process. In the presence of development controls, space rents
do reflect more locational value, and the marginal effect of locational
amenities on space rents does appear to be conditional on the presence or
absence of development restrictions. These marginal effects appear to be
stronger in those communities that are severely constrained with respect to
their commercial land than in those that are less constrained, stronger in
those communities imposing more restraining as opposed to more relaxed height
limits, and stronger in those communities that persistently attempt to control
commercial development within their boundaries through growth moratoria than
in those they do not.
3]. In the face, then, of a noncompetitive market, variations in floor
space rent differences across commercial subcenters in Greater Los Angeles can
to a large extent be explained by differences across centers in both spatial
demand and land supply characteristics. Such locational advantages, as access
to white collar labor and the extent and quality of transport network, and
such supply restrictions, as zoning limits, density regulations, and growth
moratoria have ultimately explained more than 90% of the observed variation in
"effective" subcenter rents.
Taken together, these conclusions give credence to the theoretical
argument that in the light of government interference with the operation of
the commercial land market, the modeling of capitalization must fully account
for the supply side of this market. Evidently, in the absence of variables
controlling for this interference in the hedonic model, the effect of spatial
amenities had either appeared to be insignificant or ran contrary to what the
underlying theory suggests.
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As such, the empirical study has provided a sound example of the failure
of simple hedonic models as means to explain urban pricing. Most importantly,
however, it has shown that such hedonic models can easily be extended to
sucessfully explore capitalization and commercial pricing issues within
contemporary multicentric metropolises.
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AN OVERVIEW AND EXTENSIONS
Overall, the dissertation presented an attempt to extend the
capitalization debate to the case of the commercial land and real estate
market. It asked whether and to what extent variations across commercial
centers in land rents, floor space rents, and wages reflect differences in
locational value, and thoroughly examined the role that local development
restrictions play in affecting the magnitude of these variations.
The study has thus aimed at improving the understanding of an important
aspect of real estate pricing. Given this objective, it has provided a
simplified, explicitly spatial theoretical framework within which to analyze
capitalization outcomes in nonmonocentric city settings, and it has suggested
and--to the extent permitted by the available data--implemented a methodology
for empirically analyzing commercial pricing and capitalization issues.
Yet, there are a number of important directions toward which both the
theoretical and empirical analyses can first be refined and then be extended
to better reflect some of the complexities characterizing the operation of
urban land markets.
1. The Theoretical Analysis
Theoretical modeling can be refined in a number of directions. These
include basic modeling refinements, as well as significant model
reformulations. All emanate out of the simplified assumptions underlying the
theoretical work.
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1.1 Modeling Refinements
Modeling refinements, for example, are needed to account for
development constraints at the least advantageous or at all centers within a
metropolitan market, to incorporate agglomeration economies or co-location
benefits at production sites, and to examine the effects of differences across
centers in residential benefits or nonproductive amenities to households,
differences in land consumption, congestion externalities, and other
irregularities operating in the land market of urban areas. The following
discussion presents an attempt to speculate on-the impact that the presence of
such complexities in the urban land market may have on the amenity
capitalization process.
The "Location" of Development Constraints
The location of development constraints may greatly affect the relative
space rent and wage capitalization shares. What happens if development
constraints exist--although unlikely--at the least advantageous center? Or,
how would capitalization outcomes differ, if similar institutional rigidities
are assumed to exist at all centers in a metropolitan area?
If development constraints exist at the least advantageous center, then,
given the equilibrium impacts of these constraints, the constrained center's
disadvantage will likely be shifted toward higher space rents and lower wages
at this center. If, on the other hand, all centers in the metropolitan market
are constrained to the same degree, then it is possible that wage differences
between centers will still reflect the major portion of locational value to
the firm.
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Agglomeration Economies
As already mentioned, the results of the theoretical models are largely
dependent on the assumption that no agglomeration benefits exist in the
commercial land market. Agglomeration economies are often omitted in
theoretical studies because of the analytical complexities they introduce, but
they are also often cited as one of the primary reasons for the existence of
cities and the primary driving force for the spatial concentration of economic
activity within their boundaries."'
The likely impact that the introduction of agglomeration effects may
have can formally be addressed by a more refined version of the model.
Agglomeration or external scale economies in aggregate form can easily be
built into the model by introducing appropriate cost functions in the service
market [Sullivan, 1986]. In this case, external scale economies can be
assumed to be dependent on the city's total export output, total square
footage, or total number of workers. In the presence of agglomerative effects
and in the face of a competitive land market, the relative size of a city's
subcenters will jointly be determined by differences in both their exogenous
advantages and agglomeration benefits. As a center grows because of an
exogenous advantage, the center's endogenous benefits will grow as well;
hence, the center's endogenous and exogenous advantages will ultimately work
together to produce large space rent and wage differences over a less
advantageous center. Capitalization, then, may still continue favoring labor
wages rather than space rents.
28/ Alonso's [1964], Mill's [1969], and White's [19761 pioneering work, for
example, does not consider external economic effects at all. A major exception
to this observation includes spatial nonmonoce-ntric models, such as Ogawa's and
Fujita's [1980], where the number and location of centers are determined
endogenously. The explicit consideration of agglomeration effects was necessary
in these analyses to indicate the process through which city centers are formed.
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In a segmented or a regulated market, however, as an advantageous center
shrinks in size, some of its agglomeration benefits are lost, and this, in
turn, may exert a downward pressure on its space rents and labor wages. As a
result, some of the positive effect of a zoning limit or a density regulation
on a center's space rents may be offset due to its decreasing scale of
production. On the contrary, however, the loss in agglomeration benefits will
reinforce the constraint's negative effect on that center's labor wages.
Given the small likelihood that the effect of agglomeration economies will
prevail over the effect of the constraints, the marginal effect of the latter
on space rents will likely remain positive, but definitely be smaller than it
would be in the absence of agglomeration effects.
Co-location Benefits
Agglomeration benefits, on the other hand, may more explicitly be
thought of as emanating out of the interaction between firms. It is often
argued that in the broader context of urban economic activity, the
interdependence of production with such services as banking, insurance, or
marketing becomes increasingly important.
Often termed co-location benefits, benefits from such interactions can
be incorporated into the model by modifying the cost function in the output
market to include the cost incurred to the firm [Clapp, 1983; Tauchen and
Witte, 1984; Sullivan, 1986; Ogawa and Fujita, 19801. In this case, different
firm types linked through production relationships have to be assumed to be
present at the city's centers. The effects of co-location benefits may be
quite similar to the effects of agglomeration economies discussed
above.
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Nonproductive Amenities
Just how the existence of nonproductive amenities to workers interferes
with the capitalization of production amenities by space rents and wages needs
to also formally be addressed. Advantages to workers may derive either out of
the characteristics of the center itself, or the characteristics of its
supporting residential area. The existence of retailing outlets in employment
centers or better transportation facilities, which may be associated with
savings in commuting costs, fall in the first category. Differences in
property tax rates fall in the second category.
In the light of differences in residential benefits across centers,
workers at the most amenable center may be willing to accept lower wages in
exchange for the savings associated with that center's amenities. This would,
in turn, allow firms to spend more on locational rents. An advantage to
workers, therefore, may intervene with the capitalization of firm amenities so
that in the presence of residential benefits, rents may reflect a higher share
of production amenities than that they would in their absence. Simply, then,
both in competitive and constrained or regulated land markets, the higher the
advantage to households at the advantageous center, the higher the share of
that center's production amenity that will be capitalized by space rents and
the lower the amenity share that will be capitalized by labor wages.
Differences in Land Consumption
The role that variations across centers in land consumption play in the
capitalization process provides another debatable issue. Differences in
exogenous residential land consumption may very well lead to different
pricing patterns than those discussed, but again not disqualify the
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conclusions regarding the role that zoning limits or density regulations play
in the capitalization process.
Suppose that the exogenously determined residential land consumption at
a central city center is lower than the exogenous residential land consumption
at a suburban center. In the absence of any advantage difference between
these centers, the central city center would have higher space rents and lower
wages than the suburban center.
If now a production cost advantage is introduced at the more dense,
central city center, both its wages and space rents will rise. As a result,
the space rent differences between the two centers will clearly be reinforced,
while their wage differences will be certainly weakened. The production
amenity in this case may thus be capitalized mostly by space rents rather than
labor wages. It can easily be inferred that if the less dense center is the
more advantageous of the two, labor wages would still capitalize a higher
share of the production amenity than space rents.
Variable Residential Densities
The above discussion sets the stage for elaborating on the effects that
variable instead of fixed residential densities might have on the theoretical
conclusions. Most likely, their effect on the relative capitalization shares
will be most pronounced if advantageous centers are also assumed to present
other amenities, which are positively valued by and thus provide utility to
urban households. In such a case, the households' density and price gradients
will be steeper, favoring thus capitalization shifts away from wages and
toward floor space rents. Yet, in the light of variable residential
densities, the sign of the marginal impact of-any zoning limits or density
regulations imposed on the commercial land market is not likely to be affected.
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Congestion Externalities
Congestion is a pervasive problem at many advantageous urban centers.
Introduced by Mohring [1972], congestion depends on the capacity of highway
facilities and the magnitude of their usage. In the presence of congestion in
the transport market, the cost of commuting is no longer a simple function of
distance from the city center, but both a function of distance and traffic
volumes, which are themselves a function of residential densities. Models
assuming that the latter are endogenous involve a simultaneous determination
of densities and commuting costs. Household equilibrium, then, should reflect
the interdependency between congestion and transport costs and, therefore, the
interplay among congestion, residential densities, and locational rents.
Such an endogeneity complicates theoretical models to the extent that
analytic solutions may become virtually impossible and numerical or simulation
solutions the only viable alternative. The effects that congestion
externalities may have on the operation of urban land markets within
monocentric city settings have first been addressed by Mills [1972] and
Solow [1972, 1973]. Both concluded that the introduction of congestion makes
the rent profile more convex; the rent falls sharply as one leaves the
congested center and less sharply near the limits of the residential area,
where congestion is much less pronounced, if not entirely absent. If this
does ultimately lead to higher rents at the congested center's edges, then, in
a competitive land market, capitalization will favor space rents more than it
does in the absence of congestion.2"
29 If, however, the addition of roads limits congestion and hence transport
costs, the households' rent gradient will be flatter, and capitalization may favor
labor wages more than-it does in the absence of congestion.
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As a constraint, however, either on a center's total land or commercial
density, is introduced, commercial activity is restricted, and congestion
externalities may be less prevalent. The effects of the restricted supply on
space rents will, therefore, be weakened, but still remain positive. In the
presence of local development restrictions and congestion externalities,
capitalization will, then, continue favoring space rents, but less than it
would in the absence of the effects of these constraints on congestion.
Other Complexities
The models have also assumed one-worker households, identical households
and firms, and ignored multiple trips within urban areas. Yet, the growing
tendency for two-worker households, the large amount of travel for purposes
other than commuting to work, and the variety of firm and household types
within metropolitan areas display realities that have to somehow be taken into
account. It seems, however, unlikely that the analytic solution mode is
appropriate to be adopted in all of these cases; simulation techniques may
provide a more feasible alternative for analyzing the impact that some of
these complexities may have on the commercial capitalization process.
1.2 Theoretical Reformulations
The adjustments discussed above basically retain the long run
equilibrium assumption, suggesting thereby the formulation of some variant of
the basic model. Thus, even with such improvements as those just discussed,
the models will not cease representing a static theory of economic
equilibrium.
Suggesting that this in fact may never be achieved, a number of authors
attempted to develop more dynamic models, which recognize the durability,
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locational fixity, and nonmalleability of the built capital [Harisson and
Kain, 1976; Anas, 1978; Wheaton, 1982; Capoza, 1989]. The ability of these
models to explain numerous irregularities observed in real world cities
demonstrates by and large their superiority over their long run equilibrium
counterparts.
Against this background, the theoretical models developed in this
dissertation need to be reformulated to explicitly address the inherently
"disequilibrium" nature of urban growth. A more dynamic approach to
capitalization must account for adjustment or decision lags, transaction costs
or indivisibilities, recognize the durability of capital and its
replaceability for economic reasons, and account for suppliers with
foresight.
Short Vs Long Run Adjustments
Given the adjustment lags in the real estate property market and the
inflexibility of wages in the labor market, one would hypothesize that short-
run capitalization outcomes would not differ from the likely capitalization
outcomes in the face of constrained land markets.
Take, for example, the case where a production cost advantage,
representing an investment in a better transport network, is exogenously
introduced at a particular center. In the presence of such an advantage over
other centers, the advantageous center's wages cannot immediately respond.
Given the increased demand for space at the center, existing landlords can
very well raise their rents, once leases are expired. At maximum, rent
changes may reflect the full amount of the exogenously introduced cost savings
at the center.
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Construction will then begin responding to the increased demand and
prices with a lag, and the increased supply may begin exerting a downward
pressure on prices. This, in turn, will facilitate absorption of commercial
space, and the center will be expanding, exerting thus an upward pressure on
wages. Thus space rents will be falling and wages increasing, and
capitalization will gradually be shifted away from space rents and toward
wages, as long run equilibrium in the market would require.
Thus, at least in the short run, even in a competitive land market,
space rents may potentially capitalize a high share of a center's cost
advantage than wages. Only after a period of time, when supply adjusts and
absorption responds, wages may begin capturing the bulk of the locational
value to the center's firms.
A more dynamic approach, therefore, to capitalization would account for
the path of capitalization outcomes, which may be diametrically different at
different stages of the adjustment process.
Accounting for Redevelopment
What role development restrictions play in the face of durable but
replaceable capital is another question that needs to be addressed in the
context of a more dynamic model. This issue becomes increasingly important as
land scarcities at advantageous locations in many metropolitan markets force
growth to mostly occur through the replacement of existing capital, rather
than through the development of vacant land.
If this is the case, zoning limits at centers that are more susceptible
to redevelopment, i.e., older centers, may play less an important role than
that they play in centers that are for economic reasons less susceptible,
i.e., have more built.capital, are newer, and more dense.
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Developers with Foresight
Lastly, how the incorporation of foresight on the part of the suppliers
of commercial space affects capitalization is another debatable issue. In
anticipation of future improvements at certain locations, land and property
values at these locations may capitalize the value of such advantages before
they are realized. Thus, once in effect, the improvements may appear to have
no effect on prices, or even have less of the expected positive effect if
overbuilding occurs.
Similar arguments may be advanced in the case of zoning restrictions,
density regulations, or growth control moratoria which can easily be
anticipated. In such cases, an increased supply of space may occur, vacancies
may increase, and rents may fall below their equilibrium level. Once in
effect, the restrictions may again appear to have no or less impact on prices,
depending on the degree of oversupply that occurred before they were enacted.
2. The Empirical Research
The empirical part, on the other hand, can be refined with respect to
the quality and precision of required data, extended to address some of the
theoretical propositions (or the assumptions which underlie them) that could
not empirically be addressed because of data constraints, or even extended to
explore such unresolved theoretical questions such as those just discussed.
The Data
First, more precise empirical work requires contract rent data, more
refined quality characteristics of office-commercial properties and floor area
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ratios at the property level, as well as more accurate housing value/rent data
and land availability measures. Housing value/rent indices in place of
average values/rents and a continuous land availability variable in place of
the dummy variables could be used. The 1990 Census along with the more
detailed locational variables likely to be surveyed and the completion of an
inventory of zoned vacant land by the Southern California Association of
Governors may provide a good opportunity to repeat the analysis with more
precise measures.
Subcenter Size
Then, a number of additional hypotheses reflected in the propositions
advanced in the theoretical part of the dissertation could be empirically
addressed: Is the size of commercial centers explained by residential land
prices, locational advantages, or both development restrictions and spatial
amenities? In analyzing size differences, instead of, or in addition to,
using a linear or multiplicative model, a probability or a discrete choice
model could be estimated.
Moreover, given the likelihood that large commercial centers present
substantial endogenous benefits, the predictive ability of a model which
accounts for the simultaneous determination of employment size and rents must
be examined.
Land Price Capitalization
There are a number of additional theoretical questions that could also
empirically be addressed, if consistent and reliable data on both residential
and commercial land prices can be made available.
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The first question draws from the assumptions made in constructing the
empirical models: Is the price of housing a good proxy for residential land
prices? The other directly draw from the propositions advanced in the
theoretical part: Is the price of commercial land explained by residential
land prices? If not, then, does the inclusion of land and/or density
constraints increase the explanatory power of the statistical model? Is the
gap between commercial and residential prices explained by zoning limits, as
the theory suggests?
Wage Capitalization
The empirical study can also be extended to include the examination of
teffective" wage differences across urban centers. To empirically verify the
hypothesized effects that zoning limits, density regulations, or growth
moratoria have on wage differences and make possible the estimation of the
full difference in locational value between centers, wage data at the
subcenter level are needed.
Moreover, the statistical analysis of both wage and space rent
differences in a metropolitan area where tax rates vary may shed more light to
the so far controversial effect of property taxes. In addition, the
estimation of both space rent and wage equations may provide further support
to the "dual" capitalization propositions advanced in this dissertation.
The Industrial Market
The theoretical analysis may also be applied to the case of industrial
land and real estate markets. Given the rather intense competition for land
in the Los Angeles and other metropolitan areas between industrial and
- 172 -
office-commercial uses, it would be interesting to see the extent to which the
prices of office land or commercial space affect the price of industrial
space.
Markets in a Disequilibrium
Finally, the issue of how departures from equilibrium are likely to
affect the results and interpretation of empirical findings needs to be
addressed. Perhaps, capitalization is weaker in softer than in more tight
markets, or, similarly, weaker in periods during which the market is soft as
opposed to periods during which the market is tight. The testing of such a
hypothesis would require the estimation of hedonic models during such
different periods and the comparison of their estimated coefficients. For a
proper analysis of these coefficients, however, data on housing prices and
locational advantages must refer to the specific years hedonic rents are to be
estimated.
2. Final Remarks
The utility of the four models developed in this dissertation does not
lie in their ability to produce results for policy analysis, but rather in
their ability to deductively illustrate how urban nonresidential land markets
work under a variety of supply conditions. Despite their overly unrealistic
assumptions, the clarity of their modeling structure has pointed to the
important effects that government intervention may have on the operation of
land markets and its repercussions on space rent and wage capitalization.
This, in turn, has stimulated meaningful empirical research on commercial rent
capitalization.
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Notably, the model adjustments and empirical refinements or extensions
just outlined provide a number of fruitful directions for further research.
Agglomeration economies and other nonlinearities, such as congestion, may
greatly complicate the modeling of capitalization, but their effect can be
analyzed using more complex variants of the models analyzed in this
dissertation. Yet, as postulated, at least in a long run framework, the
fundamental principles and the essence of capitalization may not substantially
differ under such alternative assumptions.
How exactly, however, capitalization works under a more dynamic growth
model is an issue which calls for an explicit model of short-run, gradual
adjustments in the market. This should simulate the evolutionary process of
urban development and emphasize the importance of history and change to
patterns of urban pricing. Such an approach can, perhaps, better justify long
run capitalization outcomes as the end result of an adjustment process and
give directions on how to empirically address capitalization in markets that
are in disequilibrium.
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APPENDIX I.
The Model Specification
The Appendix describes the general model of the city presented in Part 1
of this dissertation (Figure A-1). It gathers together the demand functions
and the equilibrium conditions in the city's various markets, and presents the
modifications that led to the development of the alternative models in
Chapter III.
FIGURE A-1
A SIMPLIFIED TWO-CENTER CITY
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EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. THE MODEL'S
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
: Utility parameter
: Fixed land consumption
: Annual transport cost/unit
distance
: Distance between centers
: Fixed width of the city
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: Labor coefficient
: Floor space coefficient
: Rental price of capital
: Production function
parameter
: Annual agricultural
land rent/unit land
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: Exogenous wage at Center 2
: Household utility
: Fixed, nonland
consumption
t1,. .,t6 : Area borders
NI,2
Qo
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2
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: Fixed firm output
: Size of Center 1,2 (sq.ft)
: Optimal capital/land ratio
at Center 1,2
: Residential land rents
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2. DEMAND FUNCTIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS
a. The Residential Market
The Objective Function
max U(X, q) = X"*ql~"
subject to:
W1  = X + R(T) + k*(T1 -T) for T0 <T<T
= X + R(T) + k*(T-T2) for T2 <T<T3
W2  = X + R(T) + k*(T 4 -T) for T3<T<T4
= X + R(T) + k*(T-T5 ) for T5<T<T6
The Demand Functions
X = W, - R(T) - k*(T-T2) for T2 <T<T3
X = W2 - R(T) - k*(T4 -T) for T3<T<T4
X = W2 - R(T) - k*(T-T5 ) for T,<T<T,
q(T) = q
Equilibrium Conditions
To Ti T2  T3  T3  T4  T5  T6
U = U = U = U = U = U = U = U = U = X8
C1 C1 C1 C1 C2 C2 C2 C2
Derived conditions:
= W 2 =W1 - k*(ti -t6)
" t,3 - t,, t, - t6
" W, - P,(TI) W2 - P2(T,) = U1'
= PI(TI) = P1 (T 2 ) = Pe + k*t,
= P,(T 3) + k*t 3
*. P2(T4) = P2 (Ts) = R, + k*t 6
= P2(T3) + k*t 4
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b. The Commercial Market
Objective Functions
subject to:
subject to:
The Market for Service Output
min C, = + R1*Qs1 + CE1
Qo = min {N,/a,, Qs,/aj
The Market for Commercial Space
max 1T= R,*Qs,-rK - L1*RL 1
Qs1 = KbL'( 1 b); O<b<l
Demand Functions
All Models
Qs1 = asQo; N,=aQo
Models I and II
1-b
bRL,
(1-b)r
b(1-b)r
bRL,
Models III and IV
KI = c1I1-b*Qs
L = clj-b*QsI.
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a3S
K1 =- N
an
as
Ll = - N
an
Equilibrium Conditions
The Output Market
Qs1  Qs2
W1+R1-- +CEI = W 2+R2-41CE 2
N1  N2
The Labor Market
N1 = Nh+Nh2=(tl+t,)/q
N2 = Nh,+Nh,=(t 4+t,)/q
N1+N2 = Nh =(t 1 +S+t 6 )/q
The Commercial Property Market
i = RQs 3 -RLL,-rK, =0
or:
R,= RLL,+rK /Qs,
The Commercial Land Market
LI = t 2
L2= tS
c. Border Conditions
All Models
P,(T 3 ) = P2 (T3)
P,(TO) = P2 (T6) = PA
t, + t = S
Models I and III
RL = P1(TI) = PI(T 2)
RL2 = P2 (T4 ) = P2(TS)
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APPENDIX II.
Simulation Solutions
The Appendix discusses the model solutions and presents the complete
simulation results. Simulations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 were relied on the
solution of nonlinear equations (i.e., 111.5) for tj or N, through the Newton-
Ramphson iterative method. This is briefly explained below.
1. The Newton-Ramphson Method
The equations to be solved are of the general form of:
F(x) = 0,
If x0 denotes the approximation to the root, r, the latter can be written as
r=x+h. Applying Taylor's theorem, then:
F(r)=F(x+h)=F(x)+hF' (xo)+,/2h2F' ' (x)+...
Assuming that h is small, higher powers of h can be neglected. Therefore:
h=h,=-F(xo)/F'(xo)
The sum x,±h is not the exact root, but it can be taken as a new
approximation, x,, which can likewise be expressed as:
x,=x0=-F(xo)/F'(xo)
Using x, to replace xO, this approximation process can be repeated, until a
required precision is obtained. Starting then with xO, a sequence of x, is
calculated according to the formula:
xn=x, _-F(x, 1)/F'(x-,_) for n>=1
Noting that. F(xnl)/F'(xn_,)=f has no repeated roots, the Newton-Ramphson
process for f can be written as:
xA =xu cn-fr(xn )/f a (xs)
As a result, the quadratic convergence for all roots is:
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Xn = n-1
Figure A-2 portrays this process. For each new iteration the
intersection of the x axis with the tangent line for the current iteration is
used.
FIGURE A-2
The Newton-Ramphson Method:
Graphic Illustration
F(x)
xo x, x. r
The method employed here for obtaining the simulation outpout is just
one of the variations of the process that can effectively be used in BASIC for
the solution of nonlinear equations. Dvorak and Musset [1984] discuss a
number of other variants of the method.
2. Computer Simulation Results
The actual computer simulation outputs are appended. Simulations 1-3
portray the competitive land market (Model I); Simulations 4-6 feature the
segmented land market (Model II); Simulations 7-9 the regulated land market
(Model III); and Simulations 10-12 the segmented and regulated land market
(Model IV).
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1 -wF" (xn_, ) /F' (x-_ )
,1 w=-F(x-_1) /F '(xn_, )
S I M U L A T IO N 1
MODEL I: The Base Case
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, P per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, ., $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, C,, $/worker
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a,, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
: 1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
0.00
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation:
ee C C(Cl+X)1-b-COC3(C+C2-X)1-b+2X-(C 2+CA)=0
where:
X=kt, ; C =r b( (1-b) /b ) b+b/(1-b) 1~b) ))/qq1-b; CI=PA q;
C2=k((0.0015644Nhq)/tw-S); C,=a,/an
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables Center 1 Center 2
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, NJ, N2  : 500,000.00 500,000.00
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W, : 20,000.00
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R,, R2 : 9.85 9.85
Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL, RL2 : 129,385.00 129,385.00
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4 : 129,385.00 129,385.00
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, L2tw : 3.42 3.42
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, cl,, c12  1.42 1.42
4. Other
Area Borders t1, t6  : 24.38 24.38
in Miles t3, t4 : 3.00 3.00
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SIMULAT ION 2
MODEL I: Center 1 Is More Advantageous Than Center 2
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, P per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, A, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Commercial Space per worker, a,/an, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
1,000.00
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation:
CoC3(C+X)1-b-CoC,(C,+C2-X)1-b+2X-(C 2+CA)=0
where:
X=ktl; C -r b( (1-b)/b ) b+b/(1-b 1-b~ ))/ 1q-~; CI=PA q;
C2=k((0.0015644Nhq)/tw-S); C3=a,/an
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables Center 1 Center 2
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, NJ, N2 : 549,108.00 549,108.00
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W1  : 20,941.09
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R1 , R2 : 9.97 9.73
Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RLI, RL2 : 136,107.09 122,692.92
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, L2tw : 3.62 3.22
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, c11, c12  1.49 1.35
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders t1, t6  : 25.72 23.03
in Miles t3, t4 : 4.34 1.66
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S I M U L A T IO N 3
MODEL I: Center 1 Presents A Maximum Advantage Over Center 2
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, P per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, t, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
2,229.00
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation:
COC,(C+X)1-b-COC,(C+C 2 -X)1-b+2X-(C 2+CA)=0
where:
X=ktl; C 0=r b(( 1-b)/b )b+b/(1-b)'-')))/ql-b ; C I=PAq;
C2=k((0.0015644Nhq)/tw-S); C,=a,/an
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables Center 1 Center 2
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, NJ, N : 609,445.00 390.555.00
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W, : 22,097.39
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R,, R2 : 10.11 9.58
Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL,, RL2 : 144,366.36 114,403.65
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4 : 144,366.36 114,403.65
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, L2tw : 3.84 3.94
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, cl1, C12 : 1.58 1.26
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders t1, t6  : 27.37 21.38
in Miles t3, t 4 : 6.00 0.00
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S I M U L A T IO N 4
MODEL II: Center 1 Has No Production Cost Advantage Over
Binding Zoning Limits Are Imposed On Center 1
Center 2
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, P , per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, , $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Center l's zoning limit, rl*tw, in square miles
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a,, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
0.00
1.20
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation:
where: ~ C0C4C6(CX-C3) 1-b/'-CCC6(C,+C2-X) 1-b +2X-(C, +C A)=0where:
X=kt ; C =rb((1-b)/b)b"+(b/(l-b))l~b)); C =P q;C 2 k((0.0015644Nhq)/tw-S)
C3=(0.0015644Nhq)/2tw-S); C4 (((l-b)/b asr )/0.0015644*27866482))arl-
C5=(l/(43593.836qr))1 ~b; C =a,/a.; C7=CA+C 2 ; C9=2/k
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, N,, N2Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W1
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R, R2Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL,, RL2
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Ljtw, L2tw
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, c1l, c12
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders
in Miles
ti, t6t,, t4
Center 1
458,478.00
19,204.28
13.13
451,397.19
123,701.27
4.95
23.24
1.86
Center 2
541,522.00
9.95
135,068.73
135,068.73
3.68
1.48
25.51
4.14
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S I M U L A T IO N 5
MODEL II: Center 1 Has A Production Cost Advantage Over
Binding Zoning Limits Are Imposed On Center 1
Center 2
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, P per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, t, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, C,, $/worker
Center l's zoning limit, rl*tw, in square miles
Commercial Space per worker, a,/an, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
1,000.00
1.20
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation
CoC4C6(CX-C,)-b/b-COCC 6(C+C 2-X)1-b+2X-(C,+C,)=0
X=ktI; C =rb((1-b)/b)b+(b/(1-b))l-b)); C,=Pq;C2 =k((O.0015644Nhq)/tw-S)
C,=(0. 0 015644Nhq)/2tw-S); C4=((((1-b)/bbar b5/0.0015644*27866482))arl1bl/b
C,=(l/(43593.836qr))l-b; C,=a,/a,; C7=CA+C2; C8=2/k
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, N,, N?
Center 1's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W,
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R,, R2Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RLI, RL
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2 , P4
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, L2twOptimum Capital/Land Ratio, c1l, c12
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders
in Miles
t1, t
t3, t 4
Center 1
504,302.00
20,082.44
13.51
510,844.35
129,973.86
5.60
24.49
3.12
Center 2
495,698.00
9.84
128,796.15
128,796.15
3.40
1.41
24.26
2.88
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where:
S I M U L A T IO N 6
MODEL II: Center 1 Has A Production Cost Advantage Over Center 2
Binding Zoning Limits Are Imposed On Center 1; Center 2 Workers Cross-Commute
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, P, per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, t, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Center l's zoning limit, rltw, in square miles
Commercial Space per worker, a,/an, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
0.00
0.04
250.00
7.00
0.77
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, NJ, N2
Cross Commuters
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W1
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R1 , R2Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL,, RL,
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, LItw, L2 tw
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, c1l, c12
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders
in Miles
ti, t 6t,, t 4
Center 1
93,118.00
0.00
17,893.00
22.53
4,718,718.25
114,335.00
51.77
21.37
0.00
Center 2
906,882.00
297,112.00
10.11
144,435.00
144,435.00
5.70
1.58
27.39
6.00
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S I M U L A T IO N 7
MODEL III: Center 1 Has No Production Cost Advantage Over Center 2
Binding Density Limits Are Imposed On Center 1
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, PA, per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, k, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Limit on Center l's Capital/Land Ratio
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a,, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
0.00
0.30
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation:
whr:COC (CI+X) 1-b-0 .5COC,(CI+C2-X) 1-b +2X-(C2+CA)=0
where:
X=kt,; C,=r( ( 1-b)/b)"+b/(1-b) 1-b) ))/q 1~b; C I=P Aq;
C2=k((0.0015644Nhq)/tw-S); C3=a,/a,
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables Center 1 Center 2
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, N,, N2  466,035.00 533,965.00
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W, : 19,349.10
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R,, R2 : 12.54 9.93
Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL, RL2 : 124,735.68 134,034.32
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4 : 124,735.68 134,034.32
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, ktw : 10.56 3.56
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, cl,, c12  1.47
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders t1, t6  : 23.45 25.31
in Miles t,, t 4 2.07 3.93
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S I M U L A T IO N 8
MODEL III: Center 1 Has A Production Cost Advantage Over Center 2
Binding Density Limits Are Imposed On Center 1
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, PA, per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, k, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Limit on Center l's Capital/Land Ratio
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a,, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
1,000.00
0.30
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation:
CoC(C,+X)I-b0 .5COC,(C+C 2-X)1-b+2X-(C 2+CA)=0
where:
X=kt, ; C,=r b( (1-b) /b )b+b/(1-b) 1-b) ))/q-'; C =P,q;
C2=k((0.0015644Nhq)/tw-S); C,=a,/an
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables Center 1 Center 2
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, N,, N2  : 512,029.00 487,971.00
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W, : 20,230.52
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R,, R2 : 12.90 9.82
Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL,, RL2 : 131,031.60 127,738.41
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4 : 131,031.60 127,738.41
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, Ltw : 11.60 3.38
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, cl,, c12  1.40
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders t1, t6 : 24.71 24.05
in Miles t3, t4 : 3.33 2.67
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S I M U L A T IO N 9
MODEL III: Center 1 Has A Production Cost Advantage Over Center 2
Maximum Density Regulation Is Imposed On Center 1
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, PA, per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, k, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1; C., $/worker
Limit on Center l's Capital/Land Ratio
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a,, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
1,000.00
0.08
250.00
7.00
0.77
SOLVING THE SYSTEM THROUGH THE NEWTON-RAMPHSON ITERATIVE METHOD
The Basic Nonlinear Equation:
CoC,(C+X)l-b-0.5CC,(C+C2-X)-b+2X-(C2+CA)=0
where:
X=kt,; C,,=r b( (1-b)/b )b+b/(1-b) 1~b) ))/ql-b; C,=P,,q;
C2=k((0.0015644Nhq)/tw-S); C,=a,/a,
Endogenous Variables Center 1 Center 2
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, N,, N2  : 390,493.00 609,507.00
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W1  : 17,901.41
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R,, R2 : 22.50 10.11
Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL, RL2 : 114,395.09 144,374.92
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4  114,395.09 144,374.92
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, I2tw : 24.84 3.84
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, cl, c12  1.58
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders t1, t6  :- 21.38 27.37
in Miles t,, t4 0.00 6.00
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S I M U L A T IO N 10
MODEL IV: Center 1 Has No Production Cost Advantage Over Center 2
Binding Zoning Limits And Density Regulations Are Imposed On Center 1
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, P,, per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, k, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Center l's zoning limit, rltw, in square miles
Limit on Center l's Capital/Land Ratio
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a,, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
0.00
1.20
4.20
250.00
7.00
0.77
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, NJ, N2Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W,
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R,, R2Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL, RL2Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, L1tw, L2tw
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, c11 , c12
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders
in Miles
ti, t6
t3, t4
Center 1
403,855.00
18,157.48
17.45
1,014,569.45
116,224.17
21.74
0.37
Center 2
596,045.00
10.08
14Z,545.83
142,545.83
3.80
1.56
27.01
5.63
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S I M U L A T IO N 11
MODEL IV: Center 1 Has A Production Cost Advantage Over Center 2
Binding Zoning Limits And Density Regulations Are Imposed On Center 1
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, PA, per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, k, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Center l's zoning limit, rltw, in square miles
Limit on Center 1 s Capital/Land Ratio
Commercial Space per worker, a,/a,, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
1,000.00
1.20
4.20
250.00
7.00
0.77
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, NJ, N2
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W1
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R1, R2Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RLI, RL2Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Lltw, Iktw
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, c1l, c12
Center 1
403,855.00
18,157.48
21.45
1,451,055.64
116,224.17
Center 2
596,145.00
10.08
142,545.83
142,545.83
3.80
1.56
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders
in Miles
ti, t6
t,, t4
21.74
0.37
27.01
5.63
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S I M U L A T IO N 12
MODEL IV: Center 1 Has A Production Cost Advantage Over Center 2
Binding Zoning Limits And Density Regulations Are Imposed On Center 1
Center 2 Workers Cross-Commute
VALUES OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
1. General Characteristics of the City
Number of Households, Nh
City Width, tw, in miles
Distance between the Subcenters' Inner Edges, S, in miles
2. Household Equilibrium
Household Utility Parameter, a
Household Land Consumption, q, in acres
Annual Agricultural Land Rent, PA, per acre
Annual Transport Cost per mile, k, $
Exogenous Wage at Center 2
3. Firm equilibrium
Production Cost Advantage at Center 1, CA, $/worker
Center l's zoning limit, rl*tw, in square miles
Limit on Center l's Capital/Land Ratio
Commercial Space per worker, a,/an, sq.ft/worker
Rental Price of capital, r, $/sq.ft
Production Function Parameter, b
1,000,000.00
2.00
6.00
0.50
0.07
7,500.00
350.00
20,000.00
1,000.00
1.20
3.00
250.00
7.00
0.77
DERIVED VALUES OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
Endogenous Variables
1. Center Employment and Wages
Center Employment, NJ, N2
Cross Commuters
Center l's Annual Equilibrium Wage, W1
2. Land and Space Rents
Annual Commercial Space Rents/sq.ft, R, R2Annual Commercial Land Rents/acre, RL,, RL 2
Annual Residential Land Rents/acre at T2, T4
3. Center Development Characteristics
Optimum Commercial Land Area, Litw, Ltw
Optimum Capital/Land Ratio, c11, c12
4. Border Solutions
Area Borders
in Miles
ti, t6
t,, t4
Center 1
311,678.00
17,690.00
23.37
1,458,396.82
112,885.00
21.08
Center 2
688,322.00
73,261.00
10.13
145,885.00
145,885.00
4.30
1.60
27.68
6.00
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APPENDIX III.
Estimating "Effective" Subcenter Rents:
Semilogarithmic Equations
The Appendix presents the coefficients of the semilogarithmic hedonic
equations used to estimate effective space rents across office subcenters.
The t-statistics of the estimated parameters are listed in parentheses below
the coefficients.
I. Los Angeles County
1. Downtown
Independent
Variables:"' (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Downtown -1168.40 154.74 1.26 4.49 5.29 -2.49 - - - 2.57- 0.81 4.15
(-6.11) (+6.10) (+1.97) (+6.44) (+1.93) (-2.49) - - - (+1.38) (+0.39) (+2.21)
N R2  R2
72 0.75 0.72
2. Hollywood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Hollywood -1964.53 261.32 -0.13 2.80 -0.11 -0.28 682.44 -1.67 -90.55 -0.52 - -0.96
(-3.32) (+3.36) (-0.23) (5.01) (-0.07) (-0.39) (+1.10) (-2.04) (-1.10) (-0.75) - (-0.92)
Westwood -1964.53 261.32 -0.13 2.80 -0.11 -0.28 - - - -0.52 - -0.96
(-3.32) (+3.36) (-0.23) (5.01) (-0.07) (-0.39) - - - -0.75 - (-0.92)
N R2  R2
61 0.93 0.92
"' (1) Constant; (2) Year; (3) Areafl; (4) Height; (5) Range; (6) Range*Floor; (7) Loc; (8) Loc*Height;
(9) Loc*Year; (10) Gross; (11) Netax: (12) Unknown Type
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3. Glendale/Pasadena
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Glendale -657.24 87.99 1.06 2.42 2.14 -1.29 -1238.08 1.41 162.83 -0.30 - -0.26
(-2.07) (+2.09) (1.46) (2.58) (+0.99) (-1.21) (-2.21) (+1.43) (+2.20) (-0.23) - (-0.19)
Pasadena -657.24 87.99 1.06 2.42 2.14 -1.29 - - - -0.30 - -0.26
(-2.07) (+2.09) (1.46) (2.58) (+0.99) (-1.21) - - - (-0.23) - (-0.19)
N R2  R2
58 0.57 0.48
4. San Fernando Valley
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Burbank 251.97 -32.70 1.15 2.90 0.30 -0.81 - - - 7.02 4.79 6.85
(0.80) (-0.79) (+3.58) (5.28) (+0.44) (-1.96) - - - (+6.55) (+4.05) (+5.99)
Van Nuys 251.97 -32.70 1.15 2.90 0.30 -0.81 -1692.78 -0.12 223.13 7.02 4.79 6.85
(0.80) (-0.79) (3.58) (5.28) (+0.44) (-1.96) (-3.20) (-0.19) (+3.20) (+6.55) (+4.05) (+5.99)
Canoga 251.97 -32.70 1.15 2.90 0.30 -0.81 -467.28 0.12 61.68 7.02 4.79 6.85
Park (0.80) (-0.79) (3.58) (5.28) (+0.44) (-1.96) (-0.66) (+0.21) (+0.66) (+6.55) (+4.05) (+5.99)
Westlake 251.97 -32.70 1.15 2.90 0.30 -0.81 1199.98 0.75 -158.23 7.02 4.79 6.85
Village (0.80) (-0.79) (3.58) (5.28) (+0.44) (-1.96) (+0.77) (+0.29 (-0.77) (+6.55) (+4.05) (+5.99)
N R2  R2
169 0.69 0.65
5. San Gabriel Valley
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Covina/ -4816.56 636.25 -1.12 3.75 -2.13 - - - - 4.12 2.15 2.72
Glendora (-5.15) (+5.17) (-2.59) (+3.48) (-3.63) - - - - (+3.68) (+1.78) (+2.32)
Pomona/ -4816.56 636.25 -1.12 3.75 -2.13 - 4185.01 -10.34 -549.88 4.12 2.15 2.72
La Verne (-5.15) (+5.17) (-2.59) (+3.48) (-3.63) - (+4.24) (-6.52) (-4.24) (+3.68) (+1.78) (+2.32)
Rancho -4816.56 636.25 -1.12 3.75 -2.13 - 9398.05 0.68 -1237.79 4.12 2.15 2.72
Cucamonga (-5.15) (+5.17) (-2.59) (+3.48) (-3.63) - (+2.23) (+0.44) (-2.23) (+3.68) (+1.78) (+2.32)
N R2  R2
45 0.80 0.71
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6. South Bay Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lax -2722.45 360.63 -0.08 -1.89 -1.56 0.63 - - - 5.13 2.24 3.89
(-4.29) (+4.32) (-0.22) (-2.74) (-1.96) (+1.33 - - - (+4.29) (+1.81) (+2.41)
Torrance -2722.45 360.63 -0.08 -1.89 -1.56 0.63 1543.35 3.52 -203.88 5.13 2.24 3.89
(-4.29) (+4.32) (-0.22) (-2.74) (-1.96) (+1.33' (+1.66) (+4.34) (-1.66) (+4.29) (+1.81) (+2.41)
Long Beach -2722.45 360.63 -0.08 -1.89 -1.56 0.63 -100.58 4.07 12.48 5.13 2.24 3.89
(-4.29) (+4.32) (-0.22) (-2.74) (-1.96) (+1.33) (-0.14) (+5.23) (+0.14) (+4.29) (+1.81) (+2.41)
N R2  ]2
140 0.68 0.64
7. West Los Angeles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Beverly -1094.10 145.78 1.46 2.59 -1.70 0.65 -(488.81 -2.80 196.99 1.94 1.73 1.08
Hills (-1.07) (+1.08) (+5.19) (+4.90) (-2.04) (+1.40' (-1.39) (-4.12) (+1.39) (+1.56) (+1.37) (+0.79)
Century -1094.10 145.78 1.46 2.59 -1.70 0.65 -1150.47 -1.87 152.02 1.94 1.73 1.08
City (-1.07) (+1.08) (+5.19) (+4.90) (-2.04) (+1.401 (-0.80) (-2.41) (+0.81) (+1.56) (+1.37) (+0.79)
Culver -1094.10 145.78 1.46 2.59 -1.70 0.65 -2892.59 0.24 380.51 1.94 1.73 1.08
(-1.07) (+1.08) (+5.19) (+4.90) (-2.04) (+1.40? (-1.42) (+0.23) (+1.42) (+1.56) (+1.37) (+0.79)
Santa -1094.10 145.78 1.46 2.59 -1.70 0.65 -2316.49 30.00 304.79 1.94 1.73 1.08
Monica (-1.07) (+1.08) (+5.19) (+4.90) (-2.04) (+1.40) (-1.83) (+2.51) (+1.83) (+1.56) (+1.37) (+0.79)
Venice -1094.10 145.78 1.46 2.59 -1.70 0.65 2466.72 -1.16 -325.11 1.94 1.73 1.08
(-1.07) (+1.08) (+5.19) (+4.90) (-2.04) (+1.40) (1.39) (-1.01) (-1.39) (+1.56) (+1.37) (+0.79)
N R2  R2
220 0.78 0.75
8. Wilshire District
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Mid -2031.84 269.63 1.42 0.85 -0.10 0.25 1931.63 0.23 -255.14 -1.32 - -2.02
Wilshire (-4.86) (+4.89) (+2.90) (+0.97) (-0.07) (+0.36/ (+3.79) (+0.30) (-3.80) (-1.38) - (-1.68)
Park/ -2031.84 269.63 1.42 0.85 -0.10 0.25 - - - -1.32 - -2.02
Miracle (-4.86) (+4.89) (+2.90) (+0.97) (-0.07) (+0.36' - - - (-1.38) - (-1.68)
Mile
N R2  R2
83 0.63 0.58
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II. Orange County
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. North County
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) '4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Brea/ -6722.36 885.96 1.76 2.73 0.96 - - - - 1.69 - 1.08
La Habra (-5.05) (+5.05) (+3.65) (+2.30) (+0.83) - - - - (+1.54) - (+0.84)
N R
2  
R
2
18 0.85 0.77
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Central County Area
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) '4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Orange -3954.13 522.38 -0.12 1.43 -0.52 -0.10 - - - 3.36 2.02 1.41
(-7.66) (+7.68) (-0.52) (+4.39) (-0.92) (-0.31) - - - (+4.62) (+2.38) (+1.75)
Anaheim -3954.13 522.38 -0.12 1.43 -0.52 -0.10 2022.95 1.27 -266.79 3.36 2.02 1.41
(-7.66) (+7.68) (-0.52) (+4.39) (-0.92) (-0.31) (+3.54) (+2.86) (-3.55) (+4.62) (+2.38) (+1.75)
Santa Ana -3954.13 522.38 -0.12 1.43 -0.52 -0.10 1528.04 -0.86 -201.19 3.36 2.02 1.41
(-7.66) (+7.68) (-0.52) (+4.39) (-0.92) (-0.31) (+2.61) (-2.44) (-2.60) (+4.62) (+2.38) (+1.75)
N R
2  
R
2
140 0.79 0.76
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Airport Area
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) "4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Irvine -1336.43 177.68 -0.22 2.11 -0.30 -0.52 - - - 3.25 0.48 1.36
(-4.30) (+4.34) (-1.05) (+7.12) (-0.51) (-1.37) - - - (+6.28) (+0.69) (+2.18)
Costa -1336.43 177.68 -0.22 2.11 -0.30 -0.52 -4589.99 -0.97 604.62 3.25 0.48 1.36
Mesa (-4.30) (+4.34) (-1.05) (+7.12) (-0.51) (-1.37) (-3.24) (-1.74) (+3.24) (+6.28) (+0.69) (+2.18)
N R
2  
R
2
228 0.64 0.63
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
4. West County
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) '4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Huntington -2902.18 383.22 1.09 2.99 -1.87 - - - - 2.46 - -
Beach (-1.57) (+1.57) (+1.17) (+3.05) (-1.74) - - - - (+1.56) - -
N R
2  2
25 0.74 0.67
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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5. Newport Beach
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Newport -2447.34 324.44 0.37 2.31 -0.08 - - - - 0.93 - 1.17
Beach (-3.15) (+3.16) (+0.53) (+5.28) (-0.14) - - - - (+1.06) - (+0.73)
N R
2  R
2
39 0.70 0.65
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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III. Riverside County
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Riverside -532.61 71.38 -0.06 3.74 0.05 - - - - 1.27 - 0.67
(-2.66) (+2.71) (-0.23) (+9.78) (+0.09) - - - - (+1.25) - (+0.84)
N R2  R2
74 0.62 0.59
IV. San Bernandino County
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
San -677.14 89.80 1.51 2.14 1.07 -2.02 - - - 1.90 -1.40 2.91
Bernandino (-2.62) (+2.64) (+5.74) (+4.32) (+1.74) (-3.12) - - - (+2.03) (-1.37) (+3.25)
N R2  R2
59 0.74 0.70
V. Ventura County
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ventura -1577.26 209.02 0.79 2.80 -0.66 - - - - - - -
(-2.66) (+2.67) (+2.92) (+4.66) (-1.08) - - - - - - -
N R2  R2
26 0.65 0.59
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